Nunes v. Arata, Swingle, Van Egmond & Goodwin (PLC)

• Decision Date: 29 December 2020
• Docket Number: No. 19-16816,No. 19-16815,19-16815
• Parties: Angelina NUNES, individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for her minor children D.X. and L.X.; D.X., a minor; L.X., a minor; Emanuel Alves, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. ARATA, SWINGLE, VAN EGMOND & GOODWIN (PLC) ; Brad J. Swingle; Amanda J. Heitlinger, Defendants-Appellants, and Carrie Stephens ; County of Stanislaus, Defendants. Angelina Nunes, individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for her minor children D.X. and L.X.; D.X., a minor; L.X., a minor; Emanuel Alves, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Carrie Stephens ; County of Stanislaus, Defendants-Appellants, and Arata, Swingle, Van Egmond & Goodwin (PLC) ; Brad J. Swingle; Amanda J. Heitlinger, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

983 F.3d 1108

Angelina NUNES, individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for her minor children D.X. and L.X.; D.X., a minor; L.X., a minor; Emanuel Alves, Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.ARATA, SWINGLE, VAN EGMOND & GOODWIN (PLC) ; Brad J. Swingle; Amanda J. Heitlinger, Defendants-Appellants,andCarrie Stephens ; County of Stanislaus, Defendants.

Angelina Nunes, individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for her minor children D.X. and L.X.; D.X., a minor; L.X., a minor; Emanuel Alves, Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.Carrie Stephens ; County of Stanislaus, Defendants-Appellants,andArata, Swingle, Van Egmond & Goodwin (PLC) ; Brad J. Swingle; Amanda J. Heitlinger, Defendants.

No. 19-16815

No. 19-16816

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted July 14, 2020 San Francisco, California

Filed December 29, 2020

PER CURIAM:

Angelina Nunes, individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for her minor children D.X. and L.X., and Emanuel Alves¹ (Plaintiffs) brought the present action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the County of Stanislaus (County) and its attorneys for unlawfully viewing the juvenile records of D.X. and L.X. in violation of California Welfare & Institutions Code Section 827. The district court denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Parties

Plaintiffs brought suit against the (1) County, (2) County Counsel Carrie Stephens (County Counsel), (3) the County's outside law firm Arata, Swingle, Van Egmond & Goodwin (ASVG), and (4) two attorneys from ASVG—Brad Swingle and Amanda Heitlinger.² For purposes of the present appeal, the County and County Counsel are represented by the same attorneys, and ASVG (including Swingle and Heitlinger) is represented by separate attorneys. Each filed an appeal resulting in two Court of Appeals case numbers. We resolve both appeals in this consolidated opinion.

B. The Separation Case

Prior to July 2016, the County's Community Services Agency (CSA) began a child abuse investigation related to D.X. and L.X. after L.X., then five-months old, suffered a skull fracture

. D.X. and L.X. were separated from Nunes and Alves. Plaintiffs filed a civil rights lawsuit against the County challenging the separation (Separation Case). ASVG represented the County in the Separation Case. During that litigation, County Counsel provided ASVG with D.X. and L.X.'s juvenile records.

C. Present Lawsuit

In this case, Plaintiffs sued all Defendants for unlawfully accessing the children's juvenile records without first obtaining a court order from the juvenile court, as required under California Welfare & Institutions Code Section 827 (W&I § 827 ). County Counsel believed W&I § 827 did not require court authorization to access the records and disclose them to the County's outside counsel. In addition, Plaintiffs allege that the juvenile records contained medical records of L.X., which are subject to additional protection under the Health Insurance Protection and Accountability Act ("HIPAA").

After Plaintiffs learned about the disclosure to ASVG, they filed the present § 1983 lawsuit against Defendants, arguing that the disclosure violated Plaintiffs' state and federal constitutional rights to privacy and L.X.'s medical privacy rights. Specifically, Plaintiffs brought two claims for relief. First, Plaintiffs sought § 1983 relief from a violation of their "right to privacy and/or state and federal constitutional rights in keeping the juvenile records and/or case files related to their family and their involvement with the Community Services Agency private and confidential." Second, Plaintiffs brought Monell³ claims against the County based on its custom and policy of allowing its in-house counsel and outside counsel to unlawfully access juvenile records without judicial authorization.⁴

