Northern Springs, Inc. v. Town of Wells, YOR CV-03-075

• Decision Date: 12 March 2004
• Docket Number: YOR CV-03-075
• Parties: NORTHERN SPRINGS, INC., Plaintiff v. TOWN OF WELLS, Defendant
• Court: Maine Superior Court

NORTHERN SPRINGS, INC., Plaintiff v. TOWN OF WELLS, Defendant

No. YOR CV-03-075

Superior Court of Maine, York.

March 12 2004

SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION

ORDER

Before this court is Plaintiff, Northern Springs, Inc.'s ("Northern") Motion for Summary Judgment as to Counts I and II of the Complaint, and Defendant, Town of Wells' ("Town") Motion for Summary Judgment as to all Counts of the Complaint. In addition, before this court is Plaintiff Northern's Motion to Strike specific portions of the affidavit of Jonathan Carter. For reasons stated below, Plaintiff's Motions are Denied, and Defendant's Motion is Granted.

FACTS

Plaintiff Northern owns and operates a spring water plant located on Wire Road, Wells, Maine. Plaintiff Northern collects spring water at its spring sources on Wire Road and transports the water in bulk and in bottles to its customers. In order to enter or leave Plaintiff Northern's plant, it is necessary to use Wire Road.^[1]

On or about April 2002, Defendant Town enacted Chapter 212 of the Code of the Town of Wells, an ordinance that adopted the State law regarding roadways in toto. Subsequently Defendant Town became concerned that vehicles carrying loads in excess of the weight restrictions imposed by state and local law would cause significant damage to Wire Road. Accordingly, the Town Ordinance was amended on September 3 2002. Specifically, Defendant Town amended its ordinance by striking from it the portion of the State law that established a method to obtain certain exemptions. Hence Defendant Town enforced its Wire Road restriction by having its police force stop and ticket certain over weight vehicles that attempted to access the road.

Consequently, Plaintiff Northern filed a Complaint in the York County Superior Court asserting five Counts against Defendant Town. First, Plaintiff Northern argues that State law preempts Defendant Town's ordinance requirements and that the ordinance is in violation of the Federal Supremacy Clause. Next, Plaintiff Northern contends that Defendant Town's ordinance is in violation of the Federal Commerce Clause and the State and Federal Due Process Clauses. Finally, Plaintiff Northern asserts that its use of Wire Road is a vested right and Defendant Town's ordinance is an ex post facto restriction on its use of the road.

On September 26, 2003, Plaintiff Northern filed a Motion for Summary Judgment as to Counts I and II against Defendant Town. In response, Defendant Town filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment as to all Counts of the Complaint. Moreover, Plaintiff Northern filed a Motion to Strike specific portions of Jonathan Carter's affidavit.

DISCUSSION

1. Plaintiff's and Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment

A party is entitled to summary judgment where there exists no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. M. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Saucier v. State Tax Assessor, 2000 ME 8, ¶ 4, 745 A.2d 972. A material fact is one having the potential to affect the outcome of the suit. Kenny v. Dep't of Human

Services, 1999 ME 158, ¶ 3, 740 A.2d 560. A genuine issue exists when sufficient evidence supports a factual contest to require a fact finder to choose between competing versions of the truth at trial. Blanchet v. Assurance Co. of Am., 2001 ME 40, ¶ 6, 766 A.2d 71 (citation omitted).

A. Count I

First, Plaintiff Northern asserts in Count I of its Complaint that the Town Ordinance conflicts with state law and frustrates its purpose and is therefore unlawful. More specifically, Plaintiff Northern argues that the ordinance conflicts with 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2395 et seq. and is preempted thereby.

Just as federal laws may preempt state laws either expressly or by implication, Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98, 120 L.Ed. 2d 73, 112 S.Ct. 2374 (1992), state statutes may preempt local ordinances either expressly or implicitly, see 30-A M.R.S.A. § 3001. Maine's statute extending home rule, as provided by the Maine Constitution, indicates that a municipality may adopt any ordinance or exercise any power or function which is not denied expressly or by clear implication. It includes the following standard for determining when an ordinance may be preempted by implication: the Legislature shall not be held to have implicitly denied any power granted to municipalities under this section unless the municipal ordinance in question would frustrate the purpose of any state law. The determinative factor is, therefore, whether the ordinance would frustrate the purpose of any state law. We will view municipal action as preempted only when the application of the municipal ordinance prevents the efficient accomplishment of a defined state purpose.

