Nunez Gonzalez v. Vazquez Garced, CIV. 04-2114(JP).
| Citation | 389 F.Supp.2d 214 |
| Decision Date | 08 September 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV. 04-2114(JP).,CIV. 04-2114(JP). |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
| Parties | Alex B. NUÑEZ GONZALEZ, et al., Plaintiffs v. Wanda VAZQUEZ GARCED, et al., Defendants |
PIERAS, Senior District J.
The Court has before it Defendants'"Motion to Dismiss" (docket No. 18), Plaintiffs' opposition thereto (docket No. 22), and co-Defendant Wanda Vázquez Garced's "Motion Supplementing Motion to Dismiss" (docket No. 19), which is unopposed. For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants' motion (docket No. 18) and DENIES co-Defendant Wanda Vázquez Garced's "Motion Supplementing Motion to Dismiss" (docket No. 19).
Plaintiff Alex Núñez González is suing Defendants for violating his constitutional rights by allegedly falsely arresting and prosecuting him for crimes for which he was acquitted. Also named as plaintiffs in this action are Valerie Báez Gómez, Plaintiff's wife; Alexander O. Núñez Báez and Kiara Núñez Báez, the couple's children; William Núñez Ruiz and Teresita González Crespo, Plaintiff's parents; and Lourdes Núñez González, Plaintiff's sister. Defendants are Wanda Vázquez Garced, head of the prosecutor's office of the sex crimes unit of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Department of Justice and prosecutor in the criminal case upon which the present complaint predicated; Grace Maldonado Rosado and Lydia Ruber Figueroa, police officers of the Police Department of Puerto Rico; Miguel Pereira, Superintendent of the Police Department of Puerto Rico; Pío Rechani, Director of the Institute of Forensic Science of Puerto Rico; Annabelle Rodríguez Rodríguez, Secretary of Justice of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; and Héctor Urdaneta, supervisor of the Criminal Investigations Corps forensic unit for the Police Department of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Defendants are all sued in their individual capacities.
According to the Supreme Court, a "court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512, 122 S.Ct. 992, 995, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002). Moreover, according to the First Circuit, the Court must "treat all allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the plaintiff." Rumford Pharmacy, Inc. v. City of East Providence, 970 F.2d 996, 997 (1st Cir.1992). In addition, a "complaint sufficiently raises a claim even if it points to no legal theory or even if it points to the wrong legal theory as a basis for that claim, as long as relief is possible under any set of facts that could be established consistent with the allegations." González-Pérez v. Hospital Interamericano De Medicina Avanzada, 355 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2004). Finally, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(f), "[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice."
Plaintiff Alex B. Núñez González was arrested by Defendants Grace Maldonado Rosado and Lydia Ruber Figueroa as a suspect in several crimes including rape, domiciliary robbery, and weapons law violations. Plaintiff Núñez González claims that, from the outset, he repeatedly denied committing said crimes, and requested through his attorney that a sample of his DNA be tested against the physical evidence pertaining to the crimes of which he stood accused.
Plaintiff claims that co-Defendants Wanda Vázquez Garced, the head prosecutor in Plaintiff's criminal case, and Grace Maldonado Rosado and Lydia Ruber Figueroa, the police officers involved in the criminal case, either willfully or negligently suppressed, destroyed, or hid exculpatory evidence, and that they made false statements regarding the existence (or lack thereof) of said evidence. Plaintiff claims that the exculpatory DNA evidence, which he claims was always in the possession of the prosecutor, was eventually discovered and led to his acquittal. He claims that Defendant Vázquez Garced, the prosecutor in his criminal case, induced, coached, or urged the rape victim and other witnesses to offer false testimony about the exculpatory evidence. On October 17, 2003, the trial court absolved Plaintiff of all charges, based on the exculpatory evidence.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants deliberately misled the court in an attempt to secure an illegal conviction. Plaintiff further claims that Defendants' actions directly led to economic harm to his wife and minor children, whom are also plaintiffs in this matter, because Plaintiff lost his job as a result of the accusations against him, thereby resulting in a loss of income and a reduction in the family's standard of living. Plaintiff further claims that his parents and his sister, also plaintiffs in this action, suffered severe mental damages as a result of Defendants' actions.
