Nykorchuck v. Henriques

• Decision Date: 25 January 1990
• Citation: 153 A.D.2d 316,550 N.Y.S.2d 511
• Parties: Diane NYKORCHUCK et al., Respondents, v. Edgar HENRIQUES et al., Appellants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 511

550 N.Y.S.2d 511

153 A.D.2d 316

Diane NYKORCHUCK et al., Respondents, v. Edgar HENRIQUES et al., Appellants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Third Department.

Jan. 25, 1990.

Maynard, O'Connor & Smith (Christine Kirwin Krackeler, of counsel), Albany, for appellants.

E. Stewart Jones (W. Farley Jones, of counsel), Troy, for respondents.

Before MAHONEY, P.J., and KANE, CASEY, LEVINE and HARVEY, JJ.

HARVEY, Justice.

This medical malpractice action arises out of the treatment of plaintiff Diane Nykorchuck (hereinafter plaintiff) by defendant Edgar Henriques, an obstetrician/gynecologist. Plaintiff first began seeing Henriques in September 1974, initially for infertility problems, which were deemed to be secondary to endometriosis. Henriques treated plaintiff periodically for that condition over the next several years. In July 1979, during a regularly scheduled visit, Henriques discovered a lump in plaintiff's right breast, which he allegedly told her was caused by noncancerous fibrocystic disease and he would have "to keep an eye on it". Apparently no tests were performed relating to the lump and no outside consultation was recommended. Plaintiff remained under Henriques' care for the endometriosis and, in April 1982, Henriques performed an abdominal hysterectomy and bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy on plaintiff.

Allegedly, the physical examination of plaintiff on her admission to the hospital for surgery again resulted in a notation of mobile masses in the upper outer quadrant of each of plaintiff's breasts. No further evaluation of such masses was performed. Following the surgery, plaintiff began estrogen replacement therapy prescribed by Henriques and was seen by him several times in May 1982, January 1983 and finally September 1983 for medication adjustments. Plaintiff's prescriptions were thereafter renewed by telephone until December 1985, when plaintiff called to schedule an appointment with Henriques because of further enlargement of the mass in her right breast. Henriques examined plaintiff in January 1986 and immediately referred her to an oncologist. Plaintiff was ultimately diagnosed as having cancer in that breast and underwent a right modified radical mastectomy with axillary dissection followed by chemotherapy treatment.

The present action by plaintiff and her husband was commenced in December 1987. Plaintiffs basically alleged in their suit that Henriques negligently failed to diagnose and monitor plaintiff's breast cancer. Following joinder of issue, all defendants moved to dismiss the complaint with Henriques and defendant Albany Medical College (hereinafter collectively referred to as defendants) asserting that the alleged causes of action were barred by the Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214-a). Supreme Court refused to dismiss the complaint and this appeal by defendants followed. ^*

Supreme Court declined to dismiss the complaint on Statute of Limitations grounds because it found that questions of fact existed as to whether the continuous treatment doctrine applied to plaintiffs' action so that it would be deemed timely within the 2 1/2-year limitation of CPLR 214-a. Pursuant to this doctrine, "the time in which to bring a malpractice action is stayed 'when the course of treatment which includes the wrongful acts or omissions has run continuously and is related to the same original condition or complaint ' " (McDermott v. Torre, 56 N.Y.2d 399, 405, 452 N.Y.S.2d 351, 437 N.E.2d 1108, quoting Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 155, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319, 187 N.E.2d 777 [emphasis supplied].

Separate instances of medical treatment, such as routine physicals or intermittent diagnostic examinations, do not constitute continuous treatment if each instance of treatment is discrete and complete (see, Charalambakis v. City of New York, 46 N.Y.2d 785, 787, 413 N.Y.S.2d 912, 386 N.E.2d 823; see also, Bobrow v. De Palo, 655 F.Supp. 685, 687). Clearly, "neither the 'continuing nature of a diagnosis' * * * nor the 'mere continuity of a general physician-patient relationship' * * * is sufficient to establish continuous treatment" (Rizk v. Cohen, 73 N.Y.2d 98, 103, 538 N.Y.S.2d 229, 535 N.E.2d 282 [citations omitted].

Here, although defendants apparently contend that the treatment of plaintiff for the purposes of this action ended in July 1979 with Henriques' diagnosis of fibrocystic disease, plaintiffs contend that the treatment ended in ...