Nutwell v. Prince George's County Dept. of Social Services

• Decision Date: 23 April 1974
• Docket Number: No. 678,678
• Citation: 21 Md.App. 100,318 A.2d 563
• Parties: Bonnie Gail NUTWELL v. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 100

21 Md.App. 100

318 A.2d 563

Bonnie Gail NUTWELL v. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES.

No. 678.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

April 23, 1974.

Thomas E. Walker, Hyattsville, with whom was Tyler G. Webb, Hyattsville, on the brief, for appellant.

Virginia S. Criste, Associate County Atty. for Prince George's County, with whom was Joseph S. Casula, County Atty., for Prince George's County, on the brief, for appellee.

Argued before POWERS, GILBERT and LOWE, JJ.

GILBERT, Judge.

A decree of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County granted, over vigorous objection by the natural mother, the petition of the Prince George's County Department of Social Services for 'guardianship with right to consent to adoption and/or long-term care' of two minor children. The decree severed not only all natural parental rights, but contemporaneously left the children's common bond with their brother and sister who were not the subject of the petition.

The mother and appellant, Bonnie Gail Nutwell, contends in this Court that (1) the Chancellor erred in determining that her refusal to consent to adoption was contrary to the best interest of the children, and (2) the trial court erred in holding an interview with the children absent an express waiver of the appellant-mother and without informing the appellant of the substance of the interview. We think she is right in both contentions and for the reasons stated infra we reverse the decree.

THE FACTS

The two children, Yvonne and Tracy, were, at the time of the hearing, ages nine and six respectively. They are the issue of what the appellant characterized as a 'rocky' marriage between her and Harry Francis Nutwell, the father, who, while served with a copy of the petition, did not answer it or appear at the hearing.

A recounting of a brief history of this case must commence with the night of February 6, 1971. The appellant was at that time experiencing marital difficulties that she stated were attributable to her husband's 'staying out late all the time drinking.' Appellant left Yvonne and Tracy with a babysitter and went to look for her husband. While she was gone, the husband returned, dismissed the sitter, packed his clothes and left. The two children were left alone so they set out for their maternal grandmother's home. A police officer stopped them and, after questioning, took them to the maternal grandmother. When appellant returned home she discovered that her husband and the children were gone. Appellant says that she assumed that her husband had taken the children to his mother. The next day the appellant's mother turned the children over to Royce and Violet Blair of Stafford, Virginia. The Blairs were no strangers to the appellant's mother as the appellant's brother was married to the daughter of the Blairs. A few days later a summary proceeding was held in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, and the Blairs were awarded temporary custody of the children. According to the appellant-and not contested-she was not notified of that hearing. In June of 1971 care and custody was given to the appellee 'because the Blairs were not an AFDC ¹ eligible relative and (they) needed help in supporting the children, so (appellee) took care and custody and began supporting them in August (19)71.' There is nothing in the record to indicate that appellant was apprised of that proceeding either. The Blairs' home is now considered a 'foster home of (the appellee) agency.'

The appellant first became aware of the fact that the children had been turned over to the Blairs in February 1971 because her mother told her so. Appellant did not object to the Blairs' having the children with them at that time because of the appellant's personal and marital problems. Appellant knew the Blairs and was seemingly satisfied that they would take good care of the children.

Matters continued on in the status quo, until the appellee notified the appellant by letter in March, 1972 of its intention to obtain guardianship with the right to consent to adoption. Appellant immediately contacted the social worker who had written the letter in behalf of the appellee, and she interposed her objection to the guardianship. At the same time, the appellant requested visitation rights.

