Nunley v. Cardinal Logistics Mgmt. Corp.

• Decision Date: 05 October 2022
• Docket Number: ED CV 22-01255-FWS-SP
• Parties: TONY NUNLEY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CARDINAL LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, a North Carolina corporation; and ROBERT SHEERIN, an individual; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California

TONY NUNLEY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CARDINAL LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, a North Carolina corporation; and ROBERT SHEERIN, an individual; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants.

No. ED CV 22-01255-FWS-SP

United States District Court, C.D. California

October 5, 2022

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND ACTION TO STATE COURT [13] AND DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS [15]

HON FRED W. SLAUGHTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Before the court is Plaintiff Tony Nunley's (“Plaintiff”) Motion to Remand this Action to State Court. (Dkt. 13 (“Motion” or “Mot.”).) Defendant Cardinal Logistics Management Corporation (“Defendant”) opposes the Motion. (Dkt. 17 (“Opposition” or “Opp.”).) Plaintiff filed a reply brief. (Dkt. 18 (“Reply”).)

The court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 78(b) (“By rule or order, the court may provide for submitting and determining motions on briefs, without oral hearings.”); L. R. 7-15 (authorizing courts to “dispense with oral argument on any motion except where an oral hearing is required by statute”). Based on the state of the record, as applied to the applicable law, the court GRANTS the Motion.

I. Relevant Background

In this putative class action, Plaintiff brings claims against Defendant and Defendant Robert Sheerin (collectively “Defendants”) based on (1) violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), specifically 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b(b)(2)(A), d(a)(1)(B), and m(a)(3), (Dkt. 1-1 (“Complaint” or “Compl”) ¶¶ 26-33); (2) violations of the California Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (“ICRAA”), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1786, et seq., (Compl. ¶¶ 34-46); and (3) violations of the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (“CCRAA”), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1785.1, et seq., (Compl. ¶¶ 47-55). Plaintiff seeks to bring this action on behalf of “all current, former, and prospective employees of Defendants who applied for a job with Defendants and a background check was performed beginning five (5) years preceding the filing of [the] [C]omplaint up until the date that final judgment is entered in this action.” (Id. ¶ 16.)

Plaintiff alleges Defendants employed Plaintiff “with duties that included, but were not limited to, driving and delivering appliances.”^[1] (Id. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff “applied for work with Defendants” in or around February 2021 and stopped working for them in or around October 2021. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants purported to provide consumer report disclosures to Plaintiff, and requested Plaintiff's authorization to procure consumer reports and background checks for purposes of employment. (Id. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants received consumer reports relating to Plaintiff in July 2019 and February 2020 as part of an employment background screening, but did not provide Plaintiff with the required disclosures or receive proper authorization to obtain the reports. (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff alleges the disclosures Defendants provided were inadequate in that they included “superfluous” and “extraneous” information; were “bur[ied] . . . with small font in a lengthy employment package with dense text that contain[ed] extraneous information”; were not accompanied by a summary of Plaintiff's rights under 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a)(3) or Cal. Civ. Code § 1786.22; and included a third-party liability waiver. (Id. ¶¶ 13-15, 31, 41.) Plaintiff further alleges Defendants did not obtain proper authorization before procuring consumer reports relating to him, did not provide adequate notice to Plaintiff of the source of the reports, and “routinely acquire consumer, investigative, and/or consumer credit reports . . . to conduct background checks.” (Id. ¶¶ 13, 15, 31, 41, 52.) Plaintiff alleges that, “[a]s a result of Defendants' unlawful procurement of background reports by way of [their] inadequate disclosures and authorizations,” Plaintiff has “been deprived of [his] consumer rights and prevented from making informed decisions about whether to permit Defendants to obtain [his] personal information.” (Id. ¶ 43.) Plaintiff “seek[s] some of the statutory remedies” available under the FCRA, ICRAA, and CCRAA. (Id. ¶¶ 33, 46, 55.)

Plaintiff initially filed this action in California Superior Court, San Bernardino County, on May 11, 2022, (see Compl.), and served Defendant on June 20, 2022, (Dkt. 1-2). On July 19, 2022, Defendant timely removed the matter to this court, asserting federal jurisdiction is proper based on both federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and diversity jurisdiction as amended by the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), id. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711-15. (See Dkt. 1 (“Notice of Removal” or “NOR”) ¶ 7.) Plaintiff then filed the Motion on August 18, 2022. (Dkt. 13.) The matter is fully briefed. (See Mot.; Opp.; Reply.)

II. Legal Standards

A. Removal

“Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by the defendant.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction,” the court must remand the case. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). It is the removing party's burden to establish federal jurisdiction lies. Jauregui v. Roadrunner Transp. Servs., Inc., 28 F.4th 989, 992-94 (9th Cir. 2022); see also Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[H]old[ing] that under CAFA the burden of establishing removal jurisdiction remains, as before, on the proponent of federal jurisdiction.”); Pool v. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd., 386 F.Supp.3d 1202, 1209 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (stating “in a removal situation, the defendant has the burden of proving jurisdiction, and the burden of proof is preponderance of the evidence”). “[A]lthough a presumption against federal jurisdiction exists in the usual diversity case, ‘no antiremoval presumption attends cases invoking CAFA.'” Greene v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 965 F.3d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 87 (2014)).

B. Article III Standing

Article III standing requires: (1) a plaintiff to have “suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent”; (2) “that the injury was likely caused by the defendant”; and (3) “that the injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, --- U.S. -, 141 S.Ct. 2190, 2203 (2021) (citation omitted). “[T]he party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements.” See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (Spokeo II), 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016) (citation and internal punctuation marks omitted); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).

“To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest' that is ‘concrete and particularized' and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.'” Spokeo II, 578 U.S. at 339 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). Though the “‘fairly traceable' and ‘redressability' components for standing overlap and are two facets of a single causation requirement” they “are distinct in that traceability examines the connection between the alleged misconduct and injury, whereas redressability analyzes the connection between the alleged injury and requested relief.” Mecinas v. Hobbs, 30 F.4th 890, 899 (9th Cir. 2022) (citations and some internal quotation marks omitted).

C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “In civil cases, subject matter jurisdiction is generally conferred upon federal district courts either through diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, or federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331.” Peralta v. Hispanic Bus., Inc., 419 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 2005). “Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal courts ‘have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.'” Negrete v. City of Oakland, 46 F.4th 811, 816 (9th Cir. 2022). To establish diversity jurisdiction, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the suit is between citizens of different states; and (2) the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332; see also Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Jurisdiction founded on 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires that the parties be in complete diversity and the amount in controversy exceed $75,000.”). In general, “diversity jurisdiction does not exist unless each defendant is a citizen of a different State from each plaintiff.” Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978). But, absent limited exceptions, CAFA permits a federal district court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a putative class action in which: (1) the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000; (2) the number of members of all purported classes of plaintiffs totals 100 or more persons; and (3) any member of a proposed class of plaintiffs differs in citizenship from any defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d); Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 84-85.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Article III Standing

Plaintiff argues this action should be remanded to state court because the Complaint's allegations do not sufficiently demonstrate more than a bare procedural violation of the FCRA, and thus does not set forth a concrete and particularized injury in fact required for Article III standing. (See Mot. at 7-10; Reply at 2-8.) Defendant argues this action should remain in federal court because the Complaint alleges: (1) violations of Plaintiff's...