Nyanteng v. Thompson

• Decision Date: 15 July 2022
• Docket Number: 2:21-cv-10390 (BRM) (JRA)
• Parties: SAMUEL NYANTENG, Plaintiff, v. JOHN S. THOMPSON, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

SAMUEL NYANTENG, Plaintiff, v. JOHN S. THOMPSON, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:21-cv-10390 (BRM) (JRA)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

July 15, 2022

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

HON BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendants John S. Thompson (“Thompson”), Scott A. Stevens (“Stevens”), Joseph Jakubiec (“Jakubiec”), James Morrissey (“Morrissey”), Paulo Correia (“Correia”), Randi Borgen (“Borgen”) Christopher Kaley (“Kaley”), and Arthur Clarke's (“Clarke”) (collectively “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 21) Plaintiff Samuel Nyanteng's (“Nyanteng”) Complaint (ECF No. 1) pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).^[1] Nyanteng filed an opposition to the Motion (ECF No. 29), and Defendants filed a reply (ECF No. 31). Having reviewed the parties' submissions filed in connection with the Motion and having declined to hold oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b), for the reasons set forth below and for good cause shown, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

I. Background

For purposes of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court accepts the factual allegations in the Complaint as true and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to Nyanteng. See Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). The Court applies this same standard on a motion to dismiss for lack of standing. See Ballentine v. United States, 486 F.3d 806, 810 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the Court must accept as true all material allegations set forth in the complaint, and must construe those facts in favor of the nonmoving party.”) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)). When ruling on a motion to dismiss, a district court generally “may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 944 (3d. Cir. 1985). However, documents “integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint” may be considered “without converting the motion into one for summary judgment.” Id. (citing Shaw v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1220 (1st Cir. 1996)); see also Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[A] court may consider an undisputably [sic] authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the document.”).

At all relevant times, Nyanteng was an immigration services assistant for the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). (ECF No. 1 ¶ 16.) Nyanteng brings this suit against several federal officials for allegedly violating his constitutional rights in connection with his indictment for false swearing and other related charges. (Id. ¶ 37.)

Throughout 2012, Morrissey, an Immigration Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agent, had been investigating Maxwell Poku (“Poku”) for violations of immigration laws. (Silagi Decl. (ECF No. 21-2), Ex. 1, Cert. of Probable Cause ¶ 4.)^[2] Poku, through his business, had been assisting aliens in the filing of fraudulent immigration documents. (Id.) Over the course of the investigation, Morrissey learned Nyanteng had used Poku's services on behalf of Georjet Amoh (“Amoh”). (Id. ¶ 6.) On June 5, 2013, Morrissey encountered Nyanteng during an administrative arrest of Amoh. (Id. ¶ 11.) During this encounter, “Nyanteng admitted to knowingly signing a fraudulent document for submission to [USCIS] for an application which would otherwise have been denied.” (Id.)

On January 10, 2014, Jakubiec, a United States Customs and Boarder Protection (“CBP”) employee, administered a polygraph test to Nyanteng as part of the process for receiving a promotion to the CBP. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 7, 18.) Nyanteng maintains the test was a ruse as part of an investigation related to his filing of the fraudulent application. (Id. ¶ 18.) Upon completion of the polygraph, Jakubiec “falsely informed” Nyanteng he failed the polygraph test and, to retain employment, would have to immediately provide a written statement explaining the failure. (Id. ¶¶ 20-21.) Nyanteng further asserts Jakubiec threatened him with immediate termination if he consulted with an attorney or left without completing the statement. (Id. ¶¶ 21-22.) Nyanteng then wrote a confession, with words purportedly supplied verbatim by Jakubiec, in which he admitted to filing a fraudulent Form I-751 for Amoh. (Id. ¶¶ 18, 23.) Jakubiec issued a report about the polygraph test and subsequent confession later that day. (Id. ¶ 24.)

