Adoption/Guardianship No. 11137 in Circuit Court for Montgomery County, In re

• Citation: 664 A.2d 443,106 Md.App. 308
• Decision Date: 01 September 1994
• Docket Number: No. 1924,1924
• Parties: In re ADOPTION/GUARDIANSHIP NO. 11137 IN the CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY. ,
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 308

106 Md.App. 308

664 A.2d 443

In re ADOPTION/GUARDIANSHIP NO. 11137 IN the CIRCUIT COURT

FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY.

No. 1924, Sept. Term, 1994.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Sept. 7, 1995.

Murray L. Deutchman, Rockville, for appellant

[664 A.2d 445] Walter H. Madden, Rockville, for appellees.

Argued before ALPERT, CATHELL and HOLLANDER, JJ.

CATHELL, Judge.

Appellant, Seanna B., appeals from a Decree of Final Adoption entered on September 2, 1994, in favor of appellees, Mr. and Mrs. B., ¹ by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (Miller, J., presiding). She challenges the validity of her consent thereto, and the propriety vel non of the court's order, setting forth the following issues for our consideration:

1. Whether the Court properly entered a Decree of Adoption from a procedural standpoint.

2. Whether the Consent to Adoption was procured by duress or undue influence.

3. Whether there was a valid revocation of the Consent.

4. Whether the lower court's factual findings prohibit the legal conclusion that the Consent was valid.

We shall reverse.

Appellant gave birth to her first child (the "child") on October 27, 1985. In November of 1988, an Order was entered in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County appointing appellees, the child's grandparents and appellant's parents, his co-guardians, with appellant's consent. This was later renewed on October 12, 1990, again with appellant's consent. The sole purpose of the guardianship was to provide the child with medical insurance under the grandparents' coverage.

In August of 1992, appellees, pro se, filed a document entitled "Petition for Independent Adoption" with the trial court, using a form the copy of which was obtained by Mr. B. from a book at the local library. At the time of the filing, appellees did not have appellant's consent and knew that they would have to "work on her" to obtain it. Moreover, appellees made no effort to inform appellant (their own daughter) that they were attempting to adopt her child. Thus, appellant was completely unaware that the petition had been filed. Additionally, no show cause order, as required, was issued to inform her thereof. ²

Later, on January 11, 1993, appellant, still unaware of the pending litigation, before a notary, signed a document presented to her by her father, entitled "Consent to Adoption and Waiver of Notice of Process." This form was also obtained from a book at the library. Both parties differ in their account of the events of that day. Appellant states that she, still unaware of appellees' efforts to adopt the child and of their prior initiation of adoption proceedings, was called to her parents' home. She was accompanied there by a classmate Upon her arrival at her parents' house, appellant was greeted by her father's request that she "sign the papers." Appellant testified that she did not know the papers to which he referred and, forestalling her father's efforts, indicated to him her desire to discuss the matter at a later time. Mr. B., however, would not be put off; he stated, "You are going with me, and you're going now." At that point, appellant and Provost, in one car, and Mr. B., in another, drove to a notary not far from appellees' home. At the notary, more discussion took place, culminating in appellant signing the document.

Kathy Provost, who also testified at the hearing on appellant's Motion to Revoke her Consent.

Provost testified that appellant was very upset by the entire incident and felt pressured by her father's machinations. When appellant and her father exited the place wherein the two entered to sign the "papers," appellant is said to have told her father "that she was going to try to get it overturned," to which he responded that she would be unsuccessful; "she had already lost her right."

Mr. B. offered contrary testimony--appellant is said to have indicated to him, on January 11, 1993, her readiness to sign. He testified that he asked appellant if she was certain of her decision and appellant responded, "Yes." Mr. B. further stated that he had in no way forced her to sign the document and denied that appellant told him she would get the consent set aside. According to him, appellant signed the consent voluntarily and without, at any time, revoking or expressing an intent to revoke.

Appellant did not learn of the pending adoption proceeding until June of 1993, approximately one to two days before a scheduled hearing at which she, appearing pro se, objected to the adoption and asked the trial court to declare her consent to have been revoked. She alleged that her consent had been obtained by duress and undue influence and that, alternatively, she had revoked it immediately thereafter. A continuance was granted in order for the parties to obtain counsel. Subsequently, a hearing on the issue of consent revocation was held

                on July 27, 1994, after which the trial court took the matter under advisement.  On August 4, 1994, the court issued an Opinion and Order wherein it held that the evidence fell "far short of the clear and convincing proof necessary to show that [appellant] was deprived of her free will and that she was the victim of her father's duress and undue influence."   Turning to the revocation of her consent, the court stated:  "Even assuming that [appellant] told her father [that she would get the consent "turned around"], in the Court's opinion this was not an oral revocation of her consent, but a statement of her future intention to seek revocation of that consent...."  Appellant's Motion to Revoke her Consent was therefore denied, and without any further hearing or any further opportunity for appellant to challenge the adoption, or, in fact, any further hearing in reference to the feasibility of the adoption itself, a final decree of adoption issued on September 2, 1994.  Appellant filed this timely appeal therefrom
                

