Smith v. Long

• Decision Date: 13 August 2018
• Docket Number: No. 3:18-cv-00061,3:18-cv-00061
• Parties: HAROLD M. SMITH, # 200800014382, Plaintiff, v. SHERIFF JEFF LONG, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee

HAROLD M. SMITH, # 200800014382, Plaintiff, v. SHERIFF JEFF LONG, et al., Defendants.

No. 3:18-cv-00061

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE NASHVILLE DIVISION

August 13, 2018

Judge Trauger

MEMORANDUM

Harold M. Smith, an inmate of the Williamson County Jail in Franklin, Tennessee, brings this pro se, in forma pauperis action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Sheriff Jeff Long and f/n/u Vanden Bosch, alleging violations of the plaintiff's civil rights. (Docket No. 1).

The complaint is before the court for an initial review pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.

As a preliminary matter, the court notes that the plaintiff has filed several letters and notices subsequent to the filing of his complaint. (Docket Nos. 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13). The court will consider the information set forth in these letters and notices while screening the plaintiff's complaint. However, going forward, the plaintiff is advised that he cannot litigate this action by way of letters and notices to the court. Even though the plaintiff is proceeding pro se and the court will take into consideration his pro se status when evaluating pleadings and pending motions, the plaintiff still is required to comply with the rules governing this case. These rules exist to ensure fairness to all parties. If the plaintiff wishes for the court to consider arguments and evidence, he must raise them by way of timely and properly filed motions.

I. PLRA Screening Standard

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any portion of a civil complaint filed in forma pauperis that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is frivolous, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly requires initial review of any "complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity," id. § 1915A(a), and summary dismissal of the complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in § 1915(e)(2)(B). Id. § 1915A(b).

The Sixth Circuit has confirmed that the dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), "governs dismissals for failure to state a claim under those statutes because the relevant statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6)." Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive scrutiny on initial review, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true." Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)).

Although pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadingsdrafted by lawyers, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), the courts' "duty to be 'less stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up [unpleaded] allegations." McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).

II. Section 1983 Standard

The plaintiff filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Docket No. 1 at 1). Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, abridges "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws . . . ." To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege and show two elements: (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F.3d 584, 590 (6^th Cir. 2003); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

III. Alleged Facts

The complaint alleges that inmates housed at the Williamson County Jail in Franklin, Tennessee, are not given the opportunity to earn "2 for 1" credits; the food served to the inmates is unsanitary; inmates are not afforded their right to "free speech;" inmate workers are permitted to have "thermals" to keep warm but other inmates are not; county inmates are housed with state inmates; and guards are able to view inmates in the bathroom stall areas of "363, 364, segregation, the women, and 707 work detail," which violates the inmates' privacy. (Docket No. 1 at 5).

The plaintiff further alleges that inmates are not afforded daily outdoor recreation (Docket No. 6 at 1); the jail does not acknowledge Seventh Day Adventists or Muslims (Id. at 2); inmates must sign up in advance in order to attend a religious service (Id.); only three inmates per pod may attend a religious service (Id.); inmates are not screened for infections and diseases upon enteringthe jail (Id.); the jail charges inmates for hygiene items, medical visits, and dentist visits (Id.); and the commissary overcharges inmates for items (Id.).

The plaintiff also alleges that guards open inmates' mail outside the presence of the inmates; guards search inmate cells when the inmates are not present; and inmates' clothes are insufficiently laundered. (Docket No. 5). Finally, the plaintiff alleges that inmates are not served meals with appropriate calories. (Docket No. 8).

IV. PLRA Screening

The complaint names two defendants in their individual and official capacities: Sheriff Jeff Long and f/n/u Vanden Bosch. (Docket No. 1 at 2).

Other than listing Long and Bosch in the section of the complaint for "Defendant(s) against whom this lawsuit is being brought," the complaint does not mention either defendant. (Docket No. 1 at 2). The complaint does not identify any actions Long or Bosch allegedly took that might have given rise to the plaintiff's claims against them. It is a basic pleading essential that a plaintiff attribute factual allegations to particular defendants. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544 (holding that, in order to state a claim, a plaintiff must make sufficient allegations to give a defendant fair notice of the claim). Where a person is named as a defendant without an allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is subject to dismissal, even under the liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints. See Gilmore v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 92 F. App'x 188, 190 (6th Cir. 2004) (dismissing complaint where plaintiff failed to allege how any named defendant was involved in the violation of his rights); Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App'x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing plaintiff's claims where the complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity which of the named defendants were personally involved in or responsible for each alleged violation of rights). Because the plaintiff'sallegations fail to otherwise show how Long and Bosch were personally involved in the acts about which the plaintiff complains, the court must dismiss the § 1983 claims against Long and Bosch in their individual capacities for failure to state claims upon which relief can be granted.

With respect to the plaintiff's claims against Long and Bosch in their official capacities, the complaint identifies Long as the Sheriff of Williamson County and Bosch as a Lieutenant; from the context of the complaint, the court assumes for purposes of the PLRA screening that Bosch is employed by the Williamson County Sheriff's Office or the county entity responsible for the operation of the Williamson County Jail.¹ It is well-settled that an official capacity suit is nothing more than a suit against the governmental entity. See, e.g., Leach v. Shelby Cnty, 891 F.2d 1241, 1245-46 (6th Cir. 1989) ("[The plaintiff's] suit against the Mayor and the Sheriff of Shelby County in their official capacities is, therefore, essentially and for all purposes, a suit against the County itself."); Petty v. Cnty. of Franklin, 478 F.3d 341, 349 (6th Cir. 2007) ("To the extent that [the plaintiff's Section 1983] suit is against [the sheriff] in his official capacity, it is nothing more than a suit against Franklin County itself.") (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) ("[A]n official capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.")).

While Williamson County is a suable entity, it is responsible under § 1983 only for its "own illegal acts. [It is] not vicariously liable under § 1983 for [its] employees' actions." Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359, 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Under § 1983, a municipality can only be held liable if the plaintiff demonstrates that the alleged federal violation was a direct result of the county's official policy orcustom. Burgess v. Fisher, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir.2013) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 693, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)); Regets v. City of Plymouth, 568 Fed. Appx. 380, 2014 WL 2596562, at *12 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Slusher v. Carson, 540 F.3d 449, 456-57 (6th Cir. 2008)). A plaintiff can make a showing of an illegal policy or custom by demonstrating one of the following: (1) the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2) an official with final decision making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom or tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations. Burgess, 735 F.3d at 478.

Here, the allegations of the complaint are insufficient to state a claim for municipal liability against ...