Nyamekye v. Mitsubishi Elec. Power Prods., Inc.

• Decision Date: 16 August 2018
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-852
• Parties: NATHANAEL M. NYAMEKYE, Plaintiff, v. MITSUBISHI ELECTRIC POWER PRODUCTS, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

NATHANAEL M. NYAMEKYE, Plaintiff, v. MITSUBISHI ELECTRIC POWER PRODUCTS, INC., Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-852

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

August 16, 2018

OPINION

CONTI, Chief District Judge

I. Introduction

On January 2, 2018, the court dismissed without prejudice the complaint in this employment discrimination action and marked the case closed because plaintiff Nathaniel M. Nyamekye ("plaintiff") did not comply with the court's order to show cause about how he wished to proceed in this case, i.e., pro se or with representation by counsel. (ECF No. 19.) Plaintiff thereafter filed a motion to reopen case, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60, (ECF No. 20), which the court granted. Currently pending before the court is a motion for reconsideration of the court's order reopening the case filed by defendant Mitsubishi Electric Power Products, Inc. ("defendant"). (ECF No. 24.) Defendant argues, among other things, that the court erred by granting the motion to reopen case before defendant filed a response to the motion and further erred when it decided the motion under Rule 60 because the court's order dismissing the case was not a final order or judgment. (Id.)

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, defendant's motion for reconsideration will be granted. The court's order dated January 31, 2018, will be vacated, and the motion to reopen case will be denied. Plaintiff, however, will be given an opportunity to request reconsideration of the court's order dated January 2, 2018, dismissing the case without prejudice under the appropriate rule of civil procedure.

II. Procedural History

On June 27, 2017, plaintiff initiated this case by filing a complaint against defendant. (ECF No. 1.) The complaint contains the following three counts:

- Count I—wrongful termination under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654;

- Count II—discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and

- Count III—retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

(Id.) On August 28, 2017, defendant filed an answer and affirmative defenses. (ECF No. 10.)

On September 14, 2017, plaintiff's counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and for a stay of proceedings. (ECF No. 14.) The court held a hearing on the motion, which it granted. The court permitted plaintiff's counsel to withdraw from the case and ordered a stay of the proceedings until November 27, 2017. (ECF No. 16.) The court ordered that on or before November 27, 2017, plaintiff was to obtain new counsel or advise the court that he would proceed pro se. (Id.)

On December 15, 2017, the court—having received no filings from plaintiff about whether he would proceed pro se or with the assistance of counsel—issued an order to show cause. (ECF No. 17.) The order to show cause, in pertinent part, provided:

As of the date of this order, plaintiff has failed to notify the court as to how he wishes to proceed.

Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff shall show cause by December 29, 2017, why this case should not be dismissed for plaintiff's failure to prosecute.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that failure to file response will be construed by the Court as plaintiff's consent to the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute.

(Id. at 1.)

As of January 2, 2018, plaintiff did not inform the court whether he intended to proceed pro or with representation of counsel. On that date, the court issued an order dismissing the case without prejudice. (ECF No. 19.) The order provided:

On or before 11/27/2017, plaintiff was required to find new counsel, enter an appearance, or advise the court that he would proceed pro se. As of 12/15/2017, plaintiff did not notify the court of how he wished to proceed with this case. The court entered an order to show cause instructing the plaintiff to show cause on or before 12/29/2017 why this case should not be dismissed for plaintiff's failure to prosecute. It was ordered that failure to file a response would be construed as plaintiff's consent to the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute. The court was open on 12/29/2017, and plaintiff did not make any filing with the court to explain why this case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. It is, therefore, ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to prosecute. The clerk shall mark the case closed.

(Id.)

On January 29, 2018, plaintiff's new counsel entered an appearance on the record and filed a motion to reopen case. (ECF Nos. 20, 21.) In the motion to reopen case, plaintiff asserted that:

[H]e contacted the Court via telephone very early on January 2, 2018 and spoke with somebody in the Clerk's office and informed of his efforts to secure another attorney.

...

[H]e erroneously thought that the call on January 2, 2018 was sufficient notification.

