Norwood Morris Plan Co. v. McCarthy

• Decision Date: 05 November 1936
• Parties: NORWOOD MORRIS PLAN CO. v. McCARTHY.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

295 Mass. 597

4 N.E.2d 450

NORWOOD MORRIS PLAN CO. v. McCARTHY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

November 5, 1936

Exceptions from Superior Court, Middlesex County; Morton, Judge.

Action of contract brought to the superior court by the Norwood Morris Plan Company against William T. McCarthy, executor. Plaintiff's motion for immediate entry of judgment was allowed, and the defendant defaulted, and the defendant brings exceptions.

Exceptions overruled.

H. A. Buck, of Boston, for plaintiff.

G Bergson and H. Kalus, both of Boston, for defendant.

RUGG Chief Justice.

This action of contract based upon a promissory note was brought in a district court against the executor of one of the joint and several makers. Recovery is sought of the unpaid balance of $3000 with interest, together with a reasonable attorney's fee as provided in the note and alleged to be $225. The defendant seasonably claimed a trial by jury and caused the case to be removed to the Superior Court. G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 231, § 104. There the defendant filed an answer containing a general denial, plea of payment, and allegation of lack of consideration, and a denial of the genuineness of the signature of his testator with a demand for proof thereof. Subsequently, on January 18, 1935, the plaintiff filed a motion to amend its declaration by increasing its claim for a reasonable attorney's fee from $225 to $450. This motion was allowed on January 25, 1935, apparently without objection. On the same date the plaintiff filed a motion for the immediate entry of judgment for the amount of the debt, supported by the affidavit of its treasurer. G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 231, § 59B. The affidavit set forth the belief of the affiant that there was no defense to the action; that the action was based on a note signed by the defendant's testator; that various specified payments had been made on the note showing the amount claimed to be due; that the consideration of the note was the balance due on a prior promissory note signed by the same makers including the defendant's testator; that the defendant was appointed executor on April 25, 1933; that thereafter until the suing out of the writ in the present action the plaintiff had used every diligent effort to get the note paid but was met by evasion and delay on the part of the defendant; that no payment or tender had been offered by the defendant; and that the entire balance with interest and a reasonable attorney's fee was then due. Thereupon the defendant filed a counter affidavit (1) denying specifically the signature of the defendant's testator on the note of the plaintiff, (2) denying specifically that the plaintiff furnished any consideration for the purported note and demanding proof thereof, and (3) disputing that the amount requested as an attorney's fee by the plaintiff in its original or amended declaration was a reasonable one, with a request that the reasonableness of any fee be fixed by a jury. He also stated his belief that there were good defenses to the action in that nowhere in the records or papers of his testator was there an entry relating to the note, or of any consideration therefor, that he was ignorant of the making of the note, and that he denied the genuineness of the signature of the testator on the note and demanded proof thereof.

The plaintiff's affidavit and motion for judgment were heard on January 25, 1935, in the absence of counsel for the defendant. The plaintiff's affidavit and motion for judgment and the defendant's counter affidavit were before the trial judge for consideration. Unpon consideration on the same day, the trial judge allowed the plaintiff's motion for judgment, defaulted the defendant, and ordered judgment to be entered accordingly. No question is now raised as to the simultaneous entry of judgment, since that has been corrected. See G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 231 § 113.Rule 79 of the Superior Court (1932). The defendant duly excepted to the order for judgment made on January 25, 1935, on the ground that his affidavit presented enough of a substantive defense to entitle him to go to a jury on the issues there involved. The question to be determined is whether the default and order for judgment were authorized by G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 231, § 59B, pursuant to the terms of which the proceedings heretofore narrated were taken. That section, originally enacted as St.1929, c. 172, § 1, is designed to provide a procedure for separating debt collecting from controversial litigation, and to expedite the collection of debts where there is no real defense. See recommendations of the Judicial Council in its first report, pages 32, 33, 141, its second report, pages 44-47, 114, its third report, page 76, and its fourth report, page 49. The purpose of said section 59B is to avoid the delay and expense of a trial of facts where no substantial issue of fact exists. Statutes and rules of court creating a summary procedure in those circumstances have been established in many common law jurisdictions. See the Summary Judgment, 38 Yale L.J. 423.A somewhat analogous procedure formerly existed in this Commonwealth by St.1852, c. 312, § 10, Gen.Sts. c. 129, § 45, whereby the default of a defendant was required in the absence of an affidavit by him of substantial defense to the merits of the action. Whipple v. Rogerson, 12 Gray, 347; Hunt v. Lucas, 99 Mass. 404.

