Nuno v. Pulido
| Decision Date | 30 April 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 13-96-207-CV,13-96-207-CV |
| Citation | 946 S.W.2d 448 |
| Parties | Manuel Gonzalez NUNO, Appellant, v. Pedro A. PULIDO and Branda Villarreal, Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Robert A. Allen, Plunkett Gibson & Allen, San Antonio, Alex M. Miller, San Antonio, Rene O. Oliveira, Roerig, Oliveira, & Fisher, Brownsville, for Appellant.
B. Buck Pettitt, Flores, Casso, Romero & Pettitt, McAllen, Ricardo Morado, Roerig, Oliveira & Fisher, Brownsville, Glenn D. Romero, McAllen, for Appellees.
Before SEERDEN, C.J., and FEDERICO G. HINOJOSA, Jr. and YANEZ, JJ.
Manuel Gonzalez Nuno, appellant, was involved in an automobile accident with Pedro Pulido and Branda Villarreal, appellees. Appellees brought suit against appellant claiming injuries as a result of appellant's negligence. After submitting their claims to binding arbitration, the trial court accepted the parties' agreement and the arbitrator's award, and entered judgment awarding pre-judgment interest in addition to the arbitrator's award. The only issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in awarding pre-judgment interest in addition to the arbitrator's award. We hold that the trial court did make such an error, and we reform the judgment to delete the awards of pre-judgment interest to appellees.
Appellees brought a personal injury suit against appellant for injuries sustained as a result of a car accident which occurred on July 25, 1990. During pendency of the lawsuit, appellant died. 1 Subsequently, all parties agreed to resolve their disputes through binding arbitration. The parties, through their attorneys, executed the terms of their agreement in two documents: an Arbitration Agreement, and a Rule 11 Agreement.
The Arbitration Agreement provides, in relevant part, that "by separate Rule 11 Agreement executed simultaneously with this Arbitration Agreement, all parties to the above-styled lawsuit have agreed to resolve this matter by arbitration ..." The Rule 11 Agreement provides, in pertinent part, that "all parties have agreed to submit this matter to binding arbitration with respect to all claims of Pedro Pulido and Branda Villarreal arising from this occurrence and/or asserted in this lawsuit."
On December 4, 1995, after an arbitration hearing, the arbitrator issued his Award of Arbitration. The arbitrator, after hearing the proofs and allegations of the parties, found and awarded the following:
1. The sum of $46,500 is awarded to Branda Villarreal;
2. The sum of $45,900 is awarded to Pedro A. Pulido;
3. Arbitration fees and expenses shall be borne equally by the parties, unless otherwise agreed; and
4. This Award is in full settlement of all claims submitted to this arbitration.
On January 16, 1996, the trial court entered judgment on appellees' motion. The judgment stated that the trial court "accepts the agreement of the parties and the Award of Arbitrator." The judgment then awarded to appellees, over appellant's objection, the damages awarded by the Arbitration Award along with approximately $27,000 each in pre-judgment interest. 2
On February 15, 1996, appellant filed an Amended Motion for Reconsideration and Modification of Judgment. A hearing was conducted on this motion during which the trial judge stated that he awarded pre-judgment interest in addition to the arbitration award because he did not believe that the arbitrator had included pre-judgment interest. 3 The trial court, however, did not rule on appellant's motion which was overruled by operation of law on April 1, 1996.
After appeal was perfected, the parties agreed to execute partial releases of judgment on the portion of the judgment which represented actual damages awarded by the arbitrator. Accordingly, the only issue before us on appeal is whether the trial court erred in awarding pre-judgment interest in addition to the arbitration award.
In two points of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred when it entered judgment which awarded pre-judgment interest in addition to the arbitrator's award because the judgment conflicts with the agreement between the parties to resolve the lawsuit in the amount of the arbitrator's award, and there is no evidence justifying modification of the arbitrator's award. We agree.
When the parties have reached a settlement agreement, the trial court acts in a ministerial capacity in entering judgment. Dancy v. Cave, 760 S.W.2d 40, 44 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 1988, no writ); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Williams, 603 S.W.2d 258, 262 (Tex.Civ.App.--Corpus Christi 1980, no writ). When a trial court renders judgment on the parties' settlement agreement, the judgment must be in strict or literal compliance with the terms of the agreement. Vickrey v. American Youth Camps, Inc., 532 S.W.2d 292, 292 (Tex.1976); Tinney v. Willingham, 897 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1995, no writ); Delta Drilling Co. v. Cruz, 707 S.W.2d 660, 669 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Where the judgment does not conform to the settlement agreement, the judgment will be rendered unenforceable. Delta Drilling Co., 707 S.W.2d at 669.