D. Procedural Background

The County defendants and ASVG filed separate motions to dismiss, each asserting a qualified immunity defense. The district court noted that Plaintiffs' complaint did not identify which constitutional provision was allegedly violated, and it evaluated Plaintiffs' claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court denied qualified immunity for all Defendants with respect to a Fourth Amendment privacy claim based on a violation of W&I § 827. The district court held that the dissenting opinion in Gonzalez v. Spencer , 336 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2003), clarified the Fourth Amendment right implicated by a W&I § 827 violation. It also concluded that Gonzalez found a viable Fourth Amendment claim when the attorney defending Los Angeles County wrongfully accessed a juvenile case file in violation of W&I § 827. But the district court dismissed the Plaintiffs' claims to the extent they were premised on the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants appealed the denial of qualified immunity, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Behrens v. Pelletier , 516 U.S. 299, 307, 311, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996).

II. DISCUSSION

We review denial of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. Dunn v. Castro , 621 F.3d 1196, 1198 (9th Cir. 2010). Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that shields public officials facing liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless "(1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly established at the time" of the violation. District of Columbia v. Wesby , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589, 199 L.Ed.2d 453 (2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We have discretion to decide which question to consider first, and this case turns on the clearly-established-right inquiry.⁵ See Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009).

A. Clearly Established Right

A right is clearly established when its "contours [are] sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant's shoes would have understood that he was violating it." Kisela v. Hughes , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1153, 200 L.Ed.2d 449 (2018) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A clearly established right is one that has a "sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing precedent." Wesby , 138 S. Ct. at 589. That is, the rule must be "settled law," meaning it is "dictated by controlling authority or a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority." Id. at 589–90 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). There need not be a "case directly on point," but existing precedent must place the statutory or constitutional question "beyond debate." Kisela , 138 S. Ct. at 1152 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed us not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality. Id. ("This Court has repeatedly told courts—and the Ninth Circuit in particular—not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality." (quoting City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan , 575 U.S. 600, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1775–76, 191 L.Ed.2d 856 (2015) ) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

"[S]pecificity is especially important in the Fourth Amendment context, where the Court has recognized that it is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine ... will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In Kisela , the alleged constitutional violation was excessive force—an area where the outcome is highly fact-dependent. Id. at 1152–53. We acknowledge that this case presents a different scenario than those where officers are forced to make "split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving." Id. at 1152 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But the underlying question remains the same: Did Defendants' conduct violate a clearly established constitutional right of the Plaintiffs?

B. Gonzalez v. Spencer

Plaintiffs rely solely on Gonzalez in arguing that Defendants' conduct violated a clearly established right. In Gonzalez , while defending Los Angeles County in a civil rights suit brought by Raul Gonzalez, the County's attorney accessed Gonzalez's juvenile court file without notifying him and without obtaining authorization from the juvenile court as required under W&I § 827(a)(1)(M) and Cal. Rules of Court 1423(b). 336 F.3d at 834. The County's attorney used the juvenile records to cross-examine Gonzalez at his deposition. Id. In a split decision, the per curiam majority wrote a two-page opinion.⁶ Without identifying a specific constitutional right at issue, or conducting any analysis, the court concluded:

If [the County attorney] violated Gonzalez's constitutional rights, he is entitled at least to nominal damages, even if [the attorney] could have obtained the documents lawfully.

Because [the attorney] improperly obtained access to Gonzalez's juvenile court file, we need not reach the question whether [the attorney]'s use of Gonzalez's file in depositions also violated his constitutional rights.

Id. at 835 (internal citation omitted). And without any further discussion of the right that was potentially violated, the court held that the County attorney was not entitled to qualified immunity. Id.

As the district court noted, "the majority opinion does not explain why a violation of W&I § 827 was sufficient to constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment." Order on Defs.' Mot. To Dismiss, Nunes v. Stephens , No. 1:19-CV-0204 AWI BAM, at 10, 2019 WL 3975665, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2019). Indeed, the Gonzalez majority did not even specify that Fourth Amendment rights were at issue. That is gleaned only from the dissenting opinion. See Gonzalez , 336 F.3d at 836 ("Gonzalez contends that [the attorney]'s access to and use of his juvenile court case file constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment.") (W. Fletcher, J., dissenting). Nor does Gonzalez discuss or cite to any Supreme Court or Ninth...