Nylen v. Dayton, 88-280

• Decision Date: 30 March 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88-280,88-280
• Citation: 770 P.2d 1112
• Parties: Dean D. NYLEN, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. Sharon DAYTON, individually; Dayton Ranches, a partnership, and its partners, Sharon Dayton and Lynn T. Dayton, individually and as partners of Dayton Ranches, Appellees (Defendants).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 1112

770 P.2d 1112

Dean D. NYLEN, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. Sharon DAYTON, individually; Dayton Ranches, a partnership, and its partners, Sharon Dayton and Lynn T. Dayton, individually and as partners of Dayton Ranches, Appellees (Defendants).

No. 88-280.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

March 30, 1989.

Roger Cowan of Harris and Morton, P.C., Evanston, for appellant.

S.B. Freeman, III of Bormuth, Freeman & Fuller, Cody, for appellees.

George E. Powers, Jr. of Godfrey, Sundahl & Jorgenson, Cheyenne, for amici curiae Wyoming Stock Growers Ass'n, Wyoming Wool Growers Ass'n, and Wyoming Farm Bureau Federation.

Before THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ., and LEIMBACK, District Judge.

MACY, Justice.

Appellant Dean D. Nylen brought an action to recover for property damage and related expenses resulting from the collision of his tractor-trailer with a horse owned or controlled by appellees Sharon Dayton, individually, Dayton Ranches, a partnership, and its partners, Sharon Dayton and Lynn T. Dayton, individually and as partners of Dayton Ranches. The district court granted summary judgment to appellees.

We affirm.

Appellant states the issues in this manner:

WHETHER A VIOLATION OF WYO.STAT. § 11-24-108 (1977 AS AMENDED) CREATES A STANDARD OF:

(a) NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE LIVESTOCK OWNER/KEEPER; OR

(b) A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE LIVESTOCK OWNER/KEEPER; OR

(c) NEGLIGENCE PER SE ON THE PART OF THE LIVESTOCK OWNER/KEEPER.

Appellees, alternatively, articulate as a single combined issue:

A. WHETHER THE MERE PRESENCE OF A HORSE UPON THE HIGHWAY WITHOUT ANY SHOWING THAT THE APPELLEES EITHER NEGLIGENTLY OR CONSCIOUSLY PERMITTED THE HORSE TO RUN AT LARGE CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF § 11-24-108, WYOMING STATUTES, 1977 (1987 Cum.Supp.), AND, IF SO, WHETHER SUCH VIOLATION CONSTITUTES A PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE SUFFICIENT TO MAKE A CASE FOR THE JURY.

Pursuant to W.R.A.P. 4.08, the parties have submitted an agreed upon statement of the facts, approved by the district court, to be used as the basis for reviewing the legal determinations made by the district court. The statement of facts is consistent with the materials included in the record on appeal.

Appellant is an independent long-haul truck driver. Sharon Dayton is a rancher who, in partnership with her brother, Lynn Dayton, owned a ranch near Cokeville, Wyoming. ¹ On June 9, 1987, appellant was driving his truck and trailer on U.S. Highway 30 north of Cokeville. At approximately 10:30 that evening, a horse owned by Sharon Dayton wandered onto the roadway in front of appellant's truck. The truck collided with the horse, killing the horse and extensively damaging the truck. Prior to the accident the horse had been kept in pastures owned by Dayton Ranches, whose lands were adjacent to U.S. Highway 30 near the location of the collision. In this area U.S. Highway 30 is a fenced public highway. A ranch employee stated in an affidavit that the gate enclosing the pasture containing the horse was closed when he left the ranch at the end of the work day on June 9, 1987. An outer gate accessing the highway from the ranch lands may have been open. It is unknown how the horse escaped from the enclosed pasture.

By complaint and amended complaint, appellant alleged causes of action against appellees premised on negligence, negligence per se, and strict liability. After a period of discovery, both sides submitted motions for summary judgment supported by affidavit and deposition testimony. Appellant, in his motion for summary judgment, posited, as an alternative to his theory of negligence per se, the theory that a violation of the applicable statute created a rebuttable presumption of negligence. After a hearing, the district court denied appellant's motion for summary judgment and granted the motion of appellees. The district court found that appellant had presented no evidence of appellees' negligence and that the law in Wyoming does not subject livestock owners to strict liability, negligence per se, or presumptions of negligence under the facts of this case. This appeal followed in which appellant contests only the district court's findings as to negligence per se or a rebuttable presumption of negligence.