Appellees argue that the settlement agreement did not contemplate pre-judgment interest, and that, because an award of pre-judgment interest is mandatory in a personal injury case, see TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 5069-1.05, § 6(a) (Vernon Supp.1997), the trial court was obligated to award pre-judgment interest in addition to actual damages. Although we agree that pre-judgment interest is mandatory, it is our opinion that such interest was encompassed in the settlement agreement entered into by all parties.
A settlement agreement is a contract, and its construction is governed by legal principles applicable to contracts generally. Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Fuller, 919 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tex.App.--Texarkana 1996, writ denied); Stevens v. Snyder, 874 S.W.2d 241, 243 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1994, writ denied). Ordinary principles of contact law require us to ascertain the true intentions of the parties as expressed in the entire contract. Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex.1983); Kline v. O'Quinn, 874 S.W.2d 776, 782 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied). Language used by the parties in a contract should be accorded its plain grammatical meaning unless it definitely appears that the intentions of the parties would be thereby defeated. Lyons v. Montgomery, 701 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Tex.1985). We must avoid, when possible and proper, a construction which is unreasonable, inequitable, and oppressive. Reilly v. Rangers Management Inc., 727 S.W.2d 527, 530 (Tex.1987).
Applying these principles to the case at hand, we note that the parties agreed to submit their claims to binding arbitration. The Rule 11 agreement signed by all parties specifically states that "all parties have agreed to submit this matter to binding arbitration with respect to all claims of Pedro Pulido and Branda Villarreal arising from this occurrence and/or asserted in this lawsuit." (Emphasis added). At the time the case was submitted to arbitration, appellees' live petition specifically included a claim for pre-judgment interest. Accordingly, we hold that appellees' claim for pre-judgment interest was submitted to arbitration. Therefore, when the arbitrator issued his Award of Arbitrator, which was issued in "full settlement of all claims submitted to this arbitration," appellees' claim for pre-judgment interest was included in that award. 4 (Emphasis added).
In light of this holding, we find that the judgment proposed by appellees, and eventually signed by the trial court, conflicts with the settlement agreement. Specifically, the trial court's award of pre-judgment interest clearly exceeded the agreed-upon settlement amount which had already accounted for pre-judgment interest. Therefore, we sustain appellant's first point of error, and unless there was evidence justifying a modification of the settlement agreement, we must reform the judgment.
Generally, an arbitration award is given the same effect as a final judgment of a court of last resort. See City of San Antonio v. McKenzie Const. Co., 136 Tex. 315, 150 S.W.2d 989 (1941); J.J. Gregory Gourmet Servs., Inc. v. Antone's Import Co., 927 S.W.2d 31, 33 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ); House Grain Co. v. Obst, 659 S.W.2d 903, 905-06 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Arbitration awards are favored by the courts to dispose of pending disputes; therefore, every reasonable presumption will be indulged to uphold the arbitration proceeding. House Grain, 659 S.W.2d at 905-06. A trial court can modify and invalidate such an award only if it finds the arbitrator, in making his...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
International Bank of Commerce-Brownsville v. International Energy Development Corp.
...and applying the law of such magnitude that an implication of bad faith or failure to exercise an honest judgment is clear. Nuno v. Pulido, 946 S.W.2d 448, 452 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1997, no writ). The concept of "gross mistake" has been raised and applied in cases involving both common......
-
Frost Nat. Bank v. L. & F Distributors, Ltd.
...(Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.); Solis v. Evins, 951 S.W.2d 44, 50 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1997, orig. proceeding); Nuno v. Pulido, 946 S.W.2d 448, 451 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no writ). Nevertheless, an "unreasonable" construction refers to one that subverts the objective in......
-
TXI Operations, LP v. City of McKinney
... ... writ denied); Stevens v. Snyder , 874 S.W.2d 241, 243 ... (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied); see also Nuno v ... Pulido , 946 S.W.2d 448, 451 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi ... 1997, no writ). Under Texas law, there are four elements to a ... ...
-
Werline v. East Texas Salt Water Disp. Co.
...there is a mistake of fact or law." Faulconer, Inc. v. HFI Ltd. P'ship, 970 S.W.2d 36, 39 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1998, no pet.); see Nuno v. Pulido, 946 S.W.2d 448, 452 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no writ). "An arbitration award is to be given the same weight as a trial court's judgment, and t......