(ECF No. 20. ¶¶ 6-7.)

On January 31, 2018, the court issued an order granting the motion to reopen case. (ECF No. 23.) On February 9, 2018, defendant filed a motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 24) of the court's order granting plaintiff's motion to reopen case and a brief insupport of the motion (ECF No. 26). On March 5, 2018, plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion for reconsideration. (ECF No. 29.)

The motion for reconsideration having been fully briefed is now ripe for disposition by the court.

III. Standard of Review

Here, defendant seeks reconsideration of an interlocutory ruling, rather than a final judgment or order. While reconsideration of a final judgment or order may be considered under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), "the appropriate Rule under which to file motions for reconsideration of an interlocutory order is Rule 54(b)." Cezair v. JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A., Civ. Action No. 13-2928, 2014 WL 4955535, at *1 (D.Md. Sept. 30, 2014); see Qazizadeh v. Pinnacle Health Sys., 214 F.Supp.3d 292, 298 (M.D. Pa. 2016) ("[M]otions for reconsideration of interlocutory orders—whether denials of summary judgment, grants of partial summary judgment, or any other non-final orders—are motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)."). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides, in pertinent part:

[A]ny order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities.

FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b).

Here, the court's order granting the motion to reopen the case is not an adjudication of all claims, rights, or liabilities of the parties and does not end the action with respect to any claim or party. The court's order granting the motion to reopen the case is, therefore, an interlocutory order. Defendant's motion for reconsideration of that order must be considered under Rule 54(b).

A motion for reconsideration with respect to a final order or judgment must rely on one of three grounds: (1) an intervening change in the law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) the need to correct clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice. N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995). The purpose of such a motion is "to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence." Bootay v. KBR, Inc., 437 F.App'x 140, 146-47 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985)). A motion for reconsideration is not to be used to relitigate or "rehash" issues the court already decided, or to ask a district court to rethink a decision it, rightly or wrongly, already made. Williams v. City of Pittsburgh, 32 F.Supp.2d 236, 238 (W.D. Pa. 1998); Reich v. Compton, 834 F.Supp. 753, 755 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 57 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 1995); Keyes v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 766 F.Supp. 277, 280 (E.D. Pa. 1991). In order to be successful on a motion for reconsideration, the movant must demonstrate a "definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed," or that the court overlooked arguments that were previously made. United States v. Jasin, 292 F.Supp.2d 670, 676 (E.D. Pa. 2003).

"'While the standards articulated in Rule[ ] ... 60(b) are not binding in an analysis of Rule 54(b) motions, courts frequently look to these standards for guidance in considering such motions.'" Ampro Computers, Inc. v. LXE, LLC, Civ. Action No. 13-1937, 2016 WL 3703129, at *2 (D.Del. July 8, 2016) (quoting Cezair, 2014 WL 4955535, at *1).¹ Reconsideration of interlocutory orders, however, "may be had even if the movant cannot show an intervening change in controlling law, the availability of newevidence that was not available when the court issued the underlying order, or the 'need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.'" Qazizadeh, 214 F.Supp.3d at 298 (quoting Max's Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999)). "[T]he court may permit reconsideration whenever 'consonant with justice to do so.'" Qazizadeh, 214 F.Supp.3d at 298 (quoting St. Mary's Area Water Auth. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 472 F.Supp.2d 630, 632 (M.D. Pa. 2007)); United States v. Jerry, 487 F.2d 600, 604 (3d Cir. 1973) ("'[I]f an interlocutory decree be involved, a rehearing may be sought at any time before final decree, provided due diligence be employed and a revision be otherwise consonant with equity.'") (quoting John Simmons Co. v. Grier Bros. Co., 258 U.S. 82, 90-91 (1922)).

While "district courts have more discretion in reconsidering interlocutory orders than in revising final judgments," Foster v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., Civ. Action No. 09-1459, 2012 WL 2402895, at *4 (W.D. Pa. June 26, 2012), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that "[t]he trial court must, of course, exercise this authority in a responsible way, both...