North Shore Vocational Regional School Dist. v. City of Salem
| Decision Date | 20 November 1984 |
| Citation | 393 Mass. 354,471 N.E.2d 104 |
| Parties | , 21 Ed. Law Rep. 666 NORTH SHORE VOCATIONAL REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT v. CITY OF SALEM. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Mary P. Harrington, Asst. City Sol., for defendant.
Peter J. McCue, Boston (Philip M. Cronin, Boston, with him), for plaintiff.
Before WILKINS, LIACOS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and O'CONNOR, JJ.
North Shore Vocational Regional School District (district) filed a complaint against the city of Salem (city) in the Superior Court under G.L. c. 231A, seeking a declaration that the city was required to appropriate and pay to the district the amount certified to the city by the district treasurer as the city's share of the maintenance and operation costs of the North Shore Vocational Regional High School during the district's fiscal 1982. After hearing the parties on a statement of agreed facts, a judge entered a judgment declaring that the city is obligated under St.1972, c.545, § 8, to "appropriate or pay from available funds the entire amount certified to it by the treasurer of the North Shore Vocational Regional School District." The judge ordered the city to "forthwith appropriate or pay to the District the sum of $77,646.00, with interest." We interpret "appropriate or pay" to mean "appropriate and pay." No contrary contention has been made by either party. The city appealed, and the district, disagreeing with part of the judge's reasoning, cross-appealed. We transferred the case from the Appeals Court to this court on our own motion. Although we disagree with that part of the judge's reasoning that is challenged by the district, and agree with the district's reasoning, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
We summarize the facts. The district was created pursuant to St.1972, c.545, by fifteen municipalities, including the city, accepting that statute and entering into an agreement as provided therein. The district operates the North Shore Vocational Regional High School located in Beverly. In keeping with the agreement, on January 22, 1981, the district school committee adopted an operating and maintenance budget for fiscal 1982, which commenced on July 1, 1981. The budget was in the aggregate amount of $1,660,912. Also pursuant to the agreement, the budget amount was apportioned among the member municipalities in accordance with the number of students from each municipality enrolled at the school on October 1, 1980, and by letter dated January 29, 1981, the district treasurer certified to each member municipality the portion of the budget for which it was responsible. The city's certified share was $271,751. In August, 1981, the district school committee reduced the budget by $2,545, and the district treasurer recertified the city's share for fiscal 1982 to be $271,342. The city's certified share for fiscal 1981 had been $233,369.
On June 17, 1981, the city appropriated and thereafter paid $193,696 for the support of the regional school for fiscal 1982, which was $77,646 less than the amount certified to it by the district treasurer and 17% less than the city had appropriated for the support of the regional school for the district's fiscal 1981. The city's total budget for its fiscal 1982 also was reduced by 17% from its fiscal 1981 budget. The over-all reduction was required if the city was to comply with St.1980, c.580, commonly known as Proposition 2 1/2. In reliance on sections 7 and 12 of that act, the city advised the district that the city would not make any payments in excess of the $193,696 that it had appropriated for the district's fiscal 1982, and it has not done so.
Statute 1972, c.545, was a special act of the Legislature enabling the district to come into existence. St.1972, c.545, § 8, which is set forth in full in the margin, 1 authorized the district school committee to apportion its costs of maintenance and operation among its member municipalities in accordance with the municipalities' agreement. Such an agreement is a prerequisite to membership in the district. St.1972, c.545, §§ 3 and 5. The agreement provided that those costs would be apportioned among the member municipalities on the basis of their respective pupil enrollment in the regional school. The statute provides that the apportioned amounts shall be certified by the district treasurer to the treasurers of the several municipalities, that "[e]ach municipality shall appropriate the amounts so certified" and that the "city or town treasurer ... shall pay the amount so appropriated ... to said district at the time or times specified in the agreement." Id. at § 8.
Statute 1980, c.580, known as Proposition 2 1/2, enacted by the people through the initiative process, limits State and local taxation and expenditures. Section 7 of that statute amended G.L. c. 71, by striking out § 34 of c. 71, and inserting in its place the following: (emphasis added). Subsequent amendments to G.L. c. 71, § 34, are irrelevant to this case.
