Nowotny v. Blair

Decision Date30 June 1891
Citation49 N.W. 357,32 Neb. 175
PartiesMARTIN NOWOTNY ET AL. v. MARY BLAIR
CourtNebraska Supreme Court

ERROR to the district court for Butler county. Tried below before MARSHALL, J.

AFFIRMED.

A. J Evans, M. Miller, and Harwood, Ames & Kelly, for plaintiffs in error, cited: Elshire v. Schuyler, 15 Neb. 562; Roberts v. Taylor, 19 Neb. 185; Roose v Perkins, 9 Neb. 315; Jennings v. Simpson, 12 Neb. 558.

Steele Bros., contra, cited: Elshire v. Schuyler, 15 Neb 561; Hale v. Wigton, 20 Neb. 83; Kerkow v. Bauer, 15 Neb. 154; Roberts v. Taylor, 19 Neb. 184; Palmer v. People, 4 Neb. 68; Robinson v. Randall, 82 Ill. 522; Burnett v. R. Co. 16 Neb. 332.

OPINION

COBB, CH. J.

The plaintiff below and defendant in error, on December 15, 1888, brought her action against Martin Nowotny, J. R Jones, George Sheldon, and M. Demuth in the district court, alleging that on May 1, 1887, the defendant Nowotny procured a license from the city council of David City to sell malt, spirituous, and vinous liquors in that city. That as a condition of allowance of license, Nowotny, as required by law, executed and delivered to the city his undertaking to pay all damages, fines, and penalties that might be adjudged against him by reason of the sale of liquors. The other defendants were his sureties on the undertaking.

Second--The plaintiff alleged that on October 29, 1887, Nowotny, at his saloon in David City, sold and delivered to Frank Sedlock an intoxicating liquor commonly called beer, which Sedlock then and there drank, by reason of which he became intoxicated, and while so intoxicated carelessly and violently drove his wagon against the wagon of William Blair, the plaintiff's husband, wherein plaintiff was riding, and caused plaintiff to be thrown from her seat upon her back, greatly damaging and injuring her so that she has for more than a year been confined to her house, and most of the time obliged to remain in bed, and suffered intense pain both in mind and in body; that at the time of the injury, plaintiff was thrown from her seat in the wagon and fell across the back of the seat upon the small of her back, by reason of which her back was seriously injured, and she was so badly hurt as to be thrown into spasms and sinking spells, and her mind and nervous system were greatly injured and affected by her fall, and she has never recovered from her injury, but still continues to suffer, and is unable to attend to her household duties as a wife and mother; and she alleges that she is informed by physicians, and believes, that her injuries are such that she will never recover, and even if she continues to live, she will during the remainder of her life be compelled to suffer as an invalid, most of the time confined to her bed, to her damage $ 5,000.

The defendants, on February 15, 1889, answered, admitting that Nowotny procured a license to sell malt, spirituous, and vinous liquors, as alleged.

2. They deny each and every other allegation alleged.

There was a trial to a jury which, on September 24, 1889, returned a verdict for the plaintiff of $ 4,500.

On October 5, 1889, the defendant's motion for a new trial was considered and overruled, and judgment entered upon the verdict for $ 4,500, with lawful interest from that date and costs of suit, against all the defendants, to which exceptions were duly taken and the following errors assigned:

1. The verdict and judgment are excessive.

2. The same are not sustained by sufficient evidence.

3. The verdict appears to have been given under the influence of passion and prejudice.

4. The verdict is contrary to law.

5. Is contrary to instructions of the court, 2, 3, and 4, of its own motion.

6. Is contrary to the instructions.

7. Errors of law occurring at the trial and excepted to.

8. In giving instructions 1 and 2 at request of plaintiff.

9. In refusing instructions 3 and 4 at request of defendant.

10. In overruling challenge for cause of R. C. London, juror.

11. In overruling challenge for cause of D. P. Grice, juror.

12. In overruling defendant's motion for new trial on affidavits of newly discovered evidence.

The first objection offered, and argued, in the brief of the plaintiffs in error is, that the petition fails to state a cause of action; and that it is not alleged that the intoxication produced the injury complained of, but that the intoxicated man, Sedlock, carelessly and violently ran his wagon into that occupied by plaintiff, and thereby produced the injury. Three elements of the action only are stated: the intoxication and negligence of Sedlock, and the injury to the plaintiff. Counsel ask, does the injury necessarily follow from the allegation of intoxication? and is it enough to allege that the man Sedlock was intoxicated, and leave it to the court and jury to infer that he was therefore careless, or that therefore the accident happened and the injury followed? We answer these queries of counsel emphatically in the affirmative, under the proof submitted to the jury at the trial. This action is brought under chap. 50 of our Statutes, as follows:

"Sec. 18. TRIAL-EVIDENCE.--On the trial of any suit under the provisions hereof, the cause or foundation of which shall be the acts done or injuries inflicted by a person under the influence of liquor, it shall only be necessary to sustain the action to prove that the defendant or defendants sold or gave liquor to the person so intoxicated, or under the influence of liquor, whose acts or injuries are complained of, on that day or about that time when said acts were committed, or said injuries received. And in an action for damages brought by a married woman or other person whose support legally devolves upon a person disqualified by intemperance from earning the same, it shall only be necessary to prove that the defendant has given or sold intoxicating drinks to such person during the period of such disqualification."

The allegations of the plaintiff under this act are required to cover only those facts susceptible of proof. The urgent and pressing motive of the casualty and injury, beyond that of intoxication, is not required by the letter of the law. The statute was obviously framed to avoid the necessity of proof of the metaphysical instincts, and the abnormal conditions of an intoxicated secondary cause. The dealer or seller, the saloon keeper, is the first cause of injury, and is the subjective of the action. His sureties are consubstantial with him, and are equally responsible. The intoxicated and distracted party is the secondary cause of injury, and may be supposed to have reimbursed the risk taken, in the sale of liquor to him by the principal defendant.

It may be doubted that in any case witnesses could be called, at a trial, to prove that the peculiar intoxication under investigation was the only motive for the injury, or that the same party, in...

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