Northwestern Lumber Co. v. Bloom

• Decision Date: 29 June 1925
• Docket Number: 19214.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: NORTHWESTERN LUMBER CO. v. BLOOM et ux.

237 P. 295

135 Wash. 195

NORTHWESTERN LUMBER CO. v. BLOOM et ux.

No. 19214.

Supreme Court of Washington

June 29, 1925

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, Grays Harbor County; Griffiths, Judge.

Suit by the Northwestern Lumber Company against M. E. Bloom and wife with cross-complaint by defendants. From the decree plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

John C Hogan, of Aberdeen, for appellant.

J. M Phillips and T. H. McKay, both of Aberdeen, for respondents.

MAIN, J.

By this action the plaintiff sought an injunction prohibiting the defendants from interfering with its logging operations in certain particulars. The defendants countered with a cross-complaint, asking for an injunction prohibiting the plaintiff from making certain uses of their land without the legal right to do so. The cause was tried to the court without a jury, and resulted in a decree sustaining the contention of each of the parties in certain particulars. From this judgment the plaintiff appealed. No appeal was prosecuted by the defendants and cross-complainants.

The facts are these: The respondents M. E. Bloom and Laura A Bloom are husband and wife, and are the owners of 80 acres of logged off land, a small portion of which is cultivated and upon which they reside. The appellant operated a saw mill in the city of Hoquiam, and owned timber land to the north of the land owned by the respondents. Through the respondents' land there ran what was called Campbell's slough, which was a stream about 100 feet wide, in which the tide ebbed and flowed, and was adapted to the floating of logs. It emptied into Grays Harbor. The appellant, desiring to log its timber, sought to acquire a right of way across the land of the respondents for a logging railroad to a point where the logging road would reach Campbell's slough. To this end on June 1, 1920, an agreement was entered into between the appellant and the respondents whereby there was granted to the appellant a right of way for a logging railroad 40 feet in width. There was also granted to the appellant the right to construct a dump where the logging road met the slough upon a strip of land there at least 50 feet in width. The appellant agreed to pay the respondents $1,000 for the first two years, $50 a month for the third year, and $40 a month for all times thereafter. This agreement was signed by the appellant and Mr. and Mrs. Bloom. After the contract was entered into, the appellant constructed its logging road and dump. In constructing the dump it was necessary to dredge the slough, and the débris taken therefrom, in part at least, was deposited on the land of the respondents outside of the 50-foot strip. The logs were removed from the cars to the dump by means of a gin pole. To sustain the gin pole guy wires were anchored to stumps some distance from the foot thereof, and the anchorage of the guy wires and outside of the 50-foot strip mentioned in the contract. Some time later the parties entered into a second agreement whereby the appellant was given the right to build a warehouse at or near where the dump was constructed. This agreement was signed by the appellant and by Mr. and Mrs. Bloom. On March 15 a third agreement was made, which was signed by the appellant and by Mr. Bloom alone; Mrs. Bloom having refused to sign it. By this agreement the appellant, for the consideration of $150, among other things, was given the right of constructing such buildings as might be necessary for its logging purposes. Thereafter it constructed a number of buildings for the purpose of housing its employés. These agreements will be hereinafter referred to more in detail. Some time prior to April 1, 1924, when the present action was instituted Mr. Bloom was threatening, among other things, to blow out the stumps to which the appellant's guy wires were attached, and this caused the appellant to bring the action seeking to restrain interference with its operations.

The judgment entered by the trial court prohibited the making use of the respondents' land outside of the 50-foot strip for the purpose of dumping débris or anchoring guy wires, and also prohibited any use of the property under the third agreement.

The appellant's first point is that under the terms of the first agreement it had a right to a strip of land at the dump 90 feet wide instead of 50. The question of the guy wires and the dumping of the débris are treated separately in the briefs, but, as they are controlled by the same consideration, we will consider them together. The first inquiry is as to the right of the appellant under the first agreement so far as it applies to the width of the strip of land which the appellant was entitled to use at the dump. That contract provided that----

'Parties of the first part (respondents) hereby grant and give unto party of the second part (appellant), the right and privilege of constructing and operating a log dump in Campbell's slough, in front of the above described property, and the right of booming and rafting logs in said Campbell's slough, in front of said property.

'Parties of the first part hereby give and grant unto the party of the second part, for its said log dump, a strip of land at least fifty (50) feet in width from the line of the said dump the intention being that the party of the second part shall have sufficient ground to construct a spur back of its said logging dump.'

Another provision of the contract gave the appellant 'a right of way for logging railroad, forty (40) feet in width.' The contract does not seem to be ambiguous. The appellant had a right of way 40 feet wide for its logging railroad, and at the dump it was entitled to a strip of lamd 50 feet in width. It is plain that this 50 was not to be added to the 40 because the contract says...