The provisions of G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 231, § 59B, material to the present issues are these: ‘ In any action of contract where the plaintiff seeks to recover a debt or liquidated demand, he may * * * on affidavit by himself or by any other person who can swear to the facts of his own knowledge, verifying the cause of action and stating that in his belief there is no defense thereto, move for the immediate entry of judgment for the amount of the debt or demand, together with interest if any is claimed. * * * After hearing the court may, unless the defendant by affidavit, by his own evidence or otherwise shall disclose such facts as the court finds entitle him to defend, enter an order for judgment for the amount of the debt or demand, with interest if any is due, and costs. Judgment as aforesaid shall be entered at the expiration of seven days from the order unless the defendant in the meanwhile files a demand for trial; and if such demand is filed as aforesaid the case shall be advanced for speedy trial. If the defendant does not appear at said hearing or file at or before the time set for hearing an affidavit setting forth specifically and clearly the substantive facts upon which he relies as a defense, the court may enter judgment by default.'

The inquiry arises at the threshold whether the plaintiff's action falls within the scope of said section 59B. That section is restricted in operation to cases where the plaintiff seeks to recover ‘ a debt or liquidated demand.’ These words occur in a remedial statute and ought not to be given a constricted interpretation. On the other hand, they ought not to be stretched to include causes of action outside the main purpose of the enactment. No inflexible meaning has been attached to the word ‘ debt’ in our decisions. In Mill Dam Foundery v Hovey, 21 Pick. 417, 455,Smith v. First Congregational Meetinghouse, 8 Pick. 178, and Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S. 243, 249, 250, 45 S.Ct. 73, 75, 76, 69 L.Ed. 265, the word was given in different connections a broad signification. In some of these cases the action of debt at common law or as modified in practice may have been under consideration, rather than the exact conception of debt as an obligation. In H. G. Kilbourne Co. v. Standard Stamp Affixer Co., 216 Mass. 118, 121, 103 N.E. 469, 470, occurs this language: ‘ Doubtless the word ‘ debt,’ as was said in Gray v. Bennett, 3 Metc. 522, 526,‘ is of large import, including not only debts of record, or judgments, and debts by specialty, but also obligations arising under simple contract, to a very wide extent.’ * * * It may comprehend not only liquidated demands where there is an express or an implied promise to pay or an absolute duty raised by law to discharge, but also * * * an agreement for the payment of money which will require some calculation or determination of extraneous facts before its exact amount can be ascertained, provided the debtor has made a distinct and binding promise to pay. * * * A liability, although not reduced to a certainty and hence in that sense unliquidated, nevertheless may be a debt, provided that the consideration is executed and there is an express promise to pay and the precise sum of money due may be ascertained by simple mathematical calculation from known facts.' Stone, Timlow & Co., Inc., v. Stryker, 230 Mass. 67, 72, 119 N.E. 655. Commissioner of Banks v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., 247 Mass. 334, 341, 142 N.E. 100; French v. Bray, 263 Mass. 121, 123, 160 N.E. 424. It was held in Cochrane v. Forbes, 267 Mass. 417, 420, 166 N.E. 752, 753, with ample citation of supporting authorities, that liquidated damages ‘ mean damages, agreed upon as to amount by the parties, or fixed by operation of law, or under the correct applicable principles of law made certain in amount by the terms of the contract, or susceptible of being made certain in amount by mathematical calculations from factors which are or ought to be in the possession or knowledge of the party to be charged. Unliquidated damages are those which cannot thus be made certain by one of the parties alone.’ Doubtless some confusion has arisen as to circumstances which constitute a sum certain so that the obligation may fall within the description of debt. Commonly, if the damages to be recovered are unliquidated or not readily ascertained from established facts, the remedy under said section 59B must fail. Joseph Mogul,...