Rivera-Quinones v. Rivera-Gonzalez, No. CIV. 03-2326(RLA).

• Decision Date: 28 October 2005
• Docket Number: No. CIV. 03-2326(RLA).
• Citation: 397 F.Supp.2d 334
• Parties: Aida Esther RIVERA-QUIÑONES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Victor RIVERA-GONZALEZ, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

397 F.Supp.2d 334

Aida Esther RIVERA-QUIÑONES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Victor RIVERA-GONZALEZ, et al., Defendants.

No. CIV. 03-2326(RLA).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

October 28, 2005.

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José R. Olmo-Rodríguez, Esq., Olmo & Rodriguez-Matias, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Jo Ann Estades-Boyer, Esq., Maria Eugenia Villares-Seneriz, Esq., Department of Justice, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

ACOSTA, District Judge.

Several of the defendants sued in this action have moved the court to dismiss the complaint pursuant to the provisions of Rule 12(b)(1) and (6) Fed.R.Civ.P. The court having reviewed plaintiffs' response thereto hereby denies the request.

BACKGROUND

This is an action for money damages instituted by the relatives of decedent, JULIO ENRIQUE SANTOS RIVERA ("JULIO ENRIQUE"), who died on December 15, 2002 while incarcerated in a Puerto Rico state prison. Specifically, the plaintiffs are: decedent's two children who, under Puerto Rico law, inherit JULIO ENRIQUE's constitutional deprivation claim, his mother, stepfather and siblings. The complaint charges a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged failure to provide JULIO ENRIQUE with adequate protection from attacks by other inmates as well as deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Plaintiffs also plead tort claims under our supplemental jurisdiction.

In their motion to dismiss defendants argue that: (1) the complaint fails to state a valid claim; (2) plaintiffs lack standing under § 1983; (3) failure to exhaust administrative remedies; (4) plaintiffs cannot sue under the theory of respondeat superior; (5) plaintiffs have no due process claim; and (6) defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

The proper vehicle for challenging a court's subject-matter jurisdiction is not Rule 12(b)(6) but rather Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). In ruling on motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction the court is not constrained to the allegations in the pleadings as with Rule 12(b)(6) petitions. The plaintiff's jurisdictional allegations are given no presumptive weight and the court is required to address the merits of the jurisdictional claim by resolving the factual disputes between the parties. Further, the court may review extra-pleading material without transforming the petition into a summary judgment vehicle. Gonzalez v. United States, 284 F.3d 281, 288 (1st Cir.2002); Aversa v. United States, 99 F.3d 1200, 1210 (1st Cir.1996).

Even though the court is not circumscribed to the allegations in the complaint in deciding a jurisdictional issue brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) Fed.R.Civ.P. and that it may also take into consideration "extra-pleading material", 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1350 (2d ed.1990) p. 213, "[w]here movant has challenged the factual allegations of the party invoking the district court's jurisdiction, the invoking party `must submit affidavits and other relevant evidence to resolve the factual dispute regarding jurisdiction.'" Johnson v. United States, 47 F.Supp.2d 1075, 1077 (S.D.Ind.1999) (citing Kontos v. United States Dept. of Labor, 826 F.2d 573, 576 (7th Cir.1987)).

In ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), the district court must construe the complaint liberally, treating all well-pleaded facts as true and indulging all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. In addition, the court may consider whatever evidence has been submitted, such as the depositions and exhibits submitted in the case.

Aversa v. United States, 99 F.3d at 1210-11 (citations omitted). See also, Shrieve v. United States, 16 F.Supp.2d 853, 855 (N.D.Ohio 1998) ("In ruling on such a motion, the district court may resolve factual issues when necessary to resolve its jurisdiction.")

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and hence, have the duty to examine their own authority to preside over the cases assigned. "It is black-letter law that a federal court has an obligation to inquire sua sponte into its own subject matter jurisdiction." McCulloch v. Velez, 364 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2004). See also, Bonas v. Town of N. Smithfield, 265 F.3d 69, 73 (1st Cir.2001) ("Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and therefore must be certain that they have explicit authority to decide a case"); Am. Fiber & Finishing, Inc. v. Tyco Healthcare Group LP, 362 F.3d 136, 138 (1st Cir.2004) ("In the absence of jurisdiction, a court is powerless to act.").

