Nuernberger v. State

• Decision Date: 20 December 1976
• Docket Number: No. 51615,51615
• Parties: , 359 N.E.2d 412 Robert NUERNBERGER, Respondent, v. STATE of New York, Appellant. Claim
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 904

390 N.Y.S.2d 904

41 N.Y.2d 111, 359 N.E.2d 412

Robert NUERNBERGER, Respondent, v. STATE of New York, Appellant.

Claim No. 51615.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 20, 1976.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen., Albany (Peter J. Dooley, Jr., and Ruth Kessler Toch, Albany, of counsel), for appellant.

Irving Fudeman, Buffalo, for respondent.

BREITEL, Chief Judge.

Claimant, once convicted and imprisoned for assault arising from alleged incest with his 11-year-old daughter, sues the State for damages for wrongful imprisonment. He claims not innocence, but that he is entitled to damages because the County Court, which tried him, lacked 'jurisdiction' to prosecute the assault unless the Family Court had first considered and transferred the matter to the County Court. The Appellate Division has twice held that claimant is entitled to damages for the reason assigned by him. The State appeals.

One may assume that the County Court is so lacking in power of adjudication over the subject matter as to be without competence to try the assault for which claimant had been tried. The issue, nevertheless, is whether the State is protected against a claim for false imprisonment when its administrati officials acted upon commitment papers issued by that court, a court otherwise of general criminal jurisdiction.

The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and the claim dismissed.

A court, otherwise competent to determine the kind of cause before it, which has 'jurisdiction' at least to determine in the first instance whether it may or should retain 'jurisdiction', has, at least, some competence over the cause. Hence, its process and mandates may not be equated with process and mandates emanating from a court totally lacking in power, any power, over subject matter. Moreover, even if such process or mandate is void, it does not follow automatically that one affected by any kind of 'void' process or mandate is entitled to damages because those obliged to enforce the 'void' process or mandates performed the duty imposed on them by law.

Some 'unlawful' commands addressed to the law's ministers and minions must be obeyed (see, e.g., Cox, Void Order and Duty to Obey, 16 U.Chi.L.Rev. 86, esp. pp. 99--110). That County Court lacked power to do more than ascertain the basic facts giving the Family Court first instance jurisdiction and to transfer the action to the Family Court does not render the County Court's process or mandate a nullity. But for article 8 of the Family Court Act, which authorizes alternative treatment of certain otherwise criminal acts between persons of specified family relationships, the competence of the County Court to have tried and convicted claimant would be unquestioned (compare Family Ct. Act, § 811, with N.Y.Const. art. VI, § 11, subd. a). The concept of subject matter jurisdiction uncritically applied to award claimant damages against the State would work a grave injustice and would illustrate a recurring confusion over a term of unfortunately elastic meaning.

In April of 1966, claimant Nuernberger was indicted for three crimes committed on his 11-year-old daughter: incest, assault with intent to commit incest, and impairing the morals of a minor. Following a jury trial in Erie County Court, Nuernberger was convicted of both the assault and the impairment charges. The sentence imposed for the assault conviction was from three to six years; on the impairment count a suspended maximum sentence of one year was imposed. Unanimous affirmance of the conviction by the Appellate Division followed (People v. Nuernberger, 31 A.D.2d 718, 297 N.Y.S.2d 525). Undisputed is that claimant was imprisoned pursuant to the County Court commitment from April 14, 1967 until July 17, 1969, when his conviction for assault was reversed by this court and the proceedings transferred to the Family Court (People v. Nuernberger, 25 N.Y.2d 179, 183, 303 N.Y.S.2d 74, 76, 250 N.E.2d 352, 353).

In the prior appeal this court noted that the record sustained claimant's conviction for assault (25 N.Y.2d, at p. 183, 303 N.Y.S.2d, at p. 76, 250 N.E.2d, at p. 353). Reversal, however, was required by the Family Court Act which reposes initially in the Family Court 'exclusive original jurisdiction' over 'acts which would constitute * * * an assault * * * between parent and child.' (Family Ct. Act, § 812; see N.Y.Const., art. VI, § 13, subd. b.) Of course, the Family Court may elect to transfer jurisdiction to an appropriate criminal court (Family Ct. Act, §§ 811, 816, subd. (a); People v. Johnson, 20 N.Y.2d 220, 223, 282 N.Y.S.2d 481, 483, 229 N.E.2d 180, 181).

Not more than three months after his release by the Family Court, on one year's probation on consent, claimant sued in the Court of Claims. His argument was simple. Since initial exclusive original jurisdiction over the assault charge was in Family Court, the County Court in which he had been convicted and sentenced lacked jurisdiction over both the person of the claimant and the subject matter of the proceeding. Hence, he argues, any mandates issued by the County Court were null and void, affording no protection to the custodial authorities who acted in reliance on their validity.

