Nutter v. Wyatt
| Docket Number | Civil Action 4:23-CV-P22-JHM |
| Decision Date | 02 July 2023 |
| Parties | CLIFFORD GREGORY NUTTER, PLAINTIFF v. LT. JAMES WYATT, DEFENDANT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky |
Plaintiff, pro se
Plaintiff Clifford Gregory Nutter, a pretrial detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, initiated this pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. The complaint is before the Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). For the following reasons, Plaintiff's claims will be dismissed.
Plaintiff who is housed at the Daviess County Detention Center (DCDC), names as Defendant in his individual and official capacities DCDC Lt. James Wyatt. Plaintiff states that on January 8, 2023, he was on the top bunk in a disciplinary cell lying naked under two blankets while using his jumpsuit as a pillow. He states that Defendant came into the cell and, although Defendant's job did not include cell inspections, told the inmate on the bottom bunk to “take that sheet down.” According to Plaintiff, Defendant then proceeded to grab Plaintiff's blankets, prompting Plaintiff to tell him not to because he was naked; however, Defendant only pulled harder, uncovering Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant looked at his genitalia with a “very odd lustful look on his face,” after which Plaintiff hurriedly put on his jumpsuit. According to the complaint, Defendant threw the blankets and books from the cell and wrote him up for having the blankets. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's act of “sexual harassment ‘voyeurism'” violated his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.[1]
Plaintiff also alleges that on another occasion, while he was in a medical cell, Defendant threw papers on the floor and demanded that Plaintiff get out of bed and pick them up; when he refused, Defendant took the TV out of the cell.
Plaintiff further alleges that he has filed grievances about these incidents. However, he states that Defendant is the officer who responds to grievances, “and when a person files a grievance about [Defendant's] conduct he justifies his own misconduct.”
As relief, Plaintiff asks for compensatory and punitive damages.
When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the action, if the Court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (2). When determining whether a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court must construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all of the factual allegations as true. Prater v. City of Burnside, Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). While a reviewing court must liberally construe pro se pleadings, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam), to avoid dismissal, a complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
“Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent [ ] another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.'” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55 (1978)). This means that Plaintiff's official-capacity claims are actually against Daviess County, Defendant's employer.
A municipality cannot be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless there is a direct causal link between a policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Id. To state a claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must “identify the policy, connect the policy to the [entity] itself and show that the particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy.” Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 8 F.3d 358, 363-64 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Coogan v. City of Wixom, 820 F.2d 170, 176 (6th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Frantz v. Vill. of Bradford, 245 F.3d 869 (6th Cir. 2001)). The policy or custom “must be ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation' in order to establish the liability” of the entity under § 1983. Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981) (citation omitted)).
Here, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant violated the constitution pursuant to a policy or custom of Daviess County. Accordingly, Plaintiff's official-capacity claims must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant pulled the blankets off of him despite his protestations that he was naked; took the blankets and books from the cell; and then wrote Plaintiff up for having the blankets even though his job does not include cell inspections. Plaintiff also alleges that on another occasion, while he was in a medical cell, Defendant took the TV out of the cell when Plaintiff refused to pick up papers on the floor.
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.” Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) ). “The Fourth Amendment, however, applies only when ‘the person invoking its protection can claim a justifiable, a reasonable or a legitimate expectation of privacy that has been invaded by government action.'” Jones v. Caruso, No. 2:11-CV-65, 2011 WL 3740578, at *8 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 24, 2011) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 (1984)). The Supreme Court has held that the search of a prisoner's cell does not violate the Fourth Amendment because “society is not prepared to recognize as legitimate any subjective expectation of privacy that a prisoner might have in his prison cell.” Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526. According to the Hudson Court, “[a] right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally incompatible with the close and continual surveillance of inmates and their cells required to ensure institutional security and internal order.” Id. at 527-28. This principle holds true whether the inmate is a convict or a pre- trial detainee. See Florence v. Bd. Of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318 (2012) (detainee case). Additionally, “[t]he rule applies to searches and seizures in equal measure.” House v. Henderson Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 4:21-CV-00038-JHM, 2022 WL 4279724, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 15, 2022). Consequently, Plaintiff does not state a Fourth Amendment claim related to Defendant's search of Plaintiff's cell or seizure of items therein.
The Sixth Circuit has recognized that inmates retain limited rights to bodily privacy under the Fourth Amendment. See Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d 912, 916 (6th Cir. 1992). However, the exposure that Plaintiff describes in the complaint -- a brief exposure to one male guard -- is not in the magnitude of those cases where a Fourth Amendment bodily privacy claim was found. See, e.g., id. (Fourth Amendment privacy claim involving strip searches conducted outdoors, in front of other inmates and at least seven officers); Fortner v. Thomas, 983 F.2d 1024, 1030 (11th Cir. 1993) (); Kent v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 1220, 1226-27 (6th Cir. 1987) (); Smith v. Long, No. 3:18-CV-00061, 2018 WL 3831394, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 13, 2018) (). The Court will dismiss Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The Eighth Amendment applies to a convicted inmate, not a pretrial detainee like Plaintiff. See Hale v. Boyle Cnty., 18 F.4th 845, 852 (6th Cir. 2021). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant engaged in sexually harassing voyeurism, and he alleges that Defendant's act of uncovering him caused him to remember a prison rape he endured when he was 17, necessitating mental health treatment.
The Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punishment extends to pretrial detainees through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, see Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S....
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