Norton v. Inhabitants of Fayette

• Decision Date: 16 November 1936
• Citation: 188 A. 281
• Parties: NORTON v. INHABITANTS OF FAYETTE et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

188 A. 281

NORTON

v. INHABITANTS OF FAYETTE et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Nov. 16, 1936.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Androscoggin County.

Action by Edna A. Norton against the Inhabitants of Fayette and trustee. Judgment of the superior court affirming judgment of the municipal court in favor of the plaintiff, and defendants bring exceptions.

Exceptions sustained.

Argued before DUNN, C. J., and STURGIS, BARNES, THAXTER, HUDSON, MANSER, JJ.

Herbert E. Foster, of Winthrop, for plaintiff.

Edmund C. Darey, of Livermore Falls, for defendants.

MANSER, Justice.

A practicing attorney at Livermore Falls, in the county of Androscoggin, at one time represented the plaintiff in connection with her claim now in suit against the defendant, He was at the same time judge of the municipal court at Livermore Falls.

The statute, R.S. c. 97, § 33, provides that: "No judge of any municipal or police court shall act as counsel or attorney in any case, cause, matter or thing, which depends upon or relates to any cause exclusively cognizable by the court over which he presides, or which is actually brought in said court, although concurrently cognizable by some other court."

The plaintiff, however, was a resident of Fayette, in the county of Kennebec, and the defendant town is also located in that county. Ordinarily the Livermore Falls municipal court is without jurisdiction outside of its county, and therefore its judge could with propriety act as attorney for the plaintiff and was not then subject to the prohibition of the statute.

Acting as such attorney, he wrote to the first selectman of Fayette, setting forth the claim of the plaintiff in a statement which shows that it is identical with that in suit, and requested immediate payment, asserting among other things, "It is an honest bill." Later a second letter discloses that he had discussed the matter with the selectman, been informed of the version of the defendant, advanced its denial by the plaintiff, and again insisted upon payment. The defendant did not comply with the request.

About five months later the plaintiff through another attorney brought this action against the defendants, returnable to the Livermore Falls municipal court. Although the claim amounts to but $37 and the defendant is a town, the plaintiff named the Livermore Falls Trust Company as trustee, alleging that the defendant did not have in its hands and possession goods and estate of the value of the ad damnum of $75. As the trustee was located at Livermore Falls, this use of the trustee process gave jurisdiction to the Livermore Falls municipal court. It appears from the record that the trustee never filed a disclosure. The plaintiff took no action to require one, and the trustee has never been charged, discharged, or defaulted by the judge.

Several terms after the case was entered the defendant filed a written motion that the action be abated or removed to a disinterested tribunal upon the ground that the judge was disqualified. The letters written by the judge were incorporated in the motion. The motion was denied. The docket of the municipal court then shows that judgment was rendered for the plaintiff for the full amount, with interest. The defendant appealed to the superior court for Androscoggin county. In that court the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for the reason that the defendant did not plead the general issue in the municipal court. The sole question presented to the presiding justice was upon the right of appeal when no plea of general issue had been made in the lower court. The plaintiff was upheld on this contention, and exceptions bring the case forward.

Argument of counsel has been directed to the point raised in the superior court, and, further, that the motion to dismiss was in the nature of a plea in abatement and was insufficient because not filed in season and not supported by affidavit.

The real question, however, is not a matter of technical defects according to the course of common-law pleadings. The writ is in proper form. The court, on the face of the writ, had jurisdiction; but as constituted, was it a disinterested tribunal? The great underlying principle is that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial, and independent. This principle should not have a narrow or technical construction, but should be applied to all cases where a judicial officer is called upon to decide controversies between the people. Such a rule is in the general interest of justice, to preserve the purity and impartiality of the courts and the respect and confidence of the people for their decisions.

In 15 R.C.L., Judges, § 16, we find the principle stated thus: "Courts should scrupulously maintain the right of every litigant to an impartial and disinterested tribunal for the determination of his rights, and courts cannot too carefully guard against any attempt of an interested judge to force himself on litigating parties."

The reason expressed by Bronson, J., in People v. Suffolk Common Pleas, 18 Wend.(N.Y.) 550, 552, shows its universal application: ...