Nutt v. Best W. Int'l
| Decision Date | 16 November 2016 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:16-CV-0002 |
| Parties | JULIE NUTT and KEITH NUTT, Plaintiffs, v. BEST WESTERN INTERNATIONAL, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(Judge Kosik)
Before the Court is Defendant Best Western International's ("BWI") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) (Doc. 66), and alternatively, Motion to Strike Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f) (Doc. 66). Also before this Court are Defendants' Primer Hotel Management ("PHM") and Premier Hotel d/b/a Best Western ("PH"), Motion to Dismiss Allegations of "recklessness" and claims for punitive damages, and to strike averments in Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and 12(f) (Doc. 68).
On January 4, 2016, Plaintiffs initiated this action against the above-captioned Defendants by filing a complaint with this Court. (Doc. 1). Plaintiffs allege that they sustained personal injuries from carbon monoxide exposure on August 24, 2014, while staying at a Best Western Plus Scranton East Hotel & Convention Center, located in Dunmore, Pennsylvania ("Dunmore Hotel"). (Pltfs. Compl.). On May 12, 2016, Defendant BWI filed its first Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. (Doc. 22).
On May 24, 2016, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. 26), thereby rendering Defendant's motion to dismiss, moot. Thereafter, Defendant BWI filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. (Doc. 30). Plaintiffs' subsequently filed a Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 36). Defendant BWI has renewed its motion for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or, alternatively, to strike pursuant to Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Doc. 66).
BWI is a non-profit Arizona membership association, with its principal place of business in Phoenix, Arizona (Doc. 67, Ex. B., Pollack Aff., at ¶ 3). BWI licenses the use of the "Best Western" name and logo to its members, operates a cooperative reservation system, and engages in joint advertising on behalf of the membership. (Id.). BWI does not own, operate, manage or lease any member hotel or motel facility; all branded hotels, including the Dunmore Hotel, are independently owned and operated. (Id. at ¶ 4). Defendants PHM and PH do not contest jurisdiction, rather, they have filed motions to dismiss and to strike certain allegations and claims pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(f) (Doc. 68).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a complaint to contain "a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a)(1). Plaintiff alleges subject-matter jurisdiction on the basis of diversity, which requires that the amount in controversy exceed $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and that all plaintiffs be diverse from all defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Because diversity of citizenship is a jurisdictional requirement, it is within the exclusive purview of the court to determine whether diversity exists.Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 195 (1990).
In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2), the court must accept all allegations in the complaint as true, and view all factual disputes in favor of the plaintiff. Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 368 (3d Cir. 2002). When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, a court may review affidavits and other evidence submitted by the parties, since it "requires resolution of factual issues outside of the pleadings." Corr. Medical Care, Inc. v. Gray, 07-2840, 2008 WL 248977, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2008) (quoting Time Share Vacation Club v. Atl. Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 66-67 n. 9 (3d Cir. 1984)). Once a defendant raises a Rule 12(b)(2) defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to "prov[e] by affidavits or other competent evidence that jurisdiction is proper." Metcalfe v. Renaissance Marine, Inc., 566 F.3d 324, 330 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Dayhoff Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 86 F.3d 1287, 1302 (3d Cir. 1996)). When no evidentiary hearing on the jurisdictional issue has been held, "the plaintiff need only demonstrate a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction at the preliminary stages of litigation." Id. (citing O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 316 (3d Cir. 2007)). "The plaintiff meets this burden and presents a prima facie case for the exercise of personal jurisdiction by 'establishing with reasonable particularity sufficient contacts between the defendant and the forum state.' " Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, Nat. Ass'n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1223 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Provident Nat. Bank v. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 819 F.2d 434, 437 (3d Cir. 1987)). "Plaintiffs cannot rely on general averments in the complaint or unsupported statements in their response, but must instead provide jurisdictional facts supported by affidavits or competent evidence to sustain their burden." Orazi v. Hilton Hotels Corp., Civ. No. 09-05959, 2010 WL 4751728, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 2010).
A. BWI's Rule 12(b)(2) Motion
BWI argues that the Court does not have general personal jurisdiction over it because it is not incorporated within Pennsylvania and its principal place of business is located in Arizona. BWI also argues that the Court does not have specific personal jurisdiction over it because the alleged cause of action does not arise from BWI's forum-related activities. Plaintiffs are silent as to whether this Court has general personal jurisdiction over BWI, but argue that the Court maintains specific personal jurisdiction over BWI because the allege cause of action arises from BWI's forum-related activities.
When the defendant raises a jurisdictional defense, the plaintiff must make a prima facie case of jurisdiction, by showing "that the cause of action arose from the defendant's forum-related activities (specific jurisdiction), or that the defendant has 'continuous and systematic' contacts with the forum state (general jurisdiction)." Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, N.A. v. DiVeronica Bros., Inc., 983 F.2d 551, 554 (3d Cir. 1993). The plaintiff must sustain its burden of proof in establishing jurisdictional facts through sworn affidavits or other competent evidence.
A federal court in Pennsylvania has jurisdiction over parties, to the extent Pennsylvania's long-arm statute permits. Pennsylvania's long-arm statute authorizes jurisdiction, "to the fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of the United States and may be based on the most minimum contact with this Commonwealth allowed under the Constitution of the United States." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5322(b). The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, requires that the defendant have minimum contacts with the forum state and that the exercise of jurisdiction "comport[s] with fair play and substantial justice." Remick v.Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 255 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). "[M]inimum contacts must have a basis in 'some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.'" Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)).
The Court first considers whether it has general jurisdiction over Defendant BWI. BWI's Director of Member Care Administration, Cheryl Pollack, declares that BWI is an Arizona non-profit membership association with its principal place of business in Phoenix, Arizona, and that it does not operate any facilities in Pennsylvania. (Doc. 67, Ex. B, Pollack Aff., at ¶¶ 1, 3, 11). BWI further argues that it does not maintain an office within Pennsylvania, does not have bank accounts in Pennsylvania, and does not own real or personal property in Pennsylvania. (Doc. 67, Br. in Support, at 18). Plaintiffs do not provide any contrary argument or evidence refuting BWI's declarations.
A court has general jurisdiction over a defendant when the defendant possesses "continuous and systematic contacts with the forum[,]" regardless of the "claim's relationship to the defendants' in-forum contacts." In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 602 F. Supp. 2d 538, 565 (M.D. Pa. 2009). It is the Plaintiffs' burden to establish personal jurisdiction after a defendant raises a jurisdictional defense.
The Supreme Court has ruled on two general jurisdiction cases: Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, — U.S. — , 131 S.Ct. 2846, 180 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011) and Daimler AGv. Bauman, — U.S. — , 134 S.Ct. 746, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014), making clear that for general jurisdiction purposes, the inquiry is not whether "a foreign corporation's in-forum contacts can be said to be in some sense 'continuous and systematic,' it is whether that corporation's 'affiliations with the state are so "continuous and systematic" as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.' " Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 761 (quoting Goodyear, 131 S.Ct. at 2851). In all but the most exceptional circumstances, a corporation is "at home" only in the two "paradigm [] ... bases for general jurisdiction": its state of incorporation and its principal place of business. Id. at 760-61.
In this case, Plaintiffs fail to meet their burden of showing that BWI is "at home" in Pennsylvania and thus, subject to general personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs do not allege that BWI is incorporated or has its principal place of business in Pennsylvania. To the contrary, Plaintiffs allege that BWI's corporate address is Phoenix, Arizona and for "diversity of jurisdiction purposes, ... is considered a resident of ... Arizona." . Moreover, despite the opportunity to respond to BWI's argument that ...
To continue reading
Request your trial