North Carolina Alliance v. U.S. Dept. of Transp.
| Decision Date | 13 April 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:99CV00134.,1:99CV00134. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina |
| Parties | NORTH CAROLINA ALLIANCE FOR TRANSPORTATION REFORM, INC.; and Friends of Forsyth County, an unincorporated association; Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; Rodney E. Slater, Secretary of United States Department of Transportation; Federal Highway Administration; Kenneth R. Wykle, Administrator, Federal Highway Administration; Nicholas L. Graf, Division Administrator, Federal Highway Administration; North Carolina Department of Transportation; and E. Norris Tolson, Secretary, North Carolina Department of Transportation; Defendants. |
Marsh Smith, Cunningham, Dedmond, Petersen & Smith, Southern Pines, NC, Bruce J. Terris, Sarah A. Adams, Demian A. Schane, Terris Pravlik & Millian, LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.
Gill P. Beck, Office of U.S. Attorney, Greensboro, NC, Elizabeth Leonard McKay, N.C. Department of Justice, Raleigh, NC, for Defendants.
This action began on February 18, 1999, when Plaintiffs, North Carolina Alliance for Transportation Reform and Friends of Forsyth County, filed a complaint alleging that the construction of the Western Section of the Winston-Salem Beltway (the "Winston-Salem Bypass") violated the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq., and the North Carolina Environmental Policy Act ("NCEPA"), North Carolina General Statutes Art. 1, Ch. 113-A. On June 21, 1999, the parties filed a joint motion for an order of dismissal. The court entered an order of dismissal on June 29, 1999. Thereafter, on August 27, 1999, Plaintiffs filed a motion for attorney's fees and expenses, along with a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rules 60(b)(1) and 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On March 23, 2000, a hearing was held on Plaintiffs' motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rules 60(b)(1) and 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the following reasons, as well as the reasons stated in open court, Plaintiffs' motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) will be granted.
On February 18, 1999, Plaintiffs filed a complaint, as well as a motion for both a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs alleged that the construction of the Winston-Salem Bypass violated the NEPA and the NCEPA. On June 21, 1999, the parties filed a joint motion for an order of dismissal. The court entered an order of dismissal on June 29, 1999.
On July 8, 1999, Plaintiffs' counsel spoke with counsel representing the Federal Defendants regarding Plaintiffs' request for attorney's fees and expenses. On July 9, 1999, Plaintiffs' counsel spoke with counsel representing the State Defendants regarding Plaintiffs' request for attorney's fees and expenses. Each of the Defendants requested a written statement from Plaintiffs' counsel concerning Plaintiffs' request for attorney's fees and expenses. Plaintiffs' counsel complied with these requests in separate letters dated July 14, 1999. In the letter to counsel for the Federal Defendants, Plaintiffs' counsel wrote, in relevant part, In the letter to the State Defendants, Plaintiffs' counsel wrote, in relevant part,
On August 2 and 3, the Federal and State Defendants notified Plaintiffs that they would not agree to the payment of any attorney's fees or expenses in this matter. On approximately August 5, 1999, counsel for Plaintiffs began research in preparation for drafting Plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees and expenses. During this preliminary research, Plaintiffs' counsel discovered that he may have been mistaken in assuming that the time limit set forth in Local Rule 54.2, rather than the time limit set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B), governed the Plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees and expenses in this matter.1 By the time of Plaintiffs' counsel's discovery, the thirty-day time period set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) had expired. On August 27, 1999, fifty-nine (59) days after the date of judgment, Plaintiffs filed a motion for attorney's fees and expenses, along with a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rules 60(b)(1) and 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The circumstances under which a party to a case brought by or against the United States may recover costs and attorney's fees are set forth in the Equal Access to Justice Act (the "EAJA"). See 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Section 2412(d)(1)(A) provides that a prevailing party other than the United States shall recover attorney's fees and other expenses, unless the court finds that the government's case was substantially justified or unless special circumstances make an award of fees unjust. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The EAJA further provides, in relevant part:
A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within thirty days of final judgment in the action, submit to the court an application for fees and other expenses which shows that the party is a prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award under this subsection ....
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). The Federal Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' motion for fees and expenses pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) is time-barred because it was not filed within thirty days of the final judgment in this action as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B).2
Plaintiffs argue they are entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(1) or, in the alternative, 60(b)(6), because in seeking to comply with Local Rule 54.2 they ran afoul of the time limit set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Rule 60(b)(6) allows a court to relieve a party from a final judgment or order for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6). According to the Fourth Circuit, Rule 60(b)(6) is:
[T]he `catch-all' clause because it provides the court with `a grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a particular case' and `vests power in courts adequate to enable them to vacate judgments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice' where relief might not be available under any other clause in 60(b).
Eberhardt v. Integrated Design & Constr., Inc., 167 F.3d 861, 872 (4th Cir.1999) (quoting Compton v. Alton Steamship Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 96, 106-07 (4th Cir.1979)). Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit has held the remedy provided by Rule 60(b) is to be invoked only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances. See Compton, 608 F.2d at 102.
In this case, the Federal Defendants were not prejudiced by Plaintiffs' allegedly untimely filing. As early as July 8, 1999, and no later than July 14, 1999, the Federal Defendants were aware that the Plaintiffs were relying on the sixty-day limit set forth in Local Rule 54.2. Unaware of the conflict between Local Rule 54.2 and the time limit set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B), the Federal Defendants remained silent. Furthermore, because the timeliness of Plaintiffs' motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) is not an issue in this matter, there will be no adverse impact on this court or its resources by permitting Plaintiffs' motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) to be heard as it would have been had Plaintiffs complied with the time limit set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Finally, there is no indication that Plaintiffs' counsel deliberately disregarded the time limit set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). The Plaintiffs did exactly what Local Rule 54.2 requires and attempted to reach agreement with the opposing parties before filing a fee petition.
The lack of prejudice to the Federal Defendants, the minimal extent of delay, and the lack of impact on the court or its resources, when coupled with the fact that the confusion over the governing time limit was the product of a mutual mistake by the parties, amount to exceptional circumstances which compel the conclusion that, in the interests of justice, the court's order of June 29, 1999, should be vacated and reentered as of March 23, 2000. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' application for attorney's fees and expenses pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) is properly before the court for further proceedings.3
Even if the Plaintiffs were not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b), the court would deem Plaintiffs' application for attorney's fees and expenses under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) timely filed. Although the limitations period set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) has been held by several circuit courts of appeal to be jurisdictional, thereby precluding equitable extension of the thirty-day filing period, see, e.g., Myers v. Sullivan, 916 F.2d 659, 666 (11th Cir. 1990), and Clifton v. Heckler, 755 F.2d 1138, 1144-45 (5th Cir.1985), neither the Supreme Court nor the Fourth Circuit has specifically addressed whether equitable principles can apply to the time limit set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that the time limitation in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) is not per se immune from equitable considerations. See Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990); United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 350-53, 117 S.Ct. 849, 136 L.Ed.2d 818 (1997); United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 48-49, 118 S.Ct. 1862, 141 L.Ed.2d 32 (1998).
In Irwin, the Supreme Court considered whether the statutory time limitation applicable to employment...
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N.C. Alliance for Transp. Reform v. D.O.T.
...court concluded that the motion is properly before the court for consideration. See North Carolina Alliance for Transp. Reform, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Transp., 104 F.Supp.2d 599 (M.D.N.C.2000). Plaintiffs seek attorney's fees and expenses from Federal Defendants under Sections 2412(......