Northern Pacific Railway Company v. Shoshone County
| Citation | 116 P.2d 221,63 Idaho 36 |
| Decision Date | 19 July 1941 |
| Docket Number | 6910,6906,6908,6904 |
| Parties | NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, a corporation, Appellant, v. SHOSHONE COUNTY, a municipal corporation; GLYNN D. EVANS, county treasurer; ROY O. SMITH, C. Y. GARBER and DANIEL MURPHY, county commissioners; and NATALIE FERGUSON, county superintendent of public instruction, Respondents. NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, a corporation, Appellant, v. SHOSHONE COUNTY, a municipal corporation; GLYNN D. EVANS, county treasurer; ROY O. SMITH, C. Y. GARBER and DANIEL MURPHY, county commissioners; and NATALIE FERGUSON, county superintendent of public instruction, Respondents. HENRY A. SCANDRETT, WALTER J. CUMMINGS and GEORGE I. HAIGHT, Trustees of the property of CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, ST. PAUL AND PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, Appellants, v. SHOSHONE COUNTY, a municipal corporation; GLYNN D. EVANS, county treasurer; ROY O. SMITH, C. Y. GARBER and DANIEL MURPHY, county commissioners; and NATALIE FERGUSON, county superintendent of public instruction, Respondents. HENRY A. SCANDRETT, WALTER J. CUMMINGS and GEORGE I. HAIGHT, Trustees of the property of CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, ST. PAUL AND PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, Appellants, v. SHOSHONE COUNTY, a municipal corporation; GLYNN D. EVANS, county treasurer; ROY O. SMITH, C. Y. GARBER and DANIEL MURPHY, county commissioners; and NATALIE FERGUSON, county superintendent of public instruction, Respondents |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Idaho |
Rehearing denied September 4, 1941.
SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS-COUNTY SCHOOL EQUALIZATION FUND-STATUTES, CONSTRUCTION OF.
1. Legislative intent is the main lode star of statutory construction.
2. A statute should be so construed as to give it effect.
3. Where all property in a county was in either an organized or an unorganized school district, the words "school district," within statute relating to taxation in those counties where property assessed at more than 67 per cent. of the total assessed valuation of such counties is situate outside of the boundaries of school districts, would not be construed as meaning all school districts in the county or all organized school districts, since such construction would render the statute wholly ineffective, and the words were properly construed to refer to any number of counties having the school population specified in the statute and less than 67 per cent. of the assessed valuation. (I. C. A. secs 32-301, 32-401, 70-114, and sec. 61-806b, as added by Sess Laws, 1939, c. 124.)
4. The statute authorizing the levy of a tax sufficient to provide a county equalization program not in excess of 35 per cent. of the state minimum educational program does not require that performance of preliminary steps by county commissioners and county superintendent of schools be made a matter of record, and, if the underlying facts justifying such steps exist, their existence is controlling. (I. C. A sec. 61-806a, as added by Sess. Laws, 1939, c. 81, and secs 61-806b, 61-806c, as added by Sess. Laws, 1939, c. 124.)
Rehearing denied September 4, 1941.
APPEALS from the District Court of the First Judicial District for Shoshone County. Hon. Albert H. Featherstone, Judge.
Appellants sued to recover taxes paid under protest. Judgment for defendants and plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.
Judgment affirmed. Costs to respondents.
H. J. Hull, for Appellants Scandrett et al., and Verner R. Clements, for Appellant Northern Pacific Railway Company.
Taxing statutes must be strictly construed against taxing authorities and liberally in favor of taxpayer. (People v. Moore, 1 Idaho 662; 25 Ruling Case Law, § 307, p. 1092).
Procedural steps precedent to levying of tax are jurisdictional, and failing these, the levy is void. (O. S. L. R. R. Co. v. Gooding County, 33 Idaho 452, 196 P. 196; O. S. L. R. R. Co. v. Minidoka County, 31 Idaho 719, 175 P. 962; Bramwell v. Guheen, 3 Idaho (Hasb.) 347, 29 P. 110; Petrie v. Common School Dist. No. 5, 38 Idaho 583, 223 P. 535.)
Albert J. Graf, Prosecuting Attorney of Shoshone County, and James A. Wayne, for Respondents.
The legislative intent controls in construing a statute. The court considers the wrong or evil sought to be remedied or prevented, and the purpose sought to be accomplished in the enactment of the statute. (Reed v. Houston, 24 Idaho 26, 34; Hodges v. Tucker, 25 Idaho 563; Gallafent v. Tucker, 48 Idaho 240.)
The duty of maintaining public schools is mandatory under the Constitution, (Article IX, Section 1).
But the organization and maintenance of the districts is purely a matter of administrative convenience. (American National Bank v. Joint Independent School District, 102 P.2d 826.)
The powers granted to and duties imposed upon county commissioners under Chapter 124, S. L. 1939, are discretionary and directory.
Four actions separately brought by the respective appellants, consolidated in the trial court and here, sought the return of taxes levied and paid under Section 61-806 b., I. C. A., 1939 S. L. Ch. 124, page 221. [1]
Appellants' first contention is that in the phrase "in those counties within the State of Idaho where property assessed at more than 67% of the total assessed valuation of such counties is situate outside of the boundaries of school districts, . . ." the words "school districts," mean all the school districts in the county, or second, at least all "organized school districts," while respondents and evidently the trial court, considered the words "school districts" to mean any one or more school districts, organized or unorganized.
