Northern Kane Educational v. Iea-Nea

• Decision Date: 23 September 2009
• Docket Number: No. 4-08-0881.,4-08-0881.
• Citation: 914 N.E.2d 1286
• Parties: NORTHERN KANE EDUCATIONAL CORPORATION, Petitioner-Appellant, v. CAMBRIDGE LAKES EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, IEA-NEA; and The Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, Respondents-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

914 N.E.2d 1286

NORTHERN KANE EDUCATIONAL CORPORATION, Petitioner-Appellant, v. CAMBRIDGE LAKES EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, IEA-NEA; and The Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 4-08-0881.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

September 23, 2009.

Justice STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:

In April 2008, correspondent, the Cambridge Lakes Education Association, IEA-NEA (Union), filed a majority interest representation petition pursuant to section 7 of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act (Education Labor Act) (115 ILCS 5/7 (West 2008)) with their correspondent in this appeal, the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board (Board), seeking to represent certain Cambridge Lakes Charter School (Cambridge Lakes) employees. In May 2008, petitioner, Northern Kane Educational Corporation (Northern Kane) — Cambridge Lakes' governing body — objected to the Union's majority interest representation petition, claiming that the Board lacked jurisdiction over Northern Kane. In November 2008, the Board found, in pertinent part, that it had jurisdiction over Northern Kane because Northern Kane was an educational employer under section 2(a) of the Education Labor Act (115 ILCS 5/2(a) (West 2008)).

Northern Kane appeals, arguing that (1) the Education Labor Act does not apply to charter schools and (2) even if it did, Northern Kane is not an "educational employer" as that term is defined under the Education Labor Act. We agree that the Education Labor Act does not apply to charter schools and reverse the Board's decision.

I. BACKGROUND

In April 2008, the Union filed a majority interest representation petition with the Board, seeking to represent certain Cambridge Lakes employees. In May 2008, Northern Kane, as Cambridge Lakes' governing body, objected to the Union's majority interest representation petition, arguing that the Board lacked jurisdiction over Northern Kane because (1) the Illinois Charter Schools Law (105 ILCS 5/27A-1 through 27A-13 (West 2008)) exempted Illinois charter schools — including Northern Kane — from "other [s]tate laws and regulations under the School Code" (105 ILCS 5/1 through 36 (West 2008)) and (2) even if charter schools were not exempt, Northern Kane was not an "educational employer" under section 2(a) of the Education Labor Act (115 ILCS 5/2(a) (West 2008)).

Section 27A-5(g) of the Charter Schools Law — the section that Northern Kane claims exempts charter schools from other state laws — states as follows:

"(g) A charter school shall comply with all provisions of this [a]rticle [(which is the article of the School Code dealing only with charter schools)] and its charter. A charter school is exempt from all other [s]tate laws and regulations in the School Code [(105 ILCS 5/1 through 36) (West 2008))] governing public schools and local school board policies, except the following:

(1) Sections 10-21.9 and 34-18.5 of the School Code [(105 ILCS 5/10-21.9, 34-18.5 (West 2008))] regarding criminal history records checks and checks of the Statewide Sex Offender Database of applications for employment;

(2) Sections 24-24 and 34-84A of the School Code [(105 ILCS 5/24-24, 34-84A (West 2008))] regarding discipline of students;

(3) The Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act [(745 ILCS 10/1-101 through 1-210 (West 2008))];

(4) Section 108.75 of the General Not For Profit Corporation Act of 1986 [(805 ILCS 105/108.75 (West 2008))] regarding indemnification of officers, directors, employees, and agents;

(5) The Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act [(325 ILCS 5/1 through 11.7 (West 2008))];

(6) The Illinois School Student Records Act [(105 ILCS 10/1 through 10 (West 2008))]; and

(7) Section 10-17a of the School Code [(105 ILCS 5/10-17a (West 2008))] regarding school report cards." 105 ILCS 5/27A-5(g) (West 2008).

An "educational employer" — which Northern Kane claims it is not — is defined under the Education Labor Act as

"the governing body of a public school district, combination of public school districts, including the governing body of joint agreements of any type formed by [two] or more school districts, public community college district or [s]tate college or university, and any [s]tate agency whose major function is providing educational services." 115 ILCS 5/2(a) (West 2008).

In November 2008, after considering the Charter Schools Law and the Education Labor Act, the Board found; in pertinent part, that it had jurisdiction over Northern Kane because it was an educational employer under the Education Labor Act. In so finding, the Board implicitly concluded that Northern Kane was not exempt from "other [s]tate laws." As a result of the Board's decision, the Union became a certified bargaining unit, authorized to represent certain Cambridge Lakes employees.

This appeal followed.

