Nunneley v. Edgar Hotel

• Decision Date: 19 December 1950
• Citation: 225 P.2d 497,36 Cal.2d 493
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: NUNNELEY v. EDGAR HOTEL et al. L. A. 21454

Page 497

225 P.2d 497

36 Cal.2d 493

NUNNELEY v. EDGAR HOTEL et al.

L. A. 21454.

Supreme Court of California

Dec. 19, 1950.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 15, 1951.

Forgy, Reinhaus & Forgy, Arthur M. Bradley and Stanley M. Reinhaus, all of Santa Ana, for appellants.

Harvey, Rimel & Johnston and Fred D. Johnston, all of Santa Ana, for respondent.

EDMONDS, Justice.

A jury awarded Golda J. Nunneley substantial damages for personal injuries sustained by her when she fell down a shaft opening onto the roof of a hotel building. The appeal from the judgment in her favor presents for decision questions as to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, the construction of section 16827 of the Health and Safety Code, and the propriety of certain instructions based upon that statute.

The chain of events which led to the accident commenced at a bar where Miss Nunneley met two Marine Corps sergeants. After a festive afternoon during which the group had a few drinks, she accompanied them to their rooms on the fourth floor of the Edgar Hotel. The rooms on this floor did not cover the entire area of the structure, and from the hallway one could walk onto the roof of the third floor.

The record includes evidence that by signs posted in conspicuous places, guests were warned to keep off the roof. According to other testimony, there had been added to cards posted in several rooms stating the Hotel Rules, a typewritten notice which read: 'Stay off roof No guests or persons allowed on roof of hotel.' Miss Nunneley and one of the Marines told the jury that the lights in the hallway were dim, and they saw no such signs. Three police officers who investigated the accident did not recall seeing any signs.

There is also testimony which may be summarized as follows: Miss Nunneley and the sergeants each had one drink in the hotel room, but did not finish it. None of the group was intoxicated. In the company of one of her companions, Miss Nunneley stepped out of the hallway onto the roof of the building. The door to the roof was open, and nothing but a small ledge impeded the exit. The only light on the roof was from the street lights or from adjacent buildings.

The couple walked on the roof until they came to a mattress which appeared to them to be resting on what looked like 'a flat top or another little roof like a little house'. However, this was the opening of a shaft which extended vertically downward for a distance of approximately two stories. No lights could be seen coming from the shaft. The shaft, 68 inches wide, was surrounded by a parapet 27 inches high at the point where the mattress rested. The mattress was 72 inches in length. Using the Marine Corps term for a bed, Miss Nunneley said, 'Here is a sack. * * * I think I will sit on it.' She did so and fell to the bottom of the shaft receiving serious injuries.

The manager of the hotel testified that he had placed the mattress upon the springs of an old bed which was on the roof. He said that he did not know it had been moved to the top of the shaft and could not explain how it got there.

By the first count of her complaint, Miss Nunneley alleged general negligence on the part of Gladys P. Brickel, the owner of the hotel, and Charles F. Brickel, her husband, who was the manager of it. Her pleading declared that there were no warning signs of the danger upon the roof, nor was there adequate lighting. It also charged that, with the knowledge of the defendants, the mattress was left upon what appeared to be a solid foundation. In a second count, Miss Nunneley asserted that the defendants were negligent in that a 'vent shaft', surrounded by a parapet less than 30 inches in height, was maintained contrary to the provisions of section 16827 of the Health and Safety Code.

The jury returned a general verdict in favor of the plaintiff without reference to the two counts in the complaint. A motion for a new trial was denied.

As ground for reversal of the judgment, the Brickels assert that certain instructions given to the jury were prejudicially erroneous. In support of this contention, it is insisted that the provisions of the Health and Safety Code which were a part of the charge do not apply to the hotel because the statute was enacted after the building was erected, and does not purport to apply retroactively. Furthermore, it is argued, even if the code section applies retroactively, the opening into which Miss Nunneley fell is not a vent shaft within the meaning of that term as used by the Legislature. The action of the court in allowing the jury, at Miss Nunneley's request, to view the premises, is also challenged. The appellants assert that the premises were not in the same condition at the time of trial as at the date of the accident.

