Nuckles v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corrs.
Decision Date | 24 May 2019 |
Docket Number | Case No.: 3:17cv756/LAC/EMT |
Parties | DONZELL K. NUCKLES, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
This cause is before the court on Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (ECF No. 1). Respondent filed an answer and relevant portions of the state court record (ECF No. 26). Petitioner filed a reply (ECF No. 28).
The case was referred to the undersigned for the issuance of all preliminary orders and any recommendations to the district court regarding dispositive matters. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). After careful consideration of all issues presented by the parties, it is the opinion of the undersigned that no evidentiary hearing is required for the disposition of this matter, Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. It is further the opinion of the undersigned that the pleadings and attachments before the court show that Petitioner is not entitled to relief.
The relevant aspects of the procedural background of this case are established by the state court record (see ECF No. 26).1 Petitioner was charged in the Circuit Court in and for Santa Rosa County, Florida, Case No. 2013-CF-112, with ten counts of sexual battery while in a position of familial or custodial authority on a child 12 years of age or older but less than 18 years of age (Counts 1-10), and two counts of lewd or lascivious molestation of a child 12 years of age or older but less than 16 years of age (Counts 11, 12) (Ex. A at 25-27). Following a jury trial on February 26-27, 2014, Petitioner was found guilty as charged on all counts (Ex. A at 512-16, Ex. C). On April 14, 2014, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to thirty (30) years in prison on each sexual battery count and fifteen (15) years in prison on each lewd or lascivious molestation count, with all sentences to run consecutively, and with pre-sentence jail credit of 449 days (Ex. A at 584-90, Ex. D).
Petitioner, through counsel, appealed the judgment to the Florida First District Court of Appeal ("First DCA"), Case No. 1D14-2036 (Ex. A at 629, Ex. E). The First DCA issued the following written opinion on April 23, 2015:
(Ex. G). Nuckles v. State, 162 So. 3d 1146 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (Mem). The mandate issued May 19, 2015 (Ex. H). On March 11, 2016, the trial court reversed Petitioner's conviction and vacated his sentence as to Count 5 (Ex. I). A corrected judgment and sentence rendered on March 29, 2016 (Ex. J).
On December 14, 2015, Petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction relief in the state circuit court, pursuant to Rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure (Ex. K at 5-12). In an order rendered March 11, 2016, the circuit court dismissed the motion for failure to comply with the certification requirement of Rule 3.850(n)(2), without prejudice to Petitioner's filing an amended Rule 3.850 motion within sixty (60) days (id. at 21-22). Petitioner filed a timely amended motion (id. at 23-34). On April 22, 2016, the circuit court issued an order noting that some of Petitioner's claims were facially insufficient, and providing Petitioner an opportunity to file a second amended Rule 3.850 motion within sixty (60) days (id. at 43-45). Petitioner filed a timely second amended motion, asserting four grounds for relief (id. at 46-61). The court appointed counsel for Petitioner and held a limited evidentiary hearing on one of Petitioner's claims (see id. at 67-68, 75-76, 88-105). On March 13, 2017, the circuit court rendered a final order denying the second amended Rule 3.850 motion (id. at 109-19). Petitioner filed a notice of appeal (Ex. K at 363, Ex. L). The First DCA assigned Case No. 1D17-1214, and affirmed the circuit court's decision per curiam without written opinion on June 7, 2017, with the mandate issuing September 13, 2017 (Exs. M, N, S). Nuckles v. State, 227 So. 3d 572 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (Table).
Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas action on October 2, 2017 (ECF No. 1).
Federal courts may grant habeas corpus relief for persons in state custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Section 2254(d) provides, in relevant part:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2011).
The United States Supreme Court explained the framework for § 2254 review in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000). The appropriate test was described by Justice O'Connor as follows:
Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
Id., 529 U.S. at 412-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Employing the Williams framework, on any issue raised in a federal habeas petition upon which there has been an adjudication on the merits in a state court proceeding, the federal court must first ascertain the "clearly established Federal law," namely, "the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court render[ed] its decision." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 155 L. Ed. 2d 144 (2003). The law is "clearly established" only when a Supreme Court holding at the time of the state court decision embodies the legal principle at issue. Thaler v. Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47, 130 S. Ct. 1171, 175 L. Ed. 2d 1003 (2010); Woods v. Donald, — U.S. —, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376, 191 L. Ed. 2d 464 (2015) .
After identifying the governing legal principle(s), the federal court determines whether the state court adjudication is contrary to the clearly established Supreme Court case law. The adjudication is not contrary to Supreme Court precedent merely because it fails to cite to that precedent. Rather, the adjudication is "contrary" only if either the reasoning or the result contradicts the relevant Supreme Court cases. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8, 123 S. Ct. 362, 154 L. Ed. 2d 263 (2002). Where there is no Supreme Court precedent on point, the state court's conclusion cannot be contrary to clearly established federal law. See Woods, 135 S. Ct. at 1377 . If the state court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law, the federal habeas court must independently consider the merits of the petitioner's claim. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 954, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 168 L. Ed. 2d 662 (2007).
If the "contrary to" clause is not satisfied, the federal habeas court next determines whether the state court "unreasonably applied" the governing legal principles set forth in the Supreme Court's cases. The federal court defers to the state court's reasoning unless the state court's application of the legal principle(s) was "objectively unreasonable" in light of the record before the state court. Williams, 529 U.S. at 409...
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