North River Ins. Co. v. Corsicana Warehouse Co.
Decision Date | 03 February 1926 |
Docket Number | (No. 6919.)<SMALL><SUP>*</SUP></SMALL> |
Citation | 281 S.W. 217 |
Parties | NORTH RIVER INS. CO. v. CORSICANA WAREHOUSE CO. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Action by the Corsicana Warehouse Company against the North River Insurance Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reformed and affirmed.
Prince & Taylor, of Corsicana, and Thompson, Knight, Baker & Harris and Pinkney Grissom, all of Dallas, for plaintiff in error.
Richard Mays, of Corsicana, for defendant in error.
Appellee sued appellant upon a policy of fire insurance for $4,000 covering a cotton warehouse in Corsicana. The case was tried to the court, and judgment was rendered for appellant for the full amount of the policy. The writ of error is to review this judgment. The parties will be designated appellant and appellee.
The contentions in the case are substantially as follows:
Appellant contends (1) that the evidence conclusively shows that it is entitled to have the policy corrected on the ground of mutual mistake and to have attached thereto a rider known as "Distribution Average Clause," which would make the liability under the policy and the loss sustained amount to $1,135.98; and (2) that no recovery can be had because there was no proof of loss as required by the policy.
Appellee contends that there was a settlement and adjustment of the loss for the full amount of the policy, subsequently to the fire.
The facts pertinent to the issues thus raised are in substance the following: The warehouse in question was a one-story brick building about 250 feet square, divided into five compartments each 50 feet in width and separated by fireproof partition walls. There was no difference in the value of the separate compartments, except that each of the end compartments was charged with the entire outer wall and one-half of a partition wall; whereas, the interior compartments were each charged with one-half of the partition wall on either side, amounting, of course, to one partition wall chargeable to each interior compartment as against a wall and a half charged to the end compartments.
Under the rules of the state fire insurance commission, the building came within a classification which required that blanket policies written thereon should contain what is denominated the "Distribution Average Clause," the effect of which was that the total amount insured by the policy should be distributed among the several divisions of the building in the proportion that the value of each subdivision thereof should bear to the aggregate value of the entire subject insured. At the time of the fire, appellee held altogether $12,000 insurance on the property, which was distributed between four companies, including appellant; the other policies being one for $4,000 and two for $2,000 each. Each of the other policies had attached to it a rider containing the distribution average clause, but no such rider was attached to the policy in suit. The evidence in this regard is without contradiction and is embraced in the following finding of the trial court:
The fire occurred on October 13, 1922, and shortly thereafter one Cole, a representative of the Bates Adjustment Company, went to Corsicana for the purpose of adjusting the loss. He represented each of the four companies involved. The fire did considerable damage to one of the end compartments, designated compartment E, and there was a small damage to the adjoining compartment D. Appellee and the adjuster each had a contractor to estimate the damage. That of the former placed the amount at $10,590; whereas, the latter's placed the amount at $7,896. After some negotiation, the amount of the loss was finally adjusted at $6,271.94. This figure was arrived at by the following method: The adjuster's contractor placed the value of the entire building at $42,206.77, that of the two end compartments at $9,158.54 each, and that of the interior compartments at $7,963.23 each. He estimated the damage to the partition wall between compartments D and E at $1,000, whereas appellee's contractor estimated this damage at $776.75, or 25 per cent. of $3,107, his entire valuation on the wall. The damage to compartment D, other than that to the partition, was evidently inconsequential and was placed at $36. The agreed amount of damage to this compartment was $536, which was arrived at by taking one-half of the highest estimate of damage to the wall and adding the $36 damage. Under the proportionate values of the several compartments above the insurance on compartment E applying the distribution average clause was $216.99+ per $1,000 of the face of the policies. The court found the value of the entire building to be $60,000, but this finding would not benefit appellee in any way under the distribution average clause, since the valuation of the partition wall by the adjuster's contractor was higher than that of appellee's; and therefore placing a greater valuation on the entire building would lessen the difference in the proportionate values of the external and internal compartments. It will thus be seen that the total amount recoverable in any event under the three concurrent policies on compartment E was $1,735.94 and on compartment D under all the policies $536. To this was added $4,000, the full face of appellant's policy; thus making in all $6,271.96. There was no theory under which appellee could recover more than this aggregate amount, which all agreed was much less than the actual loss.
There was conflict in the testimony between the adjuster on the one side, and the president and manager of appellee on the other, as to whether the adjuster agreed that appellant would pay the full amount of its policy. The trial court found the agreement was made as appellee contends; but the question becomes unimportant in the light of the other conclusions we have reached. The $2,271.94 was subsequently paid by the other companies. However, in forwarding the proof of loss before payment, the letter of transmittal contained the following clause:
These proofs were executed and payment was made accordingly. Mr. Gibson, the president of appellee company, testified that he held up these proofs for a little while, "because I didn't want to make any mistake, and I finally accepted the others as having to do so."
With reference to the proof of loss, it is quite clear that this was waived by appellant. The evidence shows an agreed amount of loss for the...
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