Summary judgment is properly granted only where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Doud v. First Interstate Bank of Gillette, 769 P.2d 927 (Wyo.1989); St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Albany County School District No. 1, 763 P.2d 1255 (Wyo.1988); Teton Plumbing and Heating, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, Laramie County School District Number One, 763 P.2d 843 (Wyo.1988). Where, as here, the facts are not in dispute and we are presented strictly with questions of law, we accord no deference to and are not bound by the lower court's decision. Mills v. Garlow, 768 P.2d 554 (Wyo.1989); Robinson v. Bell, 767 P.2d 177 (Wyo.1989).

Appellant essentially contends that the mere presence of livestock on a fenced public highway constitutes a violation of Wyo.Stat. § 11-24-108(a) (1977) and that, by its amendment to the statute in 1975, the legislature intended to create a standard of negligence per se or a rebuttable presumption of negligence for such a statutory violation. Section 11-24-108 provides in pertinent part:

(a) No owner or person having custody or charge of livestock shall permit the livestock to run at large in any fenced public highways in Wyoming as defined in W.S. 31-4-101 [§ 31-1-101]. Livestock shall not be picketed on a public highway right-of-way from one (1) hour before sundown to one (1) hour after sunrise. If livestock are picketed on a public highway and escape, the owner or person having custody or charge of the livestock is deemed to have permitted the livestock to run at large in violation of this section. No livestock shall be picketed on an interstate or national defense highway as defined in W.S. 31-5-1001(a)(xiv).

(b) Any person or corporation violating this section shall be fined not less than fifty dollars ($50.00) nor more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00) and in addition shall pay all damage done by the livestock. The provisions of this section do not apply to livestock drifting into lanes or fenced roads in going to or returning from their accustomed ranges.

Prior to its amendment in 1975, ² the predecessor to the above statute provided in material part:

It shall be unlawful for any person, persons, company or corporation being the owner of livestock of any kind or having custody or charge thereof to permit said livestock to run at large in any fenced public lanes or fenced roads in the State of Wyoming. Any person, persons, company or corporation violating the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not less than ten dollars ($10.00) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100.00) and in addition shall pay all damage done by such stock unlawfully permitted to run at large in such lanes or roads; provided that the provisions of this act [section] shall not apply to range cattle drifting into lanes or fenced roads in going to, or returning from their accustomed ranges.

Wyo.Stat. § 11-507 (1957).

Appellant asserts that the deletion of the term "unlawful" in the amended version of the statute indicates the legislature intended to impose criminal and civil liability upon the owner or keeper for livestock running at large in a fenced public highway without any showing of negligence or knowledge on behalf of the owner or keeper. Alternatively, appellees persuasively contend that the cases decided by this Court both before and after the amendment to the statute establish that the operative word in the statute is "permit" and that the statute is not violated absent a showing of negligence.

The facts in Hinkle v. Siltamaki, 361 P.2d 37 (Wyo.1961), involving a nighttime collision of an automobile with horses on a fenced highway, are strikingly similar to those in the instant case. The appellant in Hinkle similarly argued that the presence of livestock on a fenced highway created a prima facie case of negligence shifting the burden to the owners to show that they had used reasonable care in keeping the animals off the highway. In affirming summary judgment for the appellees, we observed:

Various cases discussing the owner's liability for animals at large on the highway are mentioned in Annotations at 34 A.L.R.2d 1285 and 59 A.L.R.2d 1328. Although a few jurisdictions hold that proof of an animal's running at large raises a presumption of negligence on the part of the owner, or that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies, the majority rule is:

"Where the particular statute involved provides that the owner shall not 'permit,' 'allow,' or 'suffer' his animals to run at large, the courts have generally held, or recognized, that statutes of this type are not violated in the absence of at least negligence by the owner of the animals." 34 A.L.R.2d 1285, 1289.

Id. at 40 (emphasis added). We further stated in that case:

According to the weight of authority, courts have had no hesitancy in holding that a statute making it unlawful for an owner of livestock "to permit " them to run at large implies knowledge, consent, and wilfulness on the part of the owner, or such negligent conduct as is equivalent thereto, so that the proof of one of these elements is essential either to a conviction or an assessment of damages growing out of a violation.

Id. at 41 (emphasis added). In Gilliland v. Steinhoefel, 521 P.2d 1350 (Wyo.1974), we reaffirmed our holding in Hinkle and clarified that, for purposes of civil liability, § 11-507 could be violated by simple negligence without proof of knowledge, consent, or willfulness.

As discussed, § 11-507 was amended in 1975, eliminating the term "unlawful." Endresen v. Allen, 574 P.2d 1219 (Wyo.1978), was decided after ...