Collins v. Dep't of Health, & Family Servs. ex rel. Paczek

• Decision Date: 26 June 2014
• Docket Number: No. 2–13–0536.,2–13–0536.
• Citation: 36 N.E.3d 813
• Parties: Gary W. COLLINS, Petitioner–Appellant, v. The DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, AND FAMILY SERVICES ex. rel. Wendy PACZEK, Respondent–Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

36 N.E.3d 813

Gary W. COLLINS, Petitioner–Appellant

v.The DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, AND FAMILY SERVICES ex. rel. Wendy PACZEK, Respondent–Appellee.

No. 2–13–0536.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

June 26, 2014.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 23, 2015.

Michael J. Scalzo and Todd D. Scalzo, both of Scalzo Law Offices, of Wheaton, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Janon E. Fabiano, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellee.

OPINION

Justice HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 In 1997, the Illinois Department of Public Aid (IDPA) entered an administrative order declaring petitioner, Gary W. Collins, the biological father of A.C. (the minor) and ordering him to pay child support to Wendy Paczek, the minor's mother. Thereafter, Paczek and the minor relocated to Nashville, Tennessee, and petitioner relocated to a suburb of Columbus, Ohio. While living in Ohio, petitioner filed in the circuit court of Du Page County a petition to abate or reduce child support and a petition for indirect civil contempt. Petitioner served discovery requests on respondent, the Illinois Department of Health and Family Services (IDHFS), which the trial court had previously granted leave to intervene on Paczek's behalf. The trial court, sua sponte, entered an order transferring the matter to Tennessee after finding that neither party resided in Illinois. Petitioner timely appealed, contending that the trial court erred in dismissing both of his petitions for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On August 13, 1997, IDPA entered an administrative paternity order that declared petitioner as the minor's biological father. Approximately one month later, IDPA ordered petitioner to pay child support to Paczek. In May 2008, Paczek and the minor moved from Rockford, Illinois, to Nashville, Tennessee.

¶ 4 On April 22, 2009, petitioner filed a parentage petition requesting that the trial court modify the administrative paternity order. Petitioner alleged that IDPA had increased his child support obligation and failed to consider that he paid for the minor's health insurance. On August 26, 2009, the trial court entered an agreed order providing that “any issues regarding child support will be dealt with administratively. Any issues that cannot be dealt with administratively will be reserved [and] dealt with judicially.”

¶ 5 On September 30, 2009, the trial court entered an agreed order for temporary child support. The trial court also entered an order granting IDHFS leave to intervene on Paczek's behalf for child support issues. On October 6, 2009, the parties entered an agreed order for custody and visitation, where the parties agreed that Paczek would contribute $50 per month for the minor's medical premiums and that the parties would split equally the costs of any uncovered medical expenses. The order further provided that petitioner would be responsible for 66% of the minor's travel expenses incurred when traveling to see petitioner, with Paczek responsible for the remaining 33%.

¶ 6 On February 5, 2010, petitioner filed a petition to modify child support after he had been laid off from his job in Chicago. On May 14, 2010, the trial court entered an agreed order reducing petitioner's child support. In August 2010, petitioner moved to Columbus, Ohio, for a new job.

¶ 7 On September 5, 2012, after being laid off from his job in Ohio, petitioner filed a petition in the trial court to abate or to reduce child support below the statutory guidelines. Petitioner also served IDHFS with discovery requests, including interrogatories and a financial disclosure statement. On September 25, 2012, both petitioner and IDHFS appeared at a hearing on the petition, and the trial court granted IDHFS 21 days to respond to petitioner's discovery requests. On October 5, 2012, IDHFS filed objections to petitioner's discovery requests.

¶ 8 On October 10, 2012, petitioner filed a petition for indirect civil contempt against Paczek for her failure to provide her portion of the minor's health insurance and travel expenses. The petition alleged that petitioner resided in Ohio; Paczek and the minor lived in Tennessee; the minor visited petitioner four to six times per year; and Paczek had failed to pay petitioner her share of the minor's health insurance and travel expenses.

¶ 9 On October 18, 2012, IDHFS filed its response to petitioner's petition to abate or to reduce child support. The response did not object to the trial court's jurisdiction. Petitioner and IDHFS appeared before the trial court on November 14, 2012; Paczek did not appear. The parties reached a partial agreement on petitioner's outstanding discovery requests, and the trial court continued the matter until December 19, 2012, for a status hearing on the remaining discovery requests, with which IDHFS ultimately complied.

