Nueces County Hospital Dist. v. Texas Health Facilities Commission, 12906

• Decision Date: 24 January 1979
• Docket Number: No. 12906,12906
• Citation: 576 S.W.2d 908
• Parties: NUECES COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT, d/b/a Memorial Medical Center of Corpus Christi, Appellant, v. TEXAS HEALTH FACILITIES COMMISSION et al., Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 908

576 S.W.2d 908

NUECES COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT, d/b/a Memorial Medical Center of Corpus Christi, Appellant, v. TEXAS HEALTH FACILITIES COMMISSION et al., Appellees.

No. 12906.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Austin.

Jan. 24, 1979.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 21, 1979.

Duane F. Emmert, McGinnis, Lochridge & Kilgore, Austin, for appellant.

John L. Hill, Atty. Gen., Carla J. Cox, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, for Texas Health Facilities Commission.

Fred E. Davis, David M. Davis, Davis, Davis & Sharp, Austin, for Spohn Hospital of Corpus Christi.

SHANNON, Justice.

Appellant Nueces County Hospital District, doing business as Memorial Medical Center of Corpus Christi, appeals from the judgment of the district court of Travis County which affirmed an order of appellee Texas Health Facilities Commission. The Commission's order granted the application of appellee Spohn Hospital for a certificate of need authorizing the purchase and installation of a computerized tomographic whole body scanner. In another order the Commission denied Memorial's application for a certificate of need for a similar scanner. We will affirm the judgment of the district court.

For purposes of this opinion it is accurate to state that Spohn filed an application with the Commission on April 7, 1977, to purchase a scanner to be placed and operated in the hospital in Corpus Christi. Memorial filed its application on May 6, 1977, with the Commission for a similar scanner to be placed and operated at its hospital. Pursuant to its rules, the Commission joined the applications as "potentially competing applications" and proceeded to consider the applications in a single hearing.

The parties presented evidence to the Commission pertaining to the need in the Corpus Christi community for a body scanner. The position of the parties before the agency was that there was need for two scanners, one at each hospital.

After entry of the Commission's orders, Memorial filed an administrative appeal in the district court of Travis County. In its petition Memorial attacked both the order approving Spohn's application and the order denying its own application. Pursuant to Spohn's motion, the district court severed that part of the administrative appeal complaining of the approval of Spohn's certificate from that part complaining of the denial of Memorial's certificate, and entered judgment affirming the Commission's approval of Spohn's certificate. More specifically, the district court concluded in its judgment that the Commission's order granting the requested authority to Spohn was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious. It is that judgment now under consideration in this appeal.

After severance of Spohn's cause from that of Memorial, the primary task of the district court in the severed cause was to determine whether the Commission's approval of Spohn's certificate was supported by substantial evidence. Upon appeal, the main issue presented for review is whether the district court correctly determined that the Commission's approval of Spohn's certificate was supported by substantial evidence.

An appeal from an order of the Commission is governed by the substantial evidence rule. A statement of the law relating to judicial review of agency orders is found in a recent opinion of this Court, Mutual Building and Loan Association v. Lewis, 572 S.W.2d 771 (Tex.Civ.App.1978, no writ), and need not be repeated.

The district court correctly concluded that there was substantial evidence in support of the Commission's order approving the Spohn application. In fact, during the agency hearing, Memorial's position was that there was substantial evidence to support approval by the Commission of certificates for Both Spohn and Memorial. For example, Dr. Franz J. Hallermann, Memorial's witness, testified on cross-examination, "We need two scanners and we need them badly. We need one at Spohn and we need one at Memorial." At least four other of Memorial's witnesses testified to the same effect. Memorial is hardly in a position now to claim that there is not substantial evidence to support the Commission's order...