Defendants'"Motion to Dismiss" is premised on three arguments: 1) that the complaint fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 2) that the doctrine of qualified immunity shields the individual Defendants from liability and from the burden of discovery proceedings; and 3) that because of the aforementioned, Plaintiffs' supplemental claims should be dismissed. The Court addresses these arguments in order.
In order to state a claim cognizable under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege "that some person has deprived him of a federal right." Gómez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980). To prevail in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must satisfy two prongs. First, he must prove that he was deprived of a right, immunity, or privilege secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979); Voutour v. Vitale, 761 F.2d 812, 819 (1st Cir.1985). Second, he must have been deprived of his right, immunity or privilege, by a person acting under color of state law. Id. The Court now proceeds to address each of Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims of constitutional violations.
Defendants also argue that aside from Plaintiff Alex Núñez González, Plaintiffs, all family members of Mr. Núñez González (henceforth the "family Plaintiffs"), lack standing to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that therefore all their claims should be dismissed. The Court agrees with Defendants' argument regarding Plaintiffs' standing under § 1983, but, for reasons to be explained below, decides not to wholly dismiss these Plaintiffs from the case at hand.
Only persons who have been subject to constitutional deprivations may bring actions under § 1983. Torres v. U.S., 24 F.Supp.2d 181, 183 (D.Puerto Rico 1998) (Acosta, J.). Family members do not have an independent claim under § 1983 unless the constitutionally defective conduct or omission was directed at the family relationship. Id., citing Brown v. Ives, 129 F.3d 209, 211 (1st Cir.1997); Robles Vázquez v. García, 110 F.3d 204, 206 n. 4 (1st Cir.1997). See also, e.g., Manarite v. City of Springfield, 957 F.2d 953, 960 (1st Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 837 113 S.Ct. 113, 121 L.Ed.2d 70 (1992). "State action that affects the parental relationship only incidentally, however, even though the deprivation may be permanent, as in the case of unlawful killing by the police, is not sufficient to establish a violation of a[sic] identified liberty interest." Pittsley v. Warish, 927 F.2d 3, 8 (1st Cir.1991).
The complaint in the instant case makes no allegation that the conduct alleged was in any manner directed at Plaintiff Núñez González' family members. In fact, this entire issue probably stems from the unspecific nature of Plaintiffs' complaint, from the face of which it seems fairly clear that the family Plaintiffs are present in this lawsuit under tort theory. The complaint contains no specific allegations of constitutional violations to the rights of any of the family Plaintiffs; they are generally mentioned in the context of claiming that the alleged negligence on the part of Defendants has caused them to suffer damages. The complaint generally fails to divide the claims of Plaintiffs into specific causes of action, instead settling for merely bifurcating its claims into two general causes of action, one for the federal claims, and one for the supplemental claims, the allegations for both of which are the same, namely that Plaintiffs have suffered extreme emotional injuries, stress, pain and suffering due to Defendants' actions against Plaintiff Núñez González. As part of their supplemental claims, Plaintiffs also specifically set forth claims under Article 1802 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico, Puerto Rico's tort statute.
The same is true for Plaintiffs' opposition to Defendants' motion, which also confuses the arguments in question: in opposing the contention that the family Plaintiffs lack standing under § 1983, they argue exclusively that Defendants' conduct had a direct and adverse financial and emotional effect on the family and its members. However, there is an important distinction to be drawn between conduct directed at the family relationship, which is what is required for a family to have standing under § 1983, and between conduct directly affecting the family relationship and actionable under a general tort theory, which is the argument made by Plaintiffs.
Since there are no allegations in the complaint to the effect that Defendants' conduct was directly aimed at the family...
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