Nunez-Mendoza v. State
Decision Date | 10 March 2020 |
Docket Number | A19A1870 |
Citation | 354 Ga.App. 297,840 S.E.2d 771 |
Parties | NUNEZ-MENDOZA v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Matthew P. Cavedon, for Appellant.
Lee Darragh, Gainesville, Shiv Sachdeva, for Appellee.
Following a stipulated bench trial, Victor Nunez-Mendoza was convicted on one count of trafficking in methamphetamine.1 Prior to trial, Nunez-Mendoza filed a motion to suppress physical evidence seized from his vehicle, but the trial court denied his motion. He asserts on appeal that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress because (1) the court erroneously held that Nunez-Mendoza was placed in investigative detention and not arrested at the time he was stopped, and the investigators lacked probable cause to arrest; and (2) the subsequent search of his vehicle was unlawful. We find no error and affirm.
On appeal from a motion to suppress, the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to upholding the trial court’s judgment. The credibility of witnesses and the weight accorded their testimony rest with the trier of fact. Thus, the trial court’s findings on disputed facts and credibility must be accepted unless clearly erroneous.
Williams v. State , 293 Ga. App. 842, 842-843, 668 S.E.2d 825 (2008).
The facts as set forth by the trial court after conducting an evidentiary hearing on Nunez-Mendoza’s motion to suppress are as follows:
Nunez-Mendoza moved to suppress the physical evidence, arguing that he was arrested at the time he was taken out of his car and placed into handcuffs, yet the confidential source who provided the information leading to his arrest was an untested individual of unknown reliability – akin to an anonymous tipster – whose information could not have provided probable cause to arrest. He asserted, therefore, that his arrest was unlawful, and that the narcotics discovered and seized during the subsequent search of his vehicle were tainted by that illegality and must be suppressed.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court held that Nunez-Mendez was temporarily detained, not arrested, at the time that he was removed from his vehicle. Further, the court held that the information provided by the confidential source in conjunction with the investigators’ own personal observations gave rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Nunez-Mendez was engaged in or about to be engaged in criminal activity and, thus, authorized his detention. Finally, the trial court concluded that probable cause to search Nunez-Mendoza’s vehicle was established when he identified himself to the investigator as "Manuel" and admitted to possessing drugs.
The parties’ agreed to a stipulated bench trial based upon the facts and circumstances presented in the motion to suppress hearing.2 The trial court thereafter convicted Nunez-Mendoza of trafficking in methamphetamine in violation of OCGA § 16-13-31 (e),3 and this appeal follows.
1. Nunez-Mendoza argues that the trial court erred in holding that he was temporarily detained and not arrested at the time he was removed from his vehicle and handcuffed. He further contends that law enforcement lacked probable cause to arrest because the confidential source had no track record from which to determine her credibility.
We need not determine whether the investigator’s act of removing Nunez-Mendoza from his vehicle and placing him into handcuffs amounted to a temporary detention or an arrest because we conclude, based upon the totality of the information supplied by the confidential source and the events personally observed and corroborated by the investigators as set forth in the trial court’s findings of fact, that probable cause to arrest had been established.
To be sure, a warrantless arrest must be supported by probable cause:
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id.
When, like here, the reliability of a confidential source previously unknown by law enforcement has not been established, that deficiency "can be corrected by the corroboration of the information, thereby providing a substantial basis for finding probable cause." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Wiggins v. State , 331 Ga. App. 447, 451, 771 S.E.2d 135 (2015). But "for the corroboration to be meaningful, the corroborating information must include a range of details...
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