Northern Pacific Railway Company v. State of Washington Ex Rel John Atkinson

• Decision Date: 09 January 1912
• Docket Number: No. 136,136
• Citation: Northern Pacific Railway Company v. State of Washington Ex Rel John Atkinson, 222 U.S. 370, 32 S.Ct. 160, 56 L.Ed. 237 (1912)
• Parties: NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, Plff. in Err., v. STATE OF WASHINGTON EX REL. JOHN D. ATKINSON, Attorney General
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

222 U.S. 370

32 S.Ct. 160

56 L.Ed. 237

NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, Plff. in Err.,

v STATE OF WASHINGTON EX REL. JOHN D. ATKINSON, Attorney General.

No. 136.

Submitted December 19, 1911.

Decided January 9, 1912.

Mr. Charles W. Bunn for plaintiff in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 371-373 intentionally omitted]Mr. W. V. Tanner, Attorney General of Washington, for defendant in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 373-375 intentionally omitted] Mr. Chief Justice White delivered the opinion of the court:

On July 3 and 4, 1907, the Northern Pacific Railway Company, in operating a train on its road in the state of Washington, permitted some of the train crew to remain on duty more than sixteen consecutive hours.This being apparently contrary to the prohibition of the act of Congress known as the 'hours of service' law, approved March 4, 1907, chap. 2939, 34 Stat. at L. 1415, U. S. Comp. Stat.Supp. 1909, p. 1170, if the railroad company, in the operation of the train, was subject to the power of Congress, and the prohibitions of the act were otherwise applicable, there was a violation of the act and a liability to its penalties.

The train, although moving from one point to another in the state of Washington, was hauling merchandise from points outside of the state, destined to points within the state, and from points within the state to points in British Columbia, as well as in carrying merchandise which had originated outside of the state, and was in transit through the state to a foreign destination.This transportation was interstate commerce, and the train was an interstate train, despite the fact that it may also have been carrying some local freight.In view of the unity and indivisibility of the service of the train crew and the paramount character of the authority of Congress to regulate commerce, the act of Congress was exclusively controlling.Southern R. Co. v. United States, 222 U. S. 20, 56 L. ed. 72, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 2.But while thus governed by the act of Congress, the prohibitions of that act were not operative.This follows, by reason of the provisions of § 5 to the following effect: 'That this act shall take effect and be in force one year after its passage.'

About a month before the occurrences heretofore referred to, that is, on June 11th, 1097, a law of the state of Washington regulating the hours of service of railway employees became effective.Without going into detail it suffices to say that the provisions of that act greatly resembled those of the act of Congress, and prohibited the consecutive hours of service which had taken place on the train of the Northern Pacific road.The attorney general of the state commenced the proceeding now before us to recover penalties for the violation of the state law.The railroad answered, admitted the acts complained of, but denied any liability for the penalties imposed by the state law.The denial was based upon the assertion that the train was an interstate train, and was not subject to the control of the state because within the exclusive authority of Congress, manifested by the enactment of Congress on that subject.The trial court granted a motion for judgment upon the pleadings, and awarded $1,000 penalty, and it is to a judgment of the supreme court of the state, affirming such action, that this writ of error is prosecuted.

Considering the character of the transportation, the court below held that the train was an interstate train, and within the potentiality of the exercise by Congress of its power to regulate commerce.Despite this, it was held that the penalty had been rightly imposed, because, until Congress had acted upon the subject, it was competent for the state to make a regulation concerning the hours of service of employees on railroad trains moving within the state, and to apply such regulation to a train engaged in interstate commerce.This, however was based not upon a supposed concurrent state and Federal power, but solely on the ground that Congress had not acted on the subject, and therefore the state regulation should be applied.Indeed, the court in express terms declared that if Congress had legislated, 'its act supersedes any and all state legislation on that particular subject,' and it was stated that the state in argument had so conceded.

The court said:

'On the other hand, it is conceded by the state that the power of the Congress to regulate interstate commerce is plenary; and that, as an incident to this power, the Congress may regulate by legislation the instrumentalities engaged in the business, and may prescribe the number of consecutive hours an employee of a carrier so engaged shall be required to remain on duty; and that when it does legislate upon the subject, its act supersedes any and all state legislation on that particular subject.In fact, these propositions can hardly be said to be debatable in the state courts, since the Federal courts, whose decisions are authoritative on questions of this character, have repeatedly announced them as governing principles in determining the validity of regulative legislation concerning carriers of interstate commerce.Escanaba & L. M. Transp. Co. v. Alabama, Escanaba & L. M. Transp. Co. v. Chicago, Rep. 185;Morgan's L. & T. R. & S. S. Co. v. Board of Health, 118 U. S. 455, 30 L. ed. 237, 6...