Northampton Cnty. & Va. Ass'n of Counties Grp. Self-Insurance v. Somers, Record No. 0542-15-4
| Decision Date | 20 October 2015 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 0542-15-4 |
| Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
| Parties | NORTHAMPTON COUNTY AND VIRGINIA ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES GROUP SELF-INSURANCE v. MARK SOMERS |
UNPUBLISHED
Present: Judges Humphreys, Russell and AtLee
Argued at Fredericksburg, Virginia
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
J. David Griffin (Winchester Law Group, P.C., on briefs), for appellant.
Michael A. Kernbach (Law Office of Michael A. Kernbach, P.C., on brief), for appellee.
Northampton County and the Virginia Association of Counties Group Self-Insurance (collectively, "employer") appeal a decision of the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission ("the commission") in favor of Mark Somers ("claimant"). For ease of discussion, we condense employer's five assignments of error into three: (1) claimant's second claim for temporary total disability ("TTD") was barred by the statute of limitations, (2) the commission erred by not adopting and enforcing discovery rules, and (3) claimant's second claim for TTD was not supported by sufficient evidence.1 Because we agree that the statute of limitations barred claimant's second claim, we reverse in part and affirm in part.
As the parties are fully conversant with the record in this case and because this memorandum opinion carries no precedential value, we recite only those facts and incidents of the proceedings as are necessary to the parties' understanding of the disposition of this appeal. "On appeal, this Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below." Town & Country Hosp., LP v. Davis, 64 Va. App. 658, 660, 770 S.E.2d 790, 791 (2015). In this case, claimant prevailed below. "'Factual findings by the commission that are supported by credible evidence are conclusive and binding upon this Court on appeal.'" Nurses 4 You, Inc. v. Ferris, 49 Va. App. 332, 339, 641 S.E.2d 129, 132 (2007) (quoting Southern Iron Works, Inc. v. Wallace, 16 Va. App. 131, 134, 428 S.E.2d 32, 34 (1993)).
So viewed, the facts are as follows. Claimant was a Northampton County Sheriff's deputy working at the local jail. In 2013, he filed a claim alleging compensable occupational heart disease. Claimant sought medical benefits and TTD from March 8, 2012 (the date of his diagnosis) through July 29, 2012. A hearing on his claim was rescheduled several times, and the parties had discovery disagreements. On March 6, 2014, employer sent a letter to the chief deputy commissioner stating: Claimant never signed the "stipulated Order" circulated by employer.2
On April 8, 2014, claimant requested compensation for the initial period of TTD (from March 8, 2012 to July 29, 2012) as well as, for the first time, temporary partial disability from July 30, 2012 to March 5, 2014, and TTD from March 6, 2014 and continuing. All matters were set for a hearing on August 14, 2014.
At the hearing on August 14, 2014, employer apparently offered as an exhibit3 a document entitled "Stipulation" which stated: However, employer alleged that the additional claims made by claimant on April 8, 2014 were barred by the two-year statute of limitations, which expired on March 8, 2014. The chief deputy commissioner disagreed, and found claimant's April 8, 2014 claim to be a change in condition application, rather than a new claim.
The chief deputy commissioner awarded claimant "temporary total disability during the period from March 9, 2012 through July 29, 2012, and beginning May 8, 2014 and continuing until conditions justify a modification, suspension or termination thereof."5 He also awarded claimant medical benefits for occupational heart disease "for as long as necessary pursuant to Va. Code § 65.2-603." The full commission subsequently affirmed the opinion of the chief deputy commissioner. In explaining its determination that the April 8, 2014 claim was a change in condition claim, the commission stated:
At the hearing, the defendants stipulated the disease was compensable and [claimant] was entitled to temporary total disability benefits from March 9, 2012 through July 29, 2012. These findings could have been made based upon the July 2013 hearing request without defendants' agreement. After his return to work, the partially disabled claimant worked light duty without wage loss until March 6, 2014 when the employer placed him on leave. The claimant's April 8, 2014 claim was timely as a change in condition claim.
This appeal followed.
This case requires us to review the commission's interpretation of statutes, a question of law we review de novo. Ford Motor Co. v. Gordon, 281 Va. 543, 549, 708 S.E.2d 846, 850 (2011).
Although "the practical construction given to a statute by public officials charged with its enforcement is entitled to great weight by the courts and in doubtful cases will be regarded as decisive," Southern Spring Bed Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 205 Va. 272, 275, 136 S.E.2d 900, 902 (1964), "when an issue involves a pure question of statutory interpretation, that issue does not invoke the agency's specialized competence but is a question of law to be decided by the courts." Alliance to Save the Mattaponi v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 423, 442, 621 S.E.2d 78, 88 (2005).
Commonwealth v. Barker, 275 Va. 529, 536, 659 S.E.2d 502, 505 (2008).
In interpreting the statutes at issue in this case, however, we must be guided by the purpose and principles underlying the Workers' Compensation Act.
"The purpose of the [Workers' Compensation] Act is to protect employees." Turf Care, Inc. v. Henson, 51 Va. App. 318, 336, 657 S.E.2d 787, 795 (2008) (citing Ellis v. Commonwealth Dep't of Highways, 182 Va. 293, 303, 28 S.E.2d 730, 734 (1944)). "Thus, it is to be 'construed liberally and favorably as to' employees." Id. (quoting Ellis, 182 Va. at 303, 28 S.E.2d at 734); see alsoHospice Choice, Inc. v. O'Quin, 42 Va. App. 598, 603, 593 S.E.2d 554, 556 (2004) ; 7-Eleven, Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 42 Va. App. 65, 75, 590 S.E.2d 84, 89 (2003) (en banc) .
Prince William Cty. Sch. Bd. v. Rahim, 58 Va. App. 493, 501, 711 S.E.2d 241, 245 (2011) (en banc) (alterations in original), aff'd, 284 Va. 316, 733 S.E.2d 235 (2012). Notwithstanding theliberal construction we must give to the Workers' Compensation Act, Id. at 500, 711 S.E.2d at 245 (quoting Ford Motor Co., 281 Va. at 549-50, 708 S.E.2d at 850).
Employer's statute of limitations argument is dispositive. Code § 65.2-406(A) addresses the relevant limitation period controlling the filing of initial claims for compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act. That Code section states:
Pursuant to Code § 65.2-400(A), an "occupational disease" is "a disease arising out of and in the course of employment, but not an ordinary disease of life to which the general public is exposed outside of the employment." Code § 65.2-402(B) establishes the presumption present in this case:
Hypertension or heart disease causing the death of, or any health condition or impairment resulting in total or partial disability of . . . (iv) sheriffs and deputy sheriffs . . . shall be presumed to be occupational diseases, suffered in the line of duty, that are coveredby this title unless such presumption is overcome by a preponderance of competent evidence to the contrary.
Employer conceded that claimant's July 25, 2013 claim for heart disease was compensable. The claim was governed by the statute of limitations in Code § 65.2-406(A)(6), requiring the filing of a claim within "two years after a diagnosis of the disease is first communicated to the employee." Because the date of communication was March 8, 2012, the statute of limitations for the initial claim expired on March 8, 2014.
Claimant filed a claim on April 8, 2014. The chief deputy commissioner found this to be a change in condition claim, not a new claim. A "change in condition" is a term of art. Code § 65.2-708 governs change in condition claims and states in part:
A. Upon its own motion or upon the application of any party in interest, on the ground of a change in condition, the Commission may review any award of compensation and on such review may make an award ending, diminishing or increasing the compensation previously awarded . . . . No such review...
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