Miss Nunneley declares that in the light of its legislative purpose and express terms, the provisions of the Health and Safety Code upon which she relies are applicable to her cause of action. With regard to the term 'vent shaft', a liberal construction of the statute designed to minimize the hazards caused by open shafts would give her the benefits of its provisions. In any event, it is said, her complaint refers to 'vent shaft', and the answer of the Brickels accepts that term and fails to deny that it was such an opening. In addition, she points to the record, which shows that the words 'vent shaft' and 'light well' were used interchangeably throughout the trial by counsel for both parties.

Other points relied upon in support of the judgment are that the instructions attacked by the appellants could not be prejudicially erroneous as far as the judgment against Charles F. Brickel is concerned because, by their terms, they are not directed to any conduct by him. Furthermore, the complaint is in two counts and a general verdict was returned without mention of either of them. Miss Nunneley also argues that, because the Brickels did not question the form of the verdict, nor request submission of special issues to the jury, the challenged instructions are not prejudicially erroneous if the evidence upon either count will sustain the general verdict. Another point relied upon is the contention that if the Brickels wished to have the jury informed as to the legal difference between a 'vent shaft' and a 'light well', it was their duty to offer appropriate instructions. As they did not do so, she says, they are not in a position to complain that the jury was not properly charged.

Assuming, but not deciding, that by maintaining a parapet less than 30 inches in height around an open shaft the owner of the Edgar Hotel violated section 16827 of the Health and Safety Code, Miss Nunneley may not recovery damages based upon such violation unless she is one of the class of persons for whose benefit the statute was enacted. She must also prove that the accident which occurred was of the nature which the statute was designed to prevent, and present proof of violation of the statute as the proximate cause of her injury.

Not every infraction of a statute will result in civil liability. 'Many statutes, such as those directed against various activities on Sunday, obviously are intended to protect the interests of the state, or the community at large, rather than those of any particular class of individuals.' Prosser, Torts, p. 266. It follows that violation of such a statute constitutes actionable negligence only as to those persons for whose benefit or protection the statute was enacted. Routh v. Quinn, 20 Cal.2d 488, 127 P.2d 1, 149 A.L.R. 215; King v. San Diego Elec. R. Co., 176 Cal. 266, 168 P. 131; and see 19 Cal.Jur. p. 635. But clearly section 16827 of the Health and Safety Code was enacted for the protection of any person lawfully on or about the premises, and Miss Nunneley came within that category.

However, there is the additional issue of whether the purpose of the statutory requirement for a 30 inch parapet is to protect one from the type of accident which is shown by the record in this case. Violation of a legislative enactment by failing to do a required act results in liability only if '* * * the harm which the violation causes is that from which it was the purpose of the enactment to protect * * *.' Rest. Torts, sec. 286, comment on clause c.

A well known case in which this rule was applied is Gorris v. Scott, 9 Ex. 125, L.R. 1874, which concerned a statute specifying the minimum size of pens upon vessels transporting animals across the ocean. The purpose of the legislation was to prevent sickness likely to result from overcrowding. The plaintiff's sheep were lost during a storm. It was held that the failure of the ship-owner to provide pens did not constitute actionable negligence because loss of the sheep by being washed overboard during the storm '* * * was not contemplated at all by the statute * * *.'

More in point is Indiana & Chicago Coal Co. v. Neal, 166 Ind. 458, 77 N.E. 850, which concerned a driver of a coal car who was injured while opening the door to the mine. In violation of a statute, no person had been designated to open and close the door. Recovery was denied because the purpose of the statute was to prevent interference with circulation of air and not to guard against injury received by a person who opened such a door.

The same conclusion was reached in Flynn v. Gordon, 86 N.H. 198, 200, 165 A. 715, 716, where the court said: 'The violation of a statute or ordinance becomes an actionable wrong only when the consequences contemplated by the provision in question have actually resulted from its violation. If none of the consequences which the enactment was designed to guard against have resulted from its breach, such a breach does not constitute an actionable wrong, even though some other injurious consequence has resulted. It is not enough for a plaintiff to show that the defendant neglected a duty imposed by statute and that he would not have been injured if the duty had been performed. He must go...