Nunn v. Jordan

• Decision Date: 06 April 1903
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: NUNN v. JORDAN.

72 P. 124

31 Wash. 506

NUNN v. JORDAN.

Supreme Court of Washington

April 6, 1903

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; W. R. Bell, Judge.

Action by A. H. Nunn against J. Eugene Jordan. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

James Hamilton Lewis and R. B. Albertson, for appellant.

Preston & Embree, for respondent.

HADLEY J.

Respondent brought this action against appellant for the recovery of money. The complaint alleges that on the 2d day of September 1898, the Klondike, Yukon & Copper River Company, a corporation, was indebted to respondent in the sum of $500 for services performed and for money furnished and advanced by him to said company; that on said date, for and in consideration of the sum of $500, which appellant agreed and promised to pay respondent on demand, the respondent sold and, by written assignment, transferred and set over unto appellant his said demand for $500 owing him from said company as aforesaid. It is averred that no part of said purchase price has been paid, and judgment is demanded for the sum of $500, with interest at the legal rate from September 2, 1898. The answer is a general denial. A trial was had before a jury, resulting in a verdict in favor of respondent for the amount demanded in the complaint. From a judgment entered in accordance with the verdict, this appeal is prosecuted.

It is assigned that the court erred in refusing to permit appellant to cross-examine respondent concerning a letterpress copy of the assignment of said claim to appellant. Respondent had notified appellant to produce the original assignment, which he said was delivered to appellant. This was not done, and he thereupon sought to introduce what he testified was a copy of the original. Respondent testified that the copy was taken the day of its date, and in the letter book produced there was a copy of another writing, bearing a later date, which had been copied on a preceding page. Appellant's complaint is that he was not permitted to cross-examine in relation to said transposition of dates. Such cross-examination was not material, except in so far as it may have borne upon the credibility of the respondent's testimony concerning the assignment. The record, however, discloses that when respondent was being examined in chief, by way of identifying the copy appellant's counsel asked and was granted leave to cross-examine the witness in relation thereto. The cross-examination continued for some time, covering the very ground which it is now urged he was prevented from covering. After some time, respondent objected, and the objection was sustained. In any event, the ground had already been reasonably covered, the witness had made his explanation, and we do not think prejudicial error was committed by sustaining the objection at the time it was done.

It is next urged that error was committed by the admission in evidence of the copy of the assignment, and by the remark of the court in connection therewith. The complaint alleged a written assignment. The witness testifies that the original thereof was delivered to appellant. Notice to produce it at the trial was shown. It was not produced. The writing offered was identified as a copy of the original. We know of no reason why it was not admissible under those conditions. The remark of the court urged as error was as follows: 'It would be admissible for what it is worth--what it shows--just as much as the original would be.' No exception was taken to this remark of the court. But in any event, we do not see that the remark was necessarily prejudicial. The court did not say that the paper would conclusively prove what it showed, but that it was simply admissible for what it showed, as the original would be for the same purpose. It was made very clear to the jury, however, by the admission of subsequent testimony and by instructions, that appellant denied the existence of an original assignment; and, if they believed that to be true they knew that the copy introduced did not prove what it purported to prove. In such event, they knew, as the court remarked, that it had been admitted for what it showed, and for what that showing was worth, but that, in the light of other evidence, its showing was valueless.

Respondent had been the agent at Seattle for the said Klondike, Yukon &amp Copper River Company. A certain dredger, with its equipment, belonging to said company, was stored in a warehouse in Seattle at the time respondent alleges he assigned his claim against said company to appellant. Respondent also claimed he had authority from the company to sell the dredger and apply the proceeds upon the payment of the company's debts, including his own claim. He testified that appellant wished to buy the dredger, and that it was agreed that he should pay respondent $500 for his claim against the company, and might afterwards turn in the assigned claim to the company as a payment of $500 upon the dredger, for which he agreed with respondent, representing the company, to pay $700. It was shown that the two went to the warehouse together, and respondent turned over to appellant the dredger, whereupon appellant paid him some money. Appellant claims that he simply loaned the...