Norton v. State
| Decision Date | 14 March 1912 |
| Parties | NORTON v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
After a juror had answered on his voir dire the prescribed questions counsel for the accused was permitted to question him further. He was asked: "Is your mind perfectly impartial between the state and the accused? Do you think you are strictly impartial? To this he answered: "Well, I don't know that I am." On further examination, he stated that he was in a position to pass fairly upon the guilt or innocence of the accused; that he believed he could give a fair and impartial verdict, after hearing the evidence; that he had no opinion so fixed and unalterable as not to yield to the evidence; that he had not seen the crime committed, or heard any of the evidence; that he had no prejudice or bias for or against the accused, and had no feeling against him. When asked in regard to his answer to a previous question, that he did not know that he was strictly impartial, he explained it by saying that he did not think he so answered; that he did not hear very well, and might have misunderstood the question. Held, that there was no error in ruling that the juror was competent. Cato v State, 72 Ga. 747.
It was not accurate to charge: "If you should believe to a reasonable and moral certainty, from all the circumstances and facts, in connection with the defendant's statement that the defendant was acting in self-defense, or in defense of his person against one who manifestly intended by violence or surprise to commit a felony on his person, then under the law he would be justifiable." But, when consided in connection with the general charge on the subject of the presumption in favor of the accused and the necessity to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the charge quoted does not require a reversal.
One upon whom an arrest unlawfully and without a warrant is attempted to be made has a right to resist force with force proportionate to that being used in detaining him. The mere fact of an unlawful arrest will not alone authorize the killing of the officer making it. But if, in the progress of the transaction, the officer is about to commit a felony upon the other party, or so acts and makes such a show of violence as to excite in the person sought to be arrested the fears of a reasonable man that a felony is about to be committed upon him, and such person acts under the influence of those fears and not in a spirit of revenge, he may protect himself although it may be necessary to slay the officer for that purpose. In some cases, where the circumstances are not such as to justify the killing of the officer, they may be sufficient to reduce the homicide from murder to manslaughter. Franklin v. Amerson, 118 Ga. 860, 863, 45 S.E. 698; Thomas v. State, 91 Ga. 204, 18 S.E. 305; Perdue v. State, 135 Ga. 277, 284, 69 S.E. 184; Porter v. State, 124 Ga. 297, 52 S.E. 283, 2 L. R. A (N. S.) 730.
(a) In the light of the evidence, showing an unlawful killing by a deputy sheriff, who did not even inform the person whom he shot of his official position, or of any purpose to make an arrest, before shooting, and in view of the general charge, the charge touching resisting an illegal arrest, of which complaint is made, while not altogether accurate, does not require a new trial.
If one intentionally shoots another with a pistol, and the person shot dies from the wound, this presents no theory of involuntary manslaughter, because the slayer, in his unsworn statement upon the trial, asserts that he intended to wound the decedent, but not to kill him. Stovall v. State, 106 Ga. 443, 32 S.E. 586; Scott v. State, 132 Ga. 357, 64 S.E. 272; Perdue v. State, 135 Ga. 277, 69 S.E. 184.
The evidence in this case did not raise any issue of fact requiring a charge on the subject of either voluntary or involuntary manslaughter.
(a) The statement of the accused set up justification. Had it furnished any basis to charge on the subject of voluntary manslaughter, no request was made for such a charge.
Where, after the judge had completed his charge to the jury, counsel for the accused moved the court to declare a mistrial on the ground that one of the jurors was not impartial, and offered to introduce evidence to that effect, there was no error in calling the juror from the jury room and allowing him to be sworn by the state as to his impartiality; the court sending by the bailiff an instruction to the jury not to consider the case until the juror returned, and the juror, after being examined, having been sent back to the jury room, with direction not to disclose to the jury what had transpired.
(a) It appears from a note of the presiding judge that no objection was made to the temporary withdrawal from the jury of the juror whose impartiality was attacked.
Under the evidence introduced, there was no error in refusing to grant a new trial on the ground that one of the jurors was prejudiced against the accused and had made statements indicating such partiality.
In the light of the entire charge of the court and of the evidence, none of the other grounds of the motion for a new trial were such as to require a reversal. The verdict was fully supported by the evidence.
Error from Superior Court, Jones County; Jas. B. Park, Judge.
W. B Norton was convicted of murder, and...
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Smith v. State
...and refused by the trial court is a fair statement of this principal of law, couched substantially in the language of Norton v. State, 137 Ga. 842(3), 74 S.E. 759. A defendant is entitled to have the unlawfulness of the arrest sought to be made considered in connection with the evidence and......
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...319. The court, in dictum, doubted whether the officer in question had the right to effect the arrest. Id. at 318. 132. Norton v. State, 74 S.E. 759, 760 (Ga. 1912). For other cases that cite the holding, see, for example, Mullis v. State, 27 S.E.2d 91, 98-99 (Ga. 1943), Shafer v. State, 20......