Sometime thereafter, Stevens, another CBP employee, gave the report to the Department of Homeland Security's (“DHS”) Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”) and to the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of New Jersey (“USAO”), who declined to accept the criminal case for prosecution (Id. ¶¶ 8, 25.) On August 5, 2014, Morrissey filed an application with the Essex County Prosecutor's Office (“ECPO”) for the issuance of an arrest warrant, search warrant, and criminal complaint.^[3] (Id. ¶¶ 9, 26-29; see generally ECF No. 21-2, Exs. 1-2 at 3-16.)^[4]

The Certification of Probable Cause and Complaint-Warrant allege Nyanteng committed perjury, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:28-1; false swearing, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:28-2; and conspiracy to submit false statements, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:5-2A(1). Neither document mentions the polygraph test or confession. (See ECF No. 21-2, Exs. 1-2 at 3-16.) Rather, all the factual allegations therein predate Nyanteng's January 2014 test. (Id.) Soon after the ECPO issued the arrest warrant, search warrant, and criminal complaint, Nyanteng was arrested at his home. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 38-39.)

On October 17, 2014, Kaley of ICE testified in state court before a grand jury that Nyanteng filed a fraudulent Form I-751 and had committed the additional offense of bigamy. (Id. ¶ 35.) The grand jury returned a three-count indictment charging Nyanteng with falsifying or tampering with records, false swearing, and conspiracy to falsify records. (Id. ¶ 37; Silagi Decl. Ex. 3 (ECF No. 21-2) at 17-21.) Following Nyanteng's indictment, Thompson, USCIS District Director of the Newark Office, and Borgen, USCIS Field Office Director of the Newark Office, suspended him. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 4, 6, 41.)

The case proceeded to trial on July 20, 2017, resulting in a hung jury. (ECF No. 21-2, Ex. 4 at 22-25.)^[5] The ECPO and Nyanteng ultimately agreed to dismiss the case, citing the interests of judicial economy and an agreement with Nyanteng to forfeit employment with the CBP:

Since the conclusion of the first trial, there have been numerous motions requiring testimony by Federal Agents and Employees, resulting in extensive travel time and resource expenditure. Given the protracted nature of this case and that the defendant has agreed to forfeit his employment with Custom[s] and Border Protection (see attached), the State believes it is in the interest of justice and judicial economy to dismiss same.

(Id. at 23.) The Honorable Verna Leath, J.S.C., dismissed the case with prejudice on May 3, 2019. (Id. at 24.)

Several weeks later, on June 17, 2019, Correia of USCIS wrote a letter to Nyanteng to confirm Nyanteng's resignation from USCIS. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 5, 50.) Nyanteng denied resigning from USCIS, and he was terminated soon thereafter. (Id. ¶ 50.)

On April 28, 2021, Nyanteng filed a five-count Complaint against all Defendants, alleging (1) malicious prosecution and abuse of process under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and 42 U.S.C § 1983; (2) conspiracy to violate Nyanteng's civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985; (3) violations of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 10:6-1 to 2 (“NJCRA”); and (4) negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress.^[6] (ECF No. 1 at 19-26.) On December 27, 2021, Defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 21.) Nyanteng opposed the motion on February 25, 2022. (ECF No 29.) On March 4, 2022, Defendants replied. (ECF No. 31.)

II. Legal Standard

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

Rule 12(b)(1) mandates the dismissal of a case for “lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). An assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity is a challenge to a district court's subject matter jurisdiction. See Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 693 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional bar which deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction.”) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-100 (1984)). When subject matter jurisdiction is challenged pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff typically bears the burden of persuading the court subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991). However, because “Eleventh Amendment immunity can be expressly waived by a party, or forfeited through non-assertion, it does not implicate federal subject matter jurisdiction in the ordinary sense,” and therefore, a party asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity bears the burden of proving its applicability. Christy v. Pa. Tpk. Comm., 54 F.3d 1140, 1144 (3d Cir. 1994); Carter v. City of Phila., 181 F.3d 339, 347 (3d Cir. 1999).

In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, a court must first determine whether the motion attacks the complaint as deficient on its face, or whether the motion attacks the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction in fact, apart from any pleadings. Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). If the motion is a facial attack, the court “must accept the complaint's allegations as...