Later on in the same month the appellant again contacted the appellee and requested a meeting with the social worker as well as a visitation with the children. Appellant was allowed to meet with the children on March 26, 1972, for three hours. The testimony is in conflict as to the circumstances under which the visit with the children was held. Mrs. Blair testified that she was not present during the visit. The appellant, on the other hand, stated that the meeting was held in the kitchen of the Blairs' home, and that both Mr. and Mrs. Blair remained in the room during most of the visit. The appellant, further, testified that she made seven attempts to contact the social worker in an effort to arrange other visitations, but the social worker in her testimony said that she was unaware of any such efforts on the part of the appellant. Mrs. Blair told the Chancellor that the children had received presents from their mother on the 'first Christmas', and she let the children have them. On another occasion, however, some mail was sent to the children by their mother and Mrs. Blair intercepted the letters and returned them. She also said that she gave 'one small package and . . . one other birthday card'-sent by appellant-to the children's grandmother without the children having ever seen them.

The appellee filed on June 6, 1972 the petition for guardianship with right to consent to adoption. In August of the same year the appellant filed appearance in the case and refused to consent to the appellee's petition. In February of 1973 the appellant, her attorney, a social worker and an attorney for the appellee met. At that meeting appellant advised that she desired an opportunity to straighten herself out so that she could again have custody of her own children. The social worker gave the appellant three months to conform to the agency's requirement that (1) she find adequate housing, (2) find a job other than housekeeper, (3) agree to see a therapist and (4) not visit with the children during that period of time. In an apparent effort to comply with the social worker's edict, the appellant quit her job as housekeeper and began therapy. Additionally she sought, with the assistance of the appellee, vocational rehabilitation. Because of an unsatisfactory personal relationship between the appellant and an employee of the therapist, the appellant discontinued the therapy. There is a disagreement in the testimony as to whether the appellant actually halted the thereapy or merely refused to continue under the direction of the employee as distinguished from the doctor in charge. There was evidence, however, that the appellant was scheduled to see a therapist the week following the trial of this matter. There was further testimony that the appellant in February of 1973 had been convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, and that she was on probation for that offense.

After separation from her husband and during the period of February 1971 through the date of trial, June 12, 1973, appellant established a history of involvement with male companions. At the trial J. M. Dulaney testified that he and the appellant planned to be married as soon as the appellant and her husband were divorced. The divorce was then pending in the District of Columbia on the ground of voluntary separation. The appellant had not contributed toward the support of the children after February of 1971, although we are unable to find in the record before us that any demand was ever made upon her to do so. Moreover, we are unable to find in this record that any demand was made upon the father for the support of the children. ² The appellant stated that she loved her children, was breaking away from her old group of friends, intended to marry Mr. Dulaney whose income was $225 to $300 per week, was making an effort to have her oldest two children live with her and hoped that she could eventually have all of her children in her home with her and her new husband.

On June 18, 1973 the Chancellor entered a decree in which he granted long term care to the appellee 'with the suggestion that the petition be repeated at the end of two years.' Both parties filed motions for reconsideration. Thereafter the court entered a decree on September 5, 1973, striking its earlier decree and granting the relief prayed in the appellee's petition.

I.

The Court of Appeals in Walker v. Gardner, 221 Md. 280, 157 A.2d 273 (1960), speaking through Judge Hammond (later Chief Judge) stated, at 284, 157 A.2d at 215:

'. . . '(T)he welfare and best interests of the child are the primary considerations in all adoption proceedings', Winter v. Director, 217 Md. 391, 396, 143 A.2d 81, 84 (1958); King v. Shandrowsski, 218 Md. 38, 42-43, 145 A.2d 281, 284 (1958). Unlike awards of custody, however, adoption decrees cut the child off from the natural parent, who is made a legal stranger to his offspring. The consequences of this drastic and permanent severing of the strongest and basic natural ties and relationships has led the Legislature and this Court to make sure, as far as possible, that adoption shall not be granted over parental objection unless that course clearly is justified. The welfare and best interests of the child must be weighed with great care against every just claim of an objecting parent.

'(T)he Court of Appeals has indicated that it will not permit trial courts to decree adoptions over the expressed objection of the natural parent or parents, save in very strong cases,' Strahorn; Adoption in Maryland, 7 Md.L.Rev. 275, 295 (1943). Nevertheless, in strong cases this court has said of (Md.Ann.Code art. 16, § 74): 'We...