¶ 10 At the December 19, 2012, hearing, the trial court ordered that all matters be transferred to Nashville, Tennessee. The trial court's order found that neither party resided in Illinois and that the case was being transferred “[o]n the [c]ourt's own motion.”

¶ 11 On January 18, 2013, petitioner filed a motion to reconsider. Petitioner argued that, pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (the Act) (750 ILCS 22/100 et seq. (West 2012)), the trial court retained jurisdiction to enforce its orders and therefore the trial court had jurisdiction. Petitioner also attached an affidavit averring that he owned a home in Du Page County; he moved to Ohio for a job; he had been interviewing for jobs in the Chicago area after having been laid off; he had taken steps to begin the process of moving back to Illinois; and he did not intend to remain in Ohio. IDHFS responded to petitioner's motion to reconsider by arguing that, while the trial court retained jurisdiction to enforce previously entered support orders, it did not have jurisdiction to modify such orders.

¶ 12 On April 25, 2013, the trial court denied petitioner's motion to reconsider. The trial court concluded that “[a] definite plan [to move back to Illinois] does not create residency. * * * [T]he facts of this case are that no one resides in Du Page County * * * and ha[s] not resided in this jurisdiction for many years. * * * [T]here is no nexus to [Illinois] given the use of the term residence in the statute that would give me continuing exclusive jurisdiction over these proceedings.” The trial court's order specified that it “did not retain continuing jurisdiction to enforce child support.” Petitioner timely appealed.

¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 14 The only issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in dismissing petitioner's petitions to modify and for indirect civil contempt.

¶ 15 Resolution of this issue requires us to interpret the Act (750 ILCS 22/100 et seq. (West 2012)) and our review is, therefore, de novo. See In re Marriage of Best, 228 Ill.2d 107, 116, 319 Ill.Dec. 815, 886 N.E.2d 939 (2008) (citing Fisher v. Waldrop, 221 Ill.2d 102, 112, 302 Ill.Dec. 542, 849 N.E.2d 334 (2006) ). The primary objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the legislature, and the most reliable indicator of intent is the language of the statute given its plain, ordinary, and popularly understood meaning. In re Marriage of Rogers, 213 Ill.2d 129, 136, 289 Ill.Dec. 610, 820 N.E.2d 386 (2004). The statute “ ‘should be read as a whole with all relevant parts considered.’ ” Gardner v. Mullins, 234 Ill.2d 503, 511, 334 Ill.Dec. 617, 917 N.E.2d 443 (2009) (quoting Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill.2d 178, 189, 149 Ill.Dec. 286, 561 N.E.2d 656 (1990) ). If the statutory language is clear, a reviewing court does not need to resort to extrinsic aids of construction, such as legislative history (Northern Kane Educational Corp. v. Cambridge Lakes Education Ass'n, 394 Ill.App.3d 755, 758, 333 Ill.Dec. 474, 914 N.E.2d 1286 (2009) ), and, in such situations, a court may not depart from the plain language of the statute and read into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that are inconsistent with the express legislative intent. Landheer v. Landheer, 383 Ill.App.3d 317, 321, 322 Ill.Dec. 684, 891 N.E.2d 975 (2008).

¶ 16 Section 22/205 of the Act provides:

“(a) A tribunal of this State that has issued a support order * * * shall exercise continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its child-support order if the order is the controlling order and:

(1) at the time of the filing of a request for modification this State is the residence of the obligor, the individual oblige, or the child for whose benefit the support order is issued; or

(2) even if this State is not the residence of the obligor, the individual oblige, or the child for whose benefit the support is issued, the parties consent in a record or in open court that the tribunal of this State may continue to exercise the jurisdiction to modify its order.” 750 ILCS 22/205 (West 2012).

¶ 17 “The [Act] creates a mechanism which facilitates the reciprocal enforcement or modification of child support awards entered in Illinois and other states which have also adopted the [Act].” In re Marriage of Hartman, 305 Ill.App.3d 338, 342, 238 Ill.Dec. 645, 712 N.E.2d 367 (1999). The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws originally promulgated the model Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (the Model UIFSA) in 1992 and Congress mandated in 1996 that states adopt the Model UIFSA to remain eligible for federal funding of child support enforcement. In re Marriage of Gulla, 234 Ill.2d 414, 425, 334 Ill.Dec. 566, 917 N.E.2d 392 (2009) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 666(f) (2000) ). Therefore, the Act seeks to provide “unity and structure in each state's approach to the modification and enforcement of child support orders.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gulla, 234 Ill.2d at 426, 334 Ill.Dec. 566, 917 N.E.2d 392. Our supreme court has ...