If jurisdiction is questioned, the party asserting it has the burden of proving a right to litigate in this forum. McCulloch v. Velez, 364 F.3d at 6. "Once challenged, the party invoking diversity jurisdiction must prove [it] by a preponderance of the evidence." Garcia Perez v. Santaella, 364 F.3d 348, 350 (1st Cir.2004). See also, Mangual v. Rotger-Sabat, 317 F.3d 45, 56 (1st Cir.2003) (party invoking federal jurisdiction has burden of establishing it).

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

Defendants contend that we lack jurisdiction to entertain the claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Reform Litigation Act of 1995 (PRLA). This statute, in pertinent part, reads:

No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

"[E]xhaustion in cases covered by § 1997e(a) is ... mandatory." Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524, 122 S.Ct. 983, 988, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001).

Applicability of the PLRA, however, is limited to individuals who are imprisoned at the time the suit is filed. Janes v. Hernandez, 215 F.3d 541, 543 (5th Cir.2000); Doe v. Washington County, 150 F.3d 920, 924 (8th Cir.1998); Kerr v. Puckett, 138 F.3d 321, 322-23 (7th Cir.1998). "[L]itigants ... who file prison condition actions after release from confinement are no longer `prisoners' for purposes of § 1997e(a) and, therefore, need not satisfy the exhaustion requirements of this provision." Greig v. Goord, 169 F.3d 165, 167 (2nd Cir.1999).

It appearing for obvious reasons that at the time the complaint was filed decedent was no longer "confined" for purposes of the PRLA we find the exhaustion requirement inapposite in this case.

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

In disposing of motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) Fed.R.Civ.P. the court will accept all factual allegations as true and will make all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor. Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Com., 276 F.3d 52, 56 (1st Cir.2002); Alternative Energy, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir.2001); Berezin v. Regency Sav. Bank, 234 F.3d 68, 70 (1st Cir.2000); Tompkins v. United Healthcare of New England, Inc., 203 F.3d 90, 92 (1st Cir.2000).

Our scope of review under this provision is a narrow one. Dismissal will only be granted if after having taken all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the Court finds that plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any theory. Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 530 (1st Cir.1995) cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1159, 116 S.Ct. 1044, 134 L.Ed.2d 191 (1996); Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 14 F.3d 697, 700 (1st Cir.1994). Further, our role is to examine the complaint to determine whether plaintiff has adduced sufficient facts to state a cognizable cause of action. Alternative Energy, 267 F.3d at 36. The complaint will be dismissed if the court finds that under the facts as pleaded plaintiff may not prevail on any possible theory. Berezin, 234 F.3d at 70; Tompkins, 203 F.3d at 93.

§ 1983 ELEMENTS

The complaint charges violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which reads:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proceeding for redress.

Section 1983 does not create substantive rights but is rather a procedural mechanism for enforcing constitutional or statutory rights. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994). Hence, it is plaintiffs' burden to identify the particular underlying constitutional or statutory right that is sought to be enforced via judicial proceedings.

In order to prevail in a § 1983 claim plaintiff must bring forth evidence: (1) that defendant acted "under color of state law"; and (2) of deprivation of a federally protected right. Rogan v. City of Boston, 267 F.3d 24 (1st Cir.2001); DiMarco-Zappa v. Cabanillas, 238 F.3d 25, 33 (1st Cir.2001); Collins v. Nuzzo, 244 F.3d 246 (1st Cir.2001); Barreto-Rivera, 168 F.3d at 45.

All parties concede that the defendants were acting within the scope of their duties as state officers at all relevant times. Therefore, the first element is satisfied. We must then ascertain whether decedent was deprived of any federally protected right as a result of the events which culminated in his demise.

Standing

Defendants argue that decedent's mother, stepfather and siblings have no § 1983 claim inasmuch as they did not personally suffer a constitutional deprivation.

Constitutional deprivation suits must be brought by the individuals affected by the particular acts or omissions under attack. Nunez Gonzalez v. Vazquez Garced, 389 F.Supp.2d 214, 218-19 (D.P.R.2005); Reyes Vargas v....