II. NORTHERN KANE'S CLAIM THAT CHARTER SCHOOLS ARE EXEMPT FROM THE EDUCATION LABOR ACT

Northern Kane argues that the Education Labor Act does not apply to charter schools and thus does not confer jurisdiction upon the Board over Northern Kane as the governing body of Cambridge Lakes. Specifically, Northern Kane contends that the plain language of section 27A-5(g) (105 ILCS 5/27A-5(g) (West 2008)) exempts charter schools from other state laws, which includes the Education Labor Act. The Union responds that (1) the Education Labor Act applies to charter schools and (2) Northern Kane is an educational employer as that term is defined under the Education Labor Act. We agree with Northern Kane that the Education Labor Act does not apply to charter schools.

A. The Standard of Review and Statutory Interpretation

The issue presented in this case is one of statutory interpretation — namely, whether section 27A-5(g) of the Charter Schools Law (105 ILCS 5/27A-5(g) (West 2008)) exempts charter schools from other state laws such as the Education Labor Act. As such, our review is de novo. Hadley v. Illinois Department of Corrections, 224 Ill.2d 365, 370, 309 Ill.Dec. 296, 864 N.E.2d 162, 165 (2007).

"The cardinal rule of statutory construction, to which all other rules are subordinate, is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent." People v. Hanna, 207 Ill.2d 486, 497, 279 Ill.Dec. 618, 800 N.E.2d 1201, 1207 (2003). The most reliable indicator of such intent is the plain language of the statute. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill.2d 493, 504, 247 Ill.Dec. 473, 732 N.E.2d 528, 535 (2000). This language should be given its "plain, ordinary[,] and popularly understood meaning." Hanna, 207 Ill.2d at 498, 279 Ill.Dec. 618, 800 N.E.2d at 1207. When the statutory language is clear, a reviewing court need not resort to extrinsic aids of construction, such as legislative history. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Menards, Inc., 202 Ill.2d 586, 594, 270 Ill.Dec. 64, 782 N.E.2d 258, 263 (2002). Moreover, "[w]here a statute lists the things to which it refers, there is an inference that all omissions should be understood as exclusions, despite the lack of negative words of limitation." Burke v. 12 Rothschild's Liquor Mart, Inc., 148 Ill.2d 429, 442, 170 Ill.Dec. 633, 593 N.E.2d 522, 527 (1992).

B. Section 27A-5(g) of the Charter Schools Law and This Case

The plain language of section 27A-5(g) of the Charter Schools Law states, in pertinent part, that "[a] charter school is exempt from all other [s]tate laws and regulations in the School Code governing public schools and local school board policies," except for certain specified statutes. (Emphasis added.) 105 ILCS 5/27A-5(g) (West 2008). These seven specific exceptions — of which the Education Labor Act is not one — concern safety, administrative, and reporting requirements.

The plain language of section 27A-5(g) is clear. Charter schools are exempt from "all other [s]tate laws" with limited, specified exceptions, of which the Education Labor Act is not one. Thus, to conclude that charter schools are not exempt from the Education Labor Act would be to assume the legislature overlooked the Education Labor Act when it drafted the list of specific exceptions. We reject this assumption and conclude that the omission of the Education Labor Act from the list of specified exceptions is not somehow a legislative oversight.

We find support for this conclusion in three separate sections of the Charter Schools Law. First, the legislature specified certain laws that were to apply to charter schools in section 27A-5(c) (105 ILCS 5/27A-5(c) (West 2008)). Specifically, the legislature made clear that charter schools were to be subject to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/1 through 11 (West 2008)) and the Open Meetings Act (5 ILCS 120/1 through 7 (West 2008)). 105 ILCS 5/27A-5(c) (West 2008). Second, as previously stated, the legislature listed specific and extensive exceptions to the charter schools' exemption from other state laws in section 27A-5(g)(1). See 105 ILCS 5/27A-5(g)(1) through (g)(7) (West 2008) (excluding the following from the blanket exemption provided to charter schools: (a) criminal history and sex offender background checks, (b) student discipline, (c) government tort immunity, (d) not-for-profit indemnification rules, (e) abused and neglected child reporting requirements, (f) student record care, and (g) report card standards). Third, the legislature specifically expressed the policy underlying the Charter Schools Law in section 27A-2(c), which was, in part, to create "more flexible ways of educating children" (105 ILCS 5/27A-2(c) (West 2008)).

Therefore, to conclude that the legislature did not intend charter schools to be excluded from the Education Labor Act, this court would have to, for example, first conclude that the legislature included acts such as the FOIA — an act infrequently used to obtain information from most public schools — but simply overlooked the Education Labor Act — an act that public school officials are familiar with and that...