Smith v. Town of Pittston, 2003 ME 46, ¶ 24, 820 A.2d 1200, 1207 (citations and quotations omitted).

Title 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2395, provides in relevant part that "[t]he Department of Transportation may restrict the weight or passage of any vehicle over any way when, in its judgment, such passage would be unsafe or likely to cause excessive damage to the way or bridge." 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2395(1) (2003). "The Department of Transportation may designate state and state aid highways and bridges over which restrictions on gross weight, speed, operation and equipment apply during periods of the year determined by the Department." Id. at § 2395(3). Furthermore, "County commissioners and municipal officers may designate public ways other than those in subsection 3 and impose restrictions within their respective jurisdictions similar to those made by the Department of Transportation under subsection 3." Id. at § 2395(4).

In addition, 30-A M.R.S.A. § 3001, provides:

Any municipality, by the adoption, amendment or repeal of ordinances or bylaws, may exercise any power or function which the Legislature has power to confer upon it, which is not denied either expressly or by clear implication, and exercise any power or function granted to the municipality by the Constitution of Maine, general law or charter.

1. Liberal construction. This section, being necessary for the welfare of the municipalities and their inhabitants, shall be liberally construed to affect its purposes.

2. Presumption of authority. There is a rebuttable presumption that any ordinance enacted under this section is a valid exercise of a municipality's home rule authority.

3. Standard of preemption. The Legislature shall not be held to have implicitly denied any power granted to municipalities under this section unless the municipal ordinance in question would frustrate the purpose of any state law.

4. Penalties accrue to municipality. All penalties established by ordinance shall be recovered on complaint to the use of the municipality.

30-A M.R.S.A. § 3001 (2003).

Here, the stated purpose of the amended ordinance is to "prevent damage to streets and bridges in the Town which may be caused by vehicles of excessive weight, to lessen safety hazards and the risk of injury to the traveling public, to extend the life expectancy of Town streets and bridges, and to reduce the public expense of their maintenance and repair ..." (Defendant's SMF Exh. M.) This court finds that the purpose of the State statute has not been frustrated and instead the two provisions are consistent with each other.

Although, Plaintiff Northern argues that the amended ordinance frustrates the purpose of the state law by removing from it the State's exemptions, this court disagrees. The State exemptions,^[2] although different from Defendant Town's exemptions^[3] are not frustrated. In fact, the States exemptions are similar to the amended ordinance. Therefore, because no genuine dispute of material fact exists, this court finds that the ordinance does not frustrate the purpose of State law and accordingly is not preempted.

B. Count II

Next, Plaintiff Northern alleges in Count II of its Complaint that the ordinance conflicts with Federal law and is a violation of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.

The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that the laws of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land..." U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2.

We have recognized that it is through operation of the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution that federal law preempts conflicting state law. Pre-emption occurs when Congress, in enacting a federal statute, expresses a clear intent to preempt state law, when there is an outright or actual conflict between federal and state law, where compliance with both federal and state law is in effect physically impossible, where there is implicit in federal law a barrier to state regulation, where Congress has legislated comprehensively, thus occupying an entire field of regulation and leaving no room for the States to supplement federal law, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full objectives of Congress. Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has determined that the

"exercise of federal supremacy is not lightly to be presumed. In Fort Halifax Packing, we stated: Preemption, however, is not a favored concept, and federal regulation will be deemed to be preemptive of state regulatory powers only if grounded in persuasive reasons --- either the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion or that Congress has unmistakably so ordained.

Central Maine Power Co. v. Lebanon, 571 A.2d 1189 1191--92 (Me. 1990) (citations and quotations omitted). Plaintiff Northern argues that 23 C.F.R. 658.19 preempts the Defendant Town's ordinance. This section provides, "[n]o state may enact or enforce any law denying reasonable access to vehicles ... between the NN [National Network] and...