Nwaneri v. Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, 19-CV-1101

• Decision Date: 20 May 2021
• Docket Number: No. 19-CV-1101,19-CV-1101
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals
• Parties: Ngozika J. NWANERI, Appellant, v. QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP, Appellee.

250 A.3d 1079

Ngozika J. NWANERI, Appellant,

v.QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP, Appellee.

No. 19-CV-1101

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Submitted September 22, 2020

Decided May 20, 2021

Ngozika J. Nwaneri, pro se.

Keith H. Forst and Florentina D. Field, Washington, were on the brief for appellee.

Before Easterly, McLeese, and Deahl, Associate Judges.

Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part by Associate Judge Easterly at page 1086.

McLeese, Associate Judge:

Appellant Dr. Ngozika J. Nwaneri challenges orders (1) confirming an arbitration award against Dr. Nwaneri and in favor of appellee Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP; and (2) ordering Dr. Nwaneri to pay Quinn Emanuel additional attorney's fees arising from the proceedings in Superior Court to confirm the arbitral award as well as from removal proceedings in federal district court. We affirm.

I.

Except as noted, the following facts appear to be undisputed. Quinn Emanuel represented Dr. Nwaneri in a lawsuit but later withdrew from that representation. A dispute arose about the payment of attorney's fees to Quinn Emanuel for the representation, and the matter went to arbitration.

On January 12, 2018, after a hearing, a panel of arbitrators from JAMS (an organization that provides arbitration services) issued an award of approximately $90,000 in favor of Quinn Emanuel. On February 5, 2018, Dr. Nwaneri, who was represented by counsel during the arbitration, submitted to JAMS what Dr. Nwaneri labeled a motion to appeal. That submission challenged the arbitral award on the merits and offered to introduce additional evidence. The next day, JAMS informed Dr. Nwaneri that the arbitration did not include an appellate process and that the arbitration was therefore closed.

On May 24, 2018, Quinn Emanuel filed a motion in Superior Court to confirm the arbitral award. After briefing and argument by the parties, the Superior Court concluded that Dr. Nwaneri had failed to timely move to modify, correct, or vacate the award. The trial court therefore granted Quinn Emanuel's motion to confirm the award.

Quinn Emanuel then filed a motion for additional attorney's fees arising from the proceedings to confirm the arbitral award. Dr. Nwaneri did not file an opposition, and the Superior Court awarded additional fees of approximately $50,000.

In April 2019, Dr. Nwaneri removed the case to federal court. The District Court for the District of Columbia promptly remanded the case to Superior Court, concluding that the removal was "patently improper." The District Court also ordered Dr. Nwaneri to pay Quinn Emanuel's costs and expenses, including attorney's fees. The district court left calculation of the amount of attorney's fees to the Superior Court.

Following the remand from the district court, the Superior Court ordered Dr. Nwaneri to pay approximately $23,000 in attorney's fees arising from the removal proceedings. In calculating that amount, the Superior Court reduced the hourly rate claimed by Quinn Emanuel, instead applying the so-called Laffey matrix to determine the hourly rate. See generally Tenants of 710 Jefferson St., NW v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm'n , 123 A.3d 170, 182 (D.C. 2015) (Laffey matrix is an annually updated "fee schedule of hourly rates for attorneys practicing in the District of Columbia," based on years of experience).

II.

We turn first to Dr. Nwaneri's challenge to the order confirming the arbitral award. We review such a ruling de novo. Fairman v. District of Columbia , 934 A.2d 438, 442 (D.C. 2007). We see no error in the trial court's ruling in this case.

A party to an arbitration may move for a court order confirming an arbitral award, and "the court shall issue a confirming order unless the award is modified or corrected pursuant to [D.C. Code] § 16-4420 or 16-4424 or is vacated pursuant to § 16-4423." D.C. Code § 16-4422 (2012 Repl.) (emphasis added). As the trial court correctly concluded, § 16-4422 by its terms required confirmation of the arbitral award unless one of the three statutory exceptions applied. We agree with the trial court that none of the three exceptions applied in this case.

First, D.C. Code § 16-4420 (2012 Repl.) authorizes a party to ask an arbitrator to modify or correct an arbitral award for certain specific reasons: (1) the award reflected an evident mathematical miscalculation, an evidently mistaken description, or an imperfection of form not affecting the merits of the arbitral decision; (2) because the award did not finally determine all claims submitted for arbitration; or (3) to clarify the award. Id. (referring to D.C. Code § 16-4424(a)(1), (3) (2012 Repl.)). That provision was not applicable in this case, for two reasons. Dr. Nwaneri's "appeal" to JAMS was not a request to modify or correct the arbitral award for any of the reasons listed in § 16-4420. Rather, it was a direct challenge to the merits of the arbitral award. In any event, JAMS declined to consider the appeal, and the arbitral award thus was not corrected or modified in any way. The first exception in § 16-4422 therefore did not apply, because it is applicable only if the arbitrator actually modifies or corrects the award.

