Nugent v. City of Jackson
Decision Date | 27 May 1895 |
Citation | 18 So. 493,72 Miss. 1040 |
Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Parties | W. L. NUGENT ET AL. v. THE CITY OF JACKSON |
FROM the chancery court of the first district of Hinds county. HON. H. C. CONN, Chancellor.
Appellants are seized and possessed as joint tenants of the south half of two-acre lot five, north, in the city of Jackson Mississippi, the same being occupied by them as a residence. The lot fronts on State street, on the east, one hundred and sixty feet, and runs back west three hundred and twenty feet to President street, being bounded on the south by High street.
On June 7, 1893, the mayor and board of aldermen of said city of Jackson passed the following ordinance:
Appellants, after being notified, having failed to construct the sidewalk on the south side of their lot, the city authorities proceeded to construct the same in pursuance of the ordinance. On November 30, 1893, after the sidewalk had been nearly completed, the appellants filed this bill in the court below, to enjoin the city from doing the work. The bill averred that the sidewalk was being constructed without their consent; and against their objection; that the same was of no benefit to them, and they protested against its being put down at their expense. It further averred that the ordinance under Which the improvement was sought to be made was illegal, unreasonable, and void, and that complainants, within twenty days after the passage of the ordinance, had duly filed their written protest against the construction of the sidewalk. The city answered the bill, asserting the legality of the ordinance, and averring that the sidewalk in question was a necessary public improvement. The answer also denied an allegation of the bill that the sidewalk constituted a part of the lot of complainants, and averred that it was a part of the public street.
After testimony taken, a motion was made by defendant to dissolve the injunction on bill, answer and proofs. The motion was sustained, and from a decree dissolving the injunction, complainants prayed and obtained this appeal. The evidence showed that the inclosure of complainants, on the south side of their lot, was not in line with the street as surveyed, but that the fence inclosed all the land called for in complainants' deed, and that the land on the south side, where the sidewalk was laid, had been on the outside of the inclosure, and considered a part of the highway about fifty years, though there had only been a dirt walk at this point, which was not much used by the public, this being a side street. Appellants had laid a sidewalk in front of their property on State street, and their testimony tended to show that the walk on the south side would not benefit their property. The opinion contains such further statement as is necessary for the understanding of the questions decided.
Affirmed.
Nugent & Mc Willie, for appellants.
All that is said in the ordinance about a nuisance is put in as a cover for the exercise of unwarranted jurisdiction. If there was a nuisance, no notice was ever given appellants to abate it. But it is absurd to assume that a dirt sidewalk could be a nuisance. It cannot be seriously contended that the authorities of a town can, by arbitrary ordinance, destroy private property as a nuisance, unless, on proper notice, it is shown to be such by its location or the sanitary conditions surrounding it. 42 Miss. 493; 10 Wall., 505; 23 Am. R., 609; 16 Am. & Eng. Enc. L., 937; 1 Dill. on Mun. Cor., § 308.
There has never been a general assessment of the property under § 2926, code 1892. Section 2944 empowers the city to cause to be constructed and maintained sidewalks, to determine materials and plans therefor, and to collect taxes by special assessment for payment of same. The ordinance in question was not adopted under this section, and, therefore, it is not to be considered. The language used in the title and in the first section of the ordinance places justification upon § 3011, code 1892. Appellants took advantage of this statute, and filed their protest against the improvement. Unless the court is to alter the purport of the ordinance, and do that which was not attempted to be done by the authorities, the decree should be reversed.
Appellants agree that the rule as to sidewalks in front of one's residence, on a public street, in general allows municipal authorities to compel the owner to lay the walk at his own expense. This rests upon the predicate that the property is benefited, and that all owners of lots along the same street must contribute to the improvement. In the able opinion in Macon v. Patty, 57 Miss. 378, this court stated that the owners of property sought to be taxed, must be consulted before action is taken against them, even in the case of sidewalks in front of lots. The appellants have laid the sidewalk in front of their lot. The ordinance in question requires them to build a sidewalk three hundred and twenty feet long on the side of their lot. In this they are not interested, nor is it a benefit to them or their lot. On the contrary, it detracts from the enjoyment of their property. It diminishes the value of the lot by destroying the privacy of the premises. In Macon v. Patty it is stated that the improvement of a sidewalk in front of the lot may be imposed as a police duty. That doctrine has no application, because the owners here were given twenty days within which to file a protest, which involves the idea of consultation and consent.
Opposite counsel, in the court below and here, have steered away from § 3011, under which the ordinance was passed, and attempt to justify the action of the city under § 2944. Section 3012 provides the character and extent of the special assessment authorized to be made, but it was wholly ignored in the adoption of this ordinance.
The power conferred by § 2944 of the code is vast in its scope. If its exercise rests wholly in the discretion of the authorities, to what extent may they not go? The vital question in this case is this: Can the city, for the benefit of the public, even under § 2944, impose upon appellants, without notice or opportunity to be heard, the burden of laying a brick sidewalk, three hundred and twenty feet...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Lord v. City of Kosciusko
... ... 637, 40 So. 228; Cox v. Wallace, ... 100 Miss. 525, 56 So. 461; Jones v. Belzoni Dr ... Dist., 102 Miss. 796, 59 So. 921; Stingly v ... Jackson, 140 Miss. 19, 104 So. 465; Edwards House ... Co. v. Jackson, 91 Miss. 429, 45 So. 14; 44 [170 Miss ... 171] C. J., Municipal Corporations, ... Diego v. Linda Vista Dr. Dist., 35 L. R. A. 33, and ... note; Macon v. Patty, 57 Miss. 378; Dailey v ... Swope, 47 Miss. 367; Nugent v. City of Jackson, 72 Miss ... 1040, 18 So. 493 ... Section ... 3156, Code of 1930, has no application to assessments for ... local ... ...
-
Stingily v. City of Jackson
...The several assignments of error are all to the effect, that the court erred in not holding the act unconstitutional. In Nugent v. Jackson, 72 Miss. 1040, 18 So. 493, of these special assessments, the court reaffirmed the case of Macon v. Patty, 57 Miss. 378, to the effect that: "These asse......
-
Roseberry v. Norsworthy
... ... 650; Ex Parte Wren, 63 Miss. 512; Hunt v ... Wright, 70 Miss. 303, 11 So. 608; Nugent v. City of ... Jackson, 72 Miss. 1051, 18 So. 493; State v ... Powell, 77 Miss. 566, 27 So ... ...
-
Swayne v. City of Hattiesburg
... ... may be properly assessed to the property owner ... We are ... not unmindful of Stingily v. Jackson, 140 Miss. 19, ... 104 So. 465, in which the court considered and passed upon ... the validity of chapter 194, Laws of 1924. We respectfully ... or arbitrary exercise of discretion, the question of accruing ... benefits is not open to owners of abutting property ... Nugent v. City of Jackson, 72 Miss. 1040, 18 So ... II. The ... second contention made by counsel for appellant is that the ... resolutions ... ...