Nunno v. Wixner

• Decision Date: 21 August 2001
• Docket Number: (SC 16392)
• Citation: 257 Conn. 671,778 A.2d 145
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: SHERRY NUNNO ET AL. v. WALTER WIXNER II ET AL.

257 Conn. 671

778 A.2d 145

SHERRY NUNNO ET AL. v. WALTER WIXNER II ET AL.

(SC 16392)

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued February 15, 2001.

Officially released August 21, 2001.

Sullivan, C. J., and Borden, Norcott, Katz, Palmer, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js.¹ Joseph De Lucia, for the appellant (named plaintiff). Catherine S. Nietzel, for the appellees (defendants).

Opinion

VERTEFEUILLE, J.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the provisions of General Statutes § 52-192a,² concerning an offer of judgment by a plaintiff, apply to a judgment entered as a result of a mandatory arbitration proceeding pursuant to General Statutes § 52-549u.³ We conclude that they do not.

The following undisputed facts are relevant to this appeal. On December 10, 1997, the plaintiff, Sherry Nunno,⁴ was the operator of a motor vehicle that was involved in a collision with a motor vehicle operated by the defendant Walter Wixner II and owned by the defendant Walter Wixner (defendants). After filing this action, the plaintiff filed an offer of judgment for $19,000 pursuant to § 52-192a (a).⁵ The defendants did not accept the offer of judgment.

Subsequently, the case was referred to an arbitrator under the court's mandatory arbitration program pursuant to § 52-549u and Practice Book § 23-61.⁶ After a hearing, the arbitrator issued a decision awarding the plaintiff $21,945. The arbitrator's decision and award subsequently became a judgment of the court pursuant to General Statutes § 52-549z⁷ and Practice Book § 23-66.⁸

The plaintiff thereafter filed a "Motion to Determine Plaintiffs Offer of Judgment," seeking an award of 12 percent interest on the judgment pursuant to § 52-192a because the amount awarded by the arbitrator, which became the judgment of the court, exceeded the amount of the plaintiffs offer of judgment. The trial court ultimately denied the plaintiffs motion.⁹ This appeal followed.¹⁰

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the offer of judgment statute, § 52-192a, applies to court-mandated arbitration because the arbitration proceeding was part of a civil action. Specifically, the plaintiff asserts that the arbitration proceeding constituted a civil action because it was required by the court and was held in the form of a summary trial.¹¹ In response, the defendants assert that the offer of judgment statute does not apply to a court-mandated arbitration proceeding because it is not a trial within the meaning of § 52-192a (b) and that applying offer of judgment interest would undermine the purposes of the court-mandated arbitration statute. We agree with the defendants and conclude that the legislature did not intend § 52-192a (b) to apply to court-mandated arbitration proceedings. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Our resolution of the plaintiff's claim is guided by well established principles of statutory construction. "The process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature.... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of this case .... In seeking to determine that meaning, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter.... Finally, because the question presented by this appeal involves an issue of statutory construction, our review is plenary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Winchester v. Northwest Associates, 255 Conn. 379, 386, 767 A.2d 687 (2001).

The plain language of § 52-192a (b) supports our conclusion that offer of judgment interest does not apply to judgments resulting from arbitration proceedings. The statute provides in part that "[a]fter trial the court shall examine the record to determine whether the plaintiff made an `offer of judgment' which the defendants failed to accept. If the court ascertains from the record that the plaintiff has recovered an amount equal to or greater than the sum certain stated in his `offer of judgment', the court shall add to the amount so recovered twelve per cent annual interest on said amount...." General Statutes § 52-192a (b). The wording of § 52-192a (b) indicates the legislature's intention that offer of judgment interest apply only "after trial...." We conclude that an arbitration proceeding pursuant to General Statutes § 52-549u and Practice Book § 23-61 is not a trial within the meaning of § 52-192a (b).