Statute 1980, c. 580, § 12, amended G.L. c. 59 by adding § 20A, to provide in relevant part: "No county, district, public authority or other governmental entity authorized by law to assess costs, charges or fees upon cities or towns may increase the total of such costs, charges or fees with respect to any city or town in any fiscal year by more than four percent over the total of such costs, charges or fees for such city or town for the preceding fiscal year." General Laws c. 59, § 20A, as appearing in St.1981, c.782, § 9, provides: "No county, district, including the metropolitan district commission, public authority, the commonwealth or other governmental entity authorized by law to assess costs, charges or fees upon cities and towns, except regional school districts, may increase the total of such costs, charges or fees by more than the sum of: (1) two and one-half per cent of the total of such costs, charges or fees over the preceding fiscal year; and (2) any increases in costs, charges or fees for services customarily provided locally or for services subscribed to at local option" (emphasis added). 2 As a result of St.1981, c.782, § 9, which became effective January 14, 1982, it is clear that after fiscal 1982, G.L. c. 59, § 20A, has not imposed a cap on the amount that the district may certify to a municipality as its share of the district's costs. However, no contention is made that the present controversy involving fiscal 1982, which commenced July 1, 1981, is controlled by St.1981, c.782, § 9.
The city contends that St.1980, c.580 (Proposition 2 1/2), §§ 7 and 12, impliedly repeal St.1972, c.545, § 8. It first argues that G.L. c. 71, § 34, as appearing in St.1980, c.580, § 7, limits the amount of money a city or town must provide for the support of public schools to the amount appropriated for that purpose by vote of the legislative body of that city or town. Arguing that the regional school is a public school, which, no doubt it is, the city concludes that it cannot be required to contribute more to the district than the amount its city council appropriated for that purpose. We reject the city's argument, as did the judge in the Superior Court. General Laws c. 71, § 34, by its terms provides for support of public schools "as required by [c. 71]," with the proviso that the amount of support necessary for that purpose shall be within the discretion of municipal legislative bodies. General Laws c. 71 does not require support for the regional school in question, and therefore the proviso in § 34 does not relate to the city's obligation to support it. Support for the district school is required only by the special act that gave it its existence, St.1972, c.545, and by the agreement the district members entered into pursuant to that act.
Well recognized principles of statutory construction also defeat...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Town of Dartmouth v. Greater New Bedford Reg'l Vocational Technical High Sch. Dist., SJC–10838.
...earlier statute will be construed as remaining in effect as an exception to the general statute.” North Shore Vocational Regional Sch. Dist. v. Salem, 393 Mass. 354, 359, 471 N.E.2d 104 (1984). See Haffner v. Director of Pub. Safety of Lawrence, 329 Mass. 709, 714, 110 N.E.2d 369 (1953), qu......
-
Barlow v. Town of Wareham
...later enactment that both cannot stand, then the former is not deemed to have been repealed." North Shore Vocational Regional School Dist. v. Salem, 393 Mass. 354, 358, 471 N.E.2d 104 (1984), quoting Commonwealth v. Hayes, 372 Mass. 505, 511, 362 N.E.2d 905 In addition, our observation in B......
-
Com. v. Hudson
...Chernick v. Chief Admin. Justice of the Trial Court, 395 Mass. 484, 487, 480 N.E.2d 639 (1985); North Shore Vocational Regional School Dist. v. Salem, 393 Mass. 354, 358, 471 N.E.2d 104 (1984); Boston v. Board of Educ., 392 Mass. 788, 792, 467 N.E.2d 1318 (1984). "The fact that two statutes......
-
Town of Concord v. Water Dep't of Littleton
...effect as an exception to the general statute." Dartmouth, supra at 375, 961 N.E.2d 83, quoting North Shore Vocational Regional Sch. Dist. v. Salem, 393 Mass. 354, 359, 471 N.E.2d 104 (1984).2. Scope of the WMA. It is clear from the statutory text that the WMA is comprehensive as it relates......