Appellants urge the statute should be strictly construed in favor of the taxpayer, citing People v. Moore, 1 Idaho 662, and 25 Ruling Case Law, 1092, Sec. 307. See also, Cooley, Taxation, Sec. 503. Even if such rule of construction be not negatived by Sec. 70-102 I. C. A., it is unnecessary to pass upon the point because of the compulsion of other pertinent rules of statutory construction.
Legislative intent is the main lode star of construction. Empire Copper Co. v. Henderson, 15 Idaho 635, 99 P. 127; Swain v. Fritchman, 21 Idaho 783, 125 P. 319; Oregon Short Line R. Co. v. Pfost, 53 Idaho 559, 27 P.2d 877; Steinour v. Oakley State Bank, 32 Idaho 91, 177 P. 843; Turner v. Roseberry Irr. Dist. 33 Idaho 746, 198 P. 465; State v. Armstrong, 38 Idaho 493, 225 P. 491; Gallafent v. Tucker, 48 Idaho 240, 281 P. 375; State v. Holder, 49 Idaho 514, 290 P. 387, 82 A. L. R. 348n.
A statute should be so construed as to give it effect. Hartman v. Meier, 39 Idaho 261, 227 P. 25; State v. Brassfield, 40 Idaho 203, 232 P. 1; Ryan v. Old Veteran Mining Co., 35 Idaho 637, 207 P. 1076; Sharp v. Brown, 38 Idaho 136, 221 P. 139; Hunt v. City of St. Maries, 44 Idaho 700, 260 P. 155; Diefendorf v. Gallet, 51 Idaho 619, 10 P.2d 307, 97 A. L. R. 1489n.
If appellants' first interpretation were adopted the statute would be wholly ineffective because there is no county where any taxable property lies outside of all school districts, because all the property in a county is in organized [2] or unorganized [3] school districts, hence there never could be 67 per cent or any other per cent of the total assessed valuation of such counties outside the boundaries of school districts.
The plural includes the singular. Sec. 70-114 I. C. A.
Since the phrase clearly does not mean all school districts it perforce means any number less than all, which may therefore be one or more which contain 51 per cent plus of the school population in the county and less than 67 per cent of the assessed valuation, and there is nothing to indicate the legislature intended to differentiate between all "organized districts" or any number thereof less than all. That no limitation was made clearly evidences the intention to make the determination rest on any number having sufficient school population and less than 67 per cent of the assessed valuation.
Appellants' second point is that the record does not disclose the county commissioners and the county superintendent of schools took the claimed necessary preliminary and asserted jurisdictional steps enumerated in Sec. 61-806 c, 1939 S. L. 222. [4]
The statute does not require such steps be made a matter of record, and if the underlying facts justifying such steps exist the mere performance of the steps would be directory, not mandatory. In re Overland Co. v. Utter, 44 Idaho 385, 257 P. 480; Stanolind Pipe Line Co. v. Tulsa County Excise Board (Okla.) 80 P.2d 316; School Board etc. v. Rupp, (Kan) 106 P.2d 669. It is the existence of such jurisdictional facts which controls. Stanolind Pipe Line Co. v. Excise Board of Lincoln County, 93 P.2d 1085. The complaints do not allege, (except as to the contention as to the words "school districts," disposed of supra) that the facts did not exist, but merely that the county commissioners and the county school superintendent did not make the determination and give the notifications specified in the statute. Appellants do not show in regard to the recovery of this tax how the failure to perform these acts has injured them.
The cases cited by appellants are all distinguishable; thus Bramwell v. Guheen, 3 Idaho 347, 29 P. 110, required an election, which the court determined was not held. In Oregon Short Line R. Co. v. Minidoka County, 31 Idaho 719, 175 P. 962, there was a lack of statutory authority; Oregon Short Line R. Co. v. Gooding County, 33 Idaho 452, 196 [63 Idaho 43] P. 196, lack of supporting factual premise, not failure to show such had not been preliminarily determined. Petrie v. Common School Dist. No. 5, 38 Idaho 583, 223 P. 535, the essential steps which were lacking...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Keenan v. Price
... ... Power and Irrigation Dist. v. Lincoln County, 144 Neb. 584, ... 14 N.W.2d 202, 155 A.L.R ... 16 P.2d 390; Northern P. R. Co. v. Shoshone County, ... 63 Idaho 36, ... ...
-
Petition of Idaho State Federation of Labor, 8160
...State ex rel. Anderson v. Rayner, 60 Idaho 706, 96 P.2d 244; Bel v. Benewah County, 60 Idaho 791, 97 P.2d 397; Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Shoshone County, 63 Idaho 36, 116 P.2d 221; Scandrett v. Shoshone County, 63 Idaho 46, 116 P.2d 225; State ex rel. Wright v. Headrick, 65 Idaho 148, 139 P.......
-
Christensen v. West
...(1908). 'This court is committed to the rule that legislative intent is the main lodestar of construction. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Shoshone County, 63 Idaho 36, 40, 116 P.2d 221, and cases there cited.' Willard v. First Security Bank of Idaho, 69 Idaho 265, 269, 206 P.2d 770, 773 I.C. § 72-......
-
Scandrett v. Shoshone County
... ... PAUL AND PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, Appellants, v. SHOSHONE COUNTY, a ... NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, a corporation, Appellant, v. SHOSHONE COUNTY, ... ...