Northwestern Lumber Co. v. Grays Harbor & P. S. Ry. Co.
Decision Date | 06 November 1913 |
Docket Number | 1,866-C. |
Citation | 208 F. 624 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington |
Parties | NORTHWESTERN LUMBER CO. v. GRAYS HARBOR & P.S. RY. CO. et al. |
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Grosscup & Morrow, of Tacoma, Wash., for complainant.
Bogle Graves, Merritt & Bogle, of Seattle, Wash., for defendants.
Complainant relies upon the following authorities: Windsor v. St Paul, etc., Ry. Co., 37 Wash. 156, 79 P. 613, 3 Ann.Cas. 62; No. American Trans. Co. v. Samuels, 146 F. 51, 76 C.C.A. 506; Bradley v. Steam Packet Co., 13 Pet. 89, 10 L.Ed. 72; Sultan Log. Co. v. Great Northern, 58 Wash. 604, 109 P. 320, 1020; Anderson v. Lumber Co., 30 Wash. 147, 70 P. 247; Moses v. Bank, 149 U.S. 298, 13 Sup.Ct. 900, 37 L.Ed. 743; Brashear v. West, 7 Pet. 609, 8 L.Ed. 801; McLean v. Sellers, 44 Mont. 389, 120 P. 242; Marden v. Leimbach, 115 Md. 206, 80 A. 958; Johnson v. Tribby, 27 App. D.C. 281; Willard v. Tayloe, 8 Wall. 557, 19 L.Ed. 501; Morgan v. Bell, 3 Wash. 554, 28 P. 925, 16 L.R.A. 614; Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. 842; Frye on Specific Performance, Sec. 258; Storer v. Great Western Ry., 2 Young & Collier Chancery Reports, 48; Pembroke v. Thorpe, 3 Swanston's Ch. Rep. 482; Hawkes v. Eastern Counties Ry., 22 Chancellor's Reports, 739; Cathcart v. Robinson, 5 Pet. 277, 8 L.Ed. 120; Kentucky Distilleries, etc., Co. v. Blanton, 149 F. 40, 80 C.C.A. 343; Tayloe v. Insurance Co., 9 How. 390-405, 13 L.Ed. 187; Eames v. Insurance Co., 94 U.S. 621, 24 L.Ed. 298.
Defendants rely upon the following authorities: Swash v. Sharpstein, 14 Wash. 426, 44 P. 862, 32 L.R.A. 796; Hite & Raffeto v. Savannah Elec. Co., 164 F. 944, 90 C.C.A. 348; Crossley v. Maycock, 18 Eq.Cas. 180; Clark v. Davidson, 53 Wis. 317, 10 N.W. 384; Ellis v. Cary, 74 Wis. 176, 42 N.W. 252, 4 L.R.A. 55, 17 Am.St.Rep. 125; Brown on St. Frauds, Sec. 376; Sorensen v. Keyser, 51 F. 30, 2 C.C.A. 92; Bailey v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 96, 21 L.Ed.
611; Blake v. Co., 76 F. 624, 22 C.C.A. 430; De Witt v. Berry, 134 U.S. 306, 10 Sup.Ct. 536, 33 L.Ed. 896; Johnson v. Lara, 50 Wash. 368, 97 P. 231; Allen v. Treat, 48 Wash. 552, 94 P. 102; Hogan v. Kyle, 7 Wash. 600, 35 P. 399, 38 Am.St.Rep. 910; Peters v. Van Horn, 37 Wash. 550, 79 P. 1110; Morgan v. Bell, 3 Wash. 554, 565, 28 P. 925, 16 L.R.A. 614; 3 Pom.Eq.Jur. § 1410; McKinney v. Big H. & C. Co., 167 F. 770, 93 C.C.A. 258.
This cause is for decision upon the bill, answer, reply, and evidence thereunder. The bill is one for specific performance. Complainant is, and was, the owner of a large amount of real estate in the town of Hoquiam, and otherwise interested in certain business enterprises at that place.
The defendant Grays Harbor & Puget Sound Railway Company was, in 1908, seeking to obtain an entrance for its road to Hoquiam, and to acquire depot and terminal grounds, right of way, and franchises therein. The other defendants have succeeded to or acquired interests from the Grays Harbor & Puget Sound Railway Company, the nature of whose rights and liabilities among themselves it is not necessary to state. They will be mentioned herein as 'defendants.'
Through the chief engineer of said railroad company, it entered into negotiations with complainant, which resulted in complainant, in September, 1908, submitting three separate propositions to the defendant railroad company, through the latter's engineer. The second and third propositions were:
In June, 1909, this offer was conditionally accepted by a letter from the railroad company's engineer to complainant, stating:
This, in turn, was accepted by the complainant. Thereafter a map was presented to complainant by the defendant's engineer. This map showed the location of a railroad bridge across the river in Hoquiam. Abstracts were, without delay, furnished the attorney of the defendant railroad company. These abstracts disclosed good title to the property, save in certain particulars, not material.
In June, 1909, the engineer of the defendant railroad company, who had conducted the negotiations, died, being succeeded, July 1, 1909, by Mr. J. R. Holman. There were conferences between the representatives of the parties upon the terms and details of the formal contract, mentioned in the defendant's acceptance.
The attorney for the railroad company and George H. Emerson, vice president of complainant, at length so far agreed upon a form of contract as to dictate a draft to complainant's stenographer, which was submitted to the president of the complainant company. It contained the following provision:
The president of complainant refused to execute the contract until another paragraph was inserted, providing:
'8. It is stipulated by the first party that the construction of the approach to the proposed bridge on the extension of Simpson Ave. shall be so arranged as to interfere with the handling of logs in their mill pond the least possible, and with that object in view that an ample span shall be placed west of the west pier of the drawbridge, and that the bridge abutment be placed as nearly as possible, consistent with the economical spacing of the spans of said bridge, and in accordance with the requirements of the U.S. government, about thirty ft. into the river from the line of the piles of the first party's pond as such piles are now driven. It is also further stipulated by the first party that such bridge may be a joint user bridge with the city of Hoquiam provided the city of Hoquiam contributes its share of cost of construction and maintenance.'
The following provision was also inserted:
* * * '
The contract, as then prepared, was, on July 7, 1909, forwarded to the railroad company at Seattle by complainant; but was returned, unexecuted, July 21st to the attorney of the railroad company in Hoquiam, by Mr. Holman, who had, on July 1st, succeeded to the position of engineer for the railroad company, after the decease of Mr. Baldwin. This attorney, July 23d, advised complainant that the railroad company would not execute the contract on account of its containing, in paragraph 8, the 'common user' bridge clause.
Conferences were had between the officers of complainant and the attorney of the railroad company, trying to reach an agreement concerning the objectionable provision; but without being able to do so. Thereafter, on September 15th, complainant demanded that the attorney for the railroad company return this formal contract to it, which he did on the same day, with the following letter:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Ravarino v. Price
...is not fully settled in the courts. Some jurisdictions hold that possession is an indispensible element, Northwestern Lumber Co. v. Grays Harbor & P. S. R. Co., D.C., 208 F. 624 while others indicate the possession is only ordinarily necessary. Blakely v. Sumner, 62 Wash. 206, 113 P. 257. W......