Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Chehalis County Bank

• Decision Date: 24 October 1911
• Citation: 65 Wash. 374,118 P. 326
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: NORTHWESTERN MUT. LIFE INS. CO. v. CHEHALIS COUNTY BANK et al. (JOHN A. ROEBLING'S SONS CO. et al., Interveners.

118 P. 326

65 Wash. 374

NORTHWESTERN MUT. LIFE INS. CO. v. CHEHALIS COUNTY BANK et al. (JOHN A. ROEBLING'S SONS CO. et al., Interveners.

Supreme Court of Washington

October 24, 1911

Department 2. Appeal from Superior Court, Chehalis County; Ben Sheeks Judge.

Action by the Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company against the Chehalis County Bank and other; John A. Roebling's Sons Company and others intervening. From the decree, intervener John A. Roebling's Sons Company appeals. Affirmed.

Conway & Snider, for appellant.

G. C Israel and J. A. Hutcheson, for respondents.

CHADWICK J.

On November 15, 1907, Joseph Bernard took out a policy of insurance for the sum of $20,000. He afterwards assigned the policy to a certain creditor, to secure such sums as might be owing it in the event of his death. On the 20th day of December, 1909, he died intestate. The assignee creditor claiming a share of the policy, and the administrator and the widow respectively claiming the whole thereof, one as assets of the estate and the other as exempt to her, the insurance company brought the fund into court disclaiming any interest in the policy save an item of $130.60 for unpaid premiums, and asked that the fund be paid to whomsoever the court found to be justly entitled thereto. Appellant John A. Roebling's Sons Company, in its own behalf and as assignee of several creditors of Bernard having established their claims against the estate, filed a bill of interpleader, in which they asked that the amount of the policy be made subject to the claims of creditors. The Roebling's Sons Company has appealed from a decree of the court holding the proceeds of the policy, after deducting the amount due the assignee and a certain sum for costs and expenses of administration, to be exempt to the widow, and denying its right to participate therein.

It was alleged by the appellants that Bernard was insolvent at the time the policy was issued, and so remained until his death. Upon this issue the court made no finding. The court below held the policy to be exempt under chapter 125 of the Session Laws of 1895, entitled 'An act exempting the proceeds of life insurance from liability for debt.' Section 1 of the act reads as follows: 'That the proceeds or avails of all life insurance shall be exempt from all liability for debt.' This act was amended in 1897, so as to exempt accident insurance, as well as life insurance. Laws 1897, p. 70.

It is the contention of the appellants, however, that chapter 142, § 36, Laws 1909, repeals the former statutes, and is now the only law upon the subject of exemptions of life insurance. That it was the intention of the legislative body to exempt the proceeds of all life insurance from all liability for any debt is clearly expressed in the earlier acts ( Flood v. Libby, 38 Wash. 368, 80 P. 533, 107 Am. St. Rep. 851), and to hold that these laws are repealed it will be necessary for us to say the repeal is worked by implication, for there is no reference to the former act and no repealing clause in the act of 1909. That repeals by implication are not favored is the established doctrine in this state, and that they will not be allowed unless the will of the Legislature is so manifest that the statutes cannot be read in pari materia without violence to the earlier statutes is a fundamental rule of construction, from which courts are not at liberty to depart.

Another principle bearing upon this case is that exemption statutes are favored, and to overcome them the legislative will should be so clearly expressed as to leave no doubt in the minds of the court. When so tested, the contentions of the appellants must be denied. The purpose of the Legislature to repeal the general exemption statute is in no way indicated in the title of the later act. Nor is its repeal necessary to give life to the provisions of section 36 of the act of 1909, which, in so far as this case is concerned, seems...