THE STANDARD OF REVIEW

The scope of review of a trial court's decision in adoption proceedings is generally limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion or whether the findings of fact by the trial court were clearly erroneous. Coffey v. Dep't of Social Servs., 41 Md.App. 340, 346, 397 A.2d 233 (1979). If it appears that the chancellor erred as to matters of law, further proceedings in the trial court will ordinarily be required unless the error is determined to be harmless. Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119, 126, 372 A.2d 231, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939, 98 S.Ct. 430, 54 L.Ed.2d 299, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 1025, 98 S.Ct. 754, 54 L.Ed.2d 774 (1977). The reviewing court, however, must exercise its best judgment in determining the ultimate question of whether the chancellor abused his discretion in determining what is best for the welfare, benefit, and interest of the child. Nutwell v. Prince George's County Dep't of Social Servs., 21 Md.App. 100, 107, 318 A.2d 563 (1974).

THE LAW

As in custody cases, the overriding consideration that must be addressed in each adoption case is the welfare By the same token, however, the rights of the natural parent or parents, though not absolute or of equal import, must be as carefully guarded as those of the child, Winter, 217 Md. at 396, 143 A.2d 81; the right to raise one's own child, "recognized by constitutional principles, ... is so fundamental that it may not be taken away unless clearly justified," In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 112, 642 A.2d By the grant of an adoption decree, a natural parent's rights to a child are terminated and a wholly new parent-child relationship is created, McGarvey v. State, 311 Md. 233, 240-41, 533 A.2d 690 (1987); a natural parent is made, in essence, a "legal stranger" to his or her child. Walker, 221 Md. at 284, 157 A.2d 273; Coffey, 41 Md.App. at 347, 397 A.2d 233. Thus, to divest a parent's rights to his or her child and vest them in another is a drastic procedure that must be strictly scrutinized and clearly justified lest a parent be improperly deprived of that child. See In re Adoption/Guardianship No. A91-71A, 334 Md. at 560, 640 A.2d 1085 ("[B]ecause adoption carries with it a finality not present in a custody decision, it is even more imperative that the decision be made with due regard to the rights of the natural parent."). "The welfare and best interests of the child must be weighed with great care against every just claim of an

                and best interests of the adoptive child. 3  In re Adoption/Guardianship No. A91-71A, 334 Md. 538, 559, 640 A.2d 1085 (1994);  Sider v. Sider, 334 Md. 512, 530 (1994);  Lippy v. Breidenstein, 249 Md. 415, 420, 240 A.2d 251 (1968);  Beltran v. Heim, 248 Md. 397, 401, 236 A.2d 723 (1968);  Walker v. Gardner, 221 Md. 280, 284, 157 A.2d 273 (1960);  Crump v. Montgomery, 220 Md. 515, 525, 154 A.2d 802 (1959), aff'd, 224 Md. 470, 168 A.2d 355 (1961);  King v. Shandrowski, 218 Md. 38, 43, 145 A.2d 281 (1958);  Winter v. Director of the Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 217 Md. 391, 396, 143 A.2d 81, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 912, 79 S.Ct. 242, 3 L.Ed.2d 233 (1958);  Ex parte Frantum, 214 Md. 100, 103, 133 A.2d 408, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 882, 78 S.Ct. 149, 78 S.Ct. 149, 2 L.Ed.2d 112 (1957);  Anderson v. Barkman, 195 Md. 94, 97, 72 A.2d 709 (1950);  Falck v. Chadwick, 190 Md. 461, 467, 59 A.2d 187 (1948);  Atkins v. Gose, 189 Md. 542, 548, 56 A.2d 697 (1948);  White v. Seward, 187 Md. 43, 48 A.2d 335 (1946);  In re Adoption No. 90072022/CAD, 87 Md.App. 630, 638, 590 A.2d 1094 (1991);  Weinschel v. Strople, 56 [664 A.2d 447] Md.App. 252, 263, 466 A.2d 1301 (1983);  Lloyd v. Schutes, 24 Md.App. 515, 521, 332 A.2d 338 (1975);  Nutwell, 21 Md.App. at 105, 318 A.2d 563;  Schwartz v. Hudgins, 12 Md.App. 419, 424, 278 A.2d 652 (1971);  Goodyear v. Cecil County Dep't of Social Servs., 11 Md.App. 280, 283, 273 A.2d 644, rev'd on other grounds, 263 Md. 611, 284 A.2d 426 (1971).  The determination of a child's best interests is to be made as of the time the adoption decision is made, no earlier.  Crump, 220 Md.

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