To be sure, it has long been said and to some extent established, without examination evidently since the common-law reports in this State, that process or mandate is void and hence cannot be relied upon where on its face it is apparent that the issuing court was without jurisdiction over the subject matter, that is, without competence to adjudicate the kind of cause before it (Savacool v. Boughton, 5 Wend. 170, 172; cf. Harty v. State of New York, 29 A.D.2d 243, 244, 287 N.Y.S.2d 306, 307, affd. 27 N.Y.2d 698, 314 N.Y.S.2d 14, 262 N.E.2d 220; Douglas v. State of New York, 269 App.Div. 521, 525, 56 N.Y.S.2d 245, 248, affd., 296 N.Y. 530, 68 N.E.2d 605; see, also, Troutman v. State of New York, 273 App.Div. 619, 621--622, 79 N.Y.S.2d 709, 711, 712, pertaining to jurisdiction over the person). In general, the statement is true, except that it does not account for the power of a court to determine that it has no kind of jurisdiction over the category of cause before it (Family Ct. Act, § 813; see Restatement, Judgments, § 10, Comment A; see, also, Dobbs, Validation of Void Judgments: Bootstrap Principle, 53 Va.L.Rev. 1003, 1005--1006, 1009--1014).

This case, however, does not yield to the facile classification suggested by the traditional statement of the rule. To begin with, not every crime between members of a family is cognizable as a Family Court offense (Family Ct. Act, § 812; People v. Lewis, 29 N.Y.2d 923, 924, 329 N.Y.S.2d 100, 101, 279 N.E.2d 856, 857 (incest not within Family Court's exclusive original jurisdiction)). Illustrative is the impairment charge for which claimant was convicted (People v. Nuernberger, 25 N.Y.2d 179, 182, 303 N.Y.S.2d 74, 76, 250 N.E.2d 352, 353, Supra). Had the sentence imposed for impairing the morals of a minor not been suspended, there would be no question but that claimant could have been committed to prison by order of County Court. And even were the instant conviction so clearly one to be initially resolved only in Family Court, the custodial authorities criticized by claimant may have assumed, reasonably, that the County Court proceeding took place only after the Family Court determined, as it could under the statute, that the matter should be criminally tried (Family Ct. Act, § 816). Not until this court reversed was it 'clear' that the commitment issued pursuant to the judgment of conviction suffered from a 'facial' invalidity, if that it was.

It is an encyclopedia commonplace that '(w)here a court is without jurisdiction in the particular case, its acts and proceedings can be of no force or validity, and are a mere nullity and void' (21 C.J.S. Courts § 116). However deceptively attractive and convenient, this commonplace is both too simple and too broad. Definitions of 'jurisdiction' are too varied and the consequences flowing from defective 'jurisdiction' too diverse. (See Lacks v. Lacks, 41 N.Y.2d 71, 74, 390 N.Y.S.2d 875, 877, 359 N.E.2d 384, 386, decided herewith; Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws, § 25, pp. 72--73; Leflar, American Conflicts Law, § 3, pp. 4--6.) In fact, discerning analysis would reveal that the absence of power of adjudication in a particular cause does not, in and of itself, automatically deprive a court's acts and proceedings of their validity.

Indeed, this court has recognized that a defect in a court's 'jurisdiction', because a defendant had not been sentenced for a six-year period after verdict, may be the basis for habeas corpus relief, but no ground on which to recover damages for false imprisonment. Thus, in People ex. rel. Harty v. Fay, 10 N.Y.2d 374, 223 N.Y.S.2d 468, 179 N.E.2d 483, defendant was successful in procuring his release from prison but his subsequent claim for false imprisonment was rejected (Harty v. State of New York 27 N.Y.2d 698, 314 N.Y.S.2d 14, 262 N.E.2d 220, affg., 29 A.D.2d 243, 287 N.Y.S.2d 306, Supra).

In rejecting the damage claim, this court evidently accepted the Appellate Division interpretation of the prior Court of Appeals holding of lack of jurisdiction as really only illegality of sentence. Whether this reassessment was calculated to avoid the unfortunate consequences routinely associated with defective 'jurisdiction' or to tecast the prior holding in the light of the versatile use of the term 'jurisdiction' is not important. What is important is that from a comparison of the results in the two litigations, one must conclude that notwithstanding the absence of 'jurisdiction' for purposes of sustaining the sentence involved, power remained with the sentencing court sufficient to protect officials who carried out its mandates. In short, the Harty cases...