Second, the latter two exceptions involve §§ 16-4423 and -4424, which permit a court to modify, correct, or vacate an arbitral award. Both of those provisions, however, ordinarily require that a motion seeking such relief be filed within ninety days after the movant receives notice of the award. D.C. Code §§ 16-4423(c), - 4424(a). It is undisputed that Dr. Nwaneri received notice of the award on January 22, 2018, and his opposition to the motion to confirm was not filed until July 26, 2018, well after that deadline. See generally, e.g. , Walter A. Brown, Inc. v. Moylan , 509 A.2d 98, 100 (D.C. 1986) (by failing to file timely motion to vacate arbitral award, and instead filing opposition to motion to confirm after ninety-day deadline ran, party "waived any right to challenge the award"; discussing predecessor arbitration statute).

For the first time in this court, Dr. Nwaneri argues that he is a "consumer" within the meaning of D.C. Code §§ 16-4401(3) (2012 Repl.) and -4424(d), and that he therefore was entitled to move to vacate the arbitral award within thirty days after receiving Quinn Emanuel's motion to confirm the award. Quinn Emanuel contends that Dr. Nwaneri does not qualify as a consumer, but also argues that this court should not consider Dr. Nwaneri's belated argument. Following our ordinary practice, we decline to consider this issue. See, e.g. , Hollins v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n , 760 A.2d 563, 574 (D.C. 2000) ("[W]e ordinarily do not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal ....").

In sum, we affirm the trial court's order confirming the arbitral award on the ground that Dr. Nwaneri failed to bring a timely challenge to the award. We therefore have no occasion to address Dr. Nwaneri's many challenges to the underlying arbitral award. Relatedly, Dr. Nwaneri raises numerous procedural objections to the trial court's ruling. We see no basis for relief on procedural grounds, particularly given that the trial court's ruling was required as a matter of law.

III.

We next turn to the trial court's order awarding Quinn Emanuel attorney's fees arising from the proceedings to confirm the arbitral award. We see no abuse of discretion. See generally, e.g. , Lively v. Flexible Packaging Ass'n , 930 A.2d 984, 988 (D.C. 2007) (setting aside attorney's fee award requires "a very strong showing of abuse of discretion").

D.C. Code § 16-4425(c) (2012 Repl.) authorizes the trial court to award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party in a proceeding to confirm an arbitral award. Dr. Nwaneri argues, however, that Quinn Emanuel is not entitled to such fees because Quinn Emmanuel was represented by its own attorneys. We disagree.

Dr. Nwaneri relies on Kay v. Ehrler , in which the Supreme Court held that a pro se attorney could not recover attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a statute providing for such fees in certain actions to enforce civil rights. 499 U.S. 432, 437-38, 111 S.Ct. 1435, 113 L.Ed.2d 486 (1991). We have followed Kay . See, e.g. , Upson v. Wallace , 3 A.3d 1148, 1168 (D.C. 2010) (pro se attorney is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 11 ). This case differs from Kay and Upson , however, in an important respect: Quinn Emanuel is a law firm, not a solo attorney handling a matter pro se.

In explaining its holding in Kay , the Supreme Court focused on the disadvantages of a single individual serving as both client and counsel. 499 U.S. at 437, 111 S.Ct. 1435 (retention of independent counsel in civil-rights cases furthers congressional goal of "ensuring the effective prosecution of meritorious claims"). The Supreme Court concluded that

[e]ven a skilled lawyer who represents himself is at a disadvantage in contested litigation. Ethical considerations may make it inappropriate for him to appear as a witness. He is deprived of the judgment of an independent third party in framing the theory of the case, evaluating alternative methods of presenting the evidence, cross-examining hostile witnesses, formulating legal arguments, and ... making sure that reason, rather than emotion, dictates the proper tactical response to unforeseen developments in the courtroom. The adage that "a lawyer who represents himself has a fool for a client" is the product of years of experience by seasoned litigators.

Id. at 437-38, 111 S.Ct. 1435 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court also signaled in dictum that the analysis might well be different if an organization was involved. Id. at 436 n.7, 111 S.Ct. 1435 ("However, an organization is not comparable to a pro se litigant, because the organization is always represented by counsel, whether in-house or pro bono , and thus there is always an attorney-client relationship.").

Relying on the Supreme Court's reasoning...