The trial court is authorized to refer to an arbitrator any civil action in which the court has a reasonable expectation that the judgment will be less than $50,000. See General Statutes § 52-549u and Practice Book § 23-61. In such court-mandated arbitration proceedings, a lawyer with a minimum of five years civil litigation experience serves as the arbitrator. See General Statutes § 52-549w¹² and Practice Book § 23-60.¹³ No record is made of the proceedings and strict adherence to the rules of evidence is not required. See Practice Book § 23-63.¹⁴ The arbitrator is required to submit a decision in writing within 120 days after the hearing. See Practice Book § 23-64.¹⁵ The parties then have the opportunity to request a trial de novo pursuant to Practice Book § 23-66 (c)¹⁶ within twenty days of the filing of the arbitrator's decision. If neither party requests a trial de novo within twenty days, the decision of the arbitrator becomes the judgment of the court.¹⁷ See Practice Book § 23-66 (a).

Court-mandated arbitration proceedings pursuant to § 52-549u do not include many of the distinctive hallmarks of a trial. In a case involving private arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, the United States Supreme Court concluded that "[a]rbitration differs from judicial proceedings in many ways: arbitration carries no right to a jury trial as guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment; arbitrators need not be instructed in the law; they are not bound by rules of evidence; they need not give reasons for their awards; witnesses need not be sworn; the record of proceedings need not be complete; and judicial review, it has been held, is extremely limited." Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 664, 85 S. Ct. 614, 13 L. Ed. 2d 580 (1965). In another case the United States Supreme Court also distinguished arbitration from judicial proceedings, concluding that "arbitral factfinding is generally not equivalent to judicial factfinding.... [T]he record of the arbitration proceedings is not as complete; the usual rules of evidence do not apply; and rights and procedures common to civil trials, such as discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony under oath, are often severely limited or unavailable." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McDonald v. West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 291, 104 S. Ct. 1799, 80 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1984). This court also has distinguished arbitration from judicial proceedings, concluding that an arbitration proceeding is not an "action" for purposes of the statute of limitations. See Dayco Corp. v. Fred T. Roberts & Co., 192 Conn. 497, 503, 472 A.2d 780 (1984). In doing so, the court concluded that "arbitration proceedings do not occur in court, indeed that their very purpose is to avoid the formalities, the delay, the expense and vexation of ordinary litigation.... [T]hese proceedings are not governed by our rules of procedure.... [A]n arbitration proceeding is not an action within the meaning of that word as used in the [s]tatute of [l]imitations." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

An examination of the arbitration proceeding in the present case supports our conclusion that the arbitration proceeding was not conducted as a trial. Although the arbitrator stated in his decision that "[this] hearing was held in the form of a summary trial," no witnesses testified for either party and no formal exhibits were offered. The parties merely submitted copies of a police report, photographs, transcripts of depositions, medical reports and medical bills. The parties also summarized their respective cases through their counsel. After reviewing all of the information provided, the arbitrator issued his nonbinding award. The arbitration proceedings in this case differed greatly from a trial. The procedures were informal and parties were allowed to present unsworn evidence. None of the rules of evidence applied in this proceeding. In addition, the proceeding was presided over by a nonjudicial officer, whose decision was not binding on the parties. The court-mandated arbitration proceeding in this case did not constitute a trial.

An examination of the definition of the word "trial" found in Black's Law Dictionary further supports our conclusion that arbitration proceedings do not constitute a trial for the purposes of § 52-192a (b). Black's Law Dictionary (7th Ed. 1999) defines trial as "[a] formal judicial examination of evidence and determination of legal claims in an adversary proceeding." It further defines "judicial" as "[o]f or relating to, or by the court" and "determination" as "[a] final decision by a court or administrative agency...." Id. The court-mandated arbitration proceeding in this case was not formal, was not presided over by a judge, and did not result in a binding determination of any of the legal claims. The arbitration proceeding therefore did not constitute a trial.

The absence of any express language referring to arbitration proceedings in § 52-192a (b) further confirms our conclusion that offer of judgment interest does not apply to judgments resulting from arbitration awards. The legislature has adopted several statutes that establish procedures for converting arbitration awards into judgments of the court. See General Statutes § 52-549z (a); see also General Statutes § 52-417 et...