Oak Woods Cemetery Ass'n v. Murphy

Decision Date14 September 1943
Docket NumberNo. 27002.,27002.
Citation383 Ill. 301,50 N.E.2d 582
PartiesOAK WOODS CEMETERY ASS'N v. MURPHY, Director of Labor.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Certiorari by Oak Woods Cemetery Association to review denial by Francis B. Murphy, Director of Labor, of claims for credit and refund of taxes paid under the Unemployment Compensation Act. From a judgment quashing the record upon the return to the writ and awarding refunds in the sum of $1254.85, the Director of Labor appeals.

Reversed and remanded with directions.Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; John Prvstalski JudgeGeorge F. Barrett, Atty. Gen. (William C. Wines, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Charles D. Albright, of Chicago, for appellee.

WILSON, Justice.

The defendant, the Director of the Department of Labor of the State, appeals from a judgment of the circuit court of Cook county, so far as is material here, quashing the record upon his return to a writ of certiorari sued out by plaintiff, Oak Woods Cemetery Association, to review the denial by defendant of claims for credit or refund paid under the Unemployment Compensation Act.

Plaintiff was incorporated by special act of the General Assembly in 1853, Priv.Laws 1853, p. 551, with power to acquire land and operate and beautify a cemetery. It owns 180 acres on the southeast side of Chicago, secluded behind a high concrete wall and cyclone fences, and completely surrounded by a densely settled residential and commercial area. Although only 10 miles distant from the ‘loop,’ it has not been annexed by the city for the reason that it is immune from condemnation, pursuant to an amendment, in 1867, to the act of incorporation. 1 Priv.Laws 1867, p. 227. Village of Hyde Park v. Pak Woods Cemetery Ass'n, 119 Ill. 141, 7 N.E. 627. Three acres are devoted to nurseries and cold frames, and two are covered by greenhouses. Within this tract of five acres, located at the front entrance of the cemetery, plaintiff maintains a commercial plant costing $143,819.31, exclusive of the land value. Twenty employees constitute its staff. The nursery and greenhouses produce for sale each year 1,000,000 plants and, also, a very large number of trees, shrubs and cut flowers. Purchasers are largely the owners of lots within the cemetery. Greenhouse equipment consists of a modern building containing six hothouses with a sales room in front, large capacity refrigerating plants for cut flowers, display rooms, designing rooms, large potting sheds, a boiler room, office machines, shredders, trucks, automatic sprayers, tractors, and the like. In fact, it is one of the largest greenhouse establishments in Chicago.

The present controversy is limited to the issue of whether certain employees denominated ‘horticulturists' are engaged in ‘agricultural labor,’ within the meaning of section 2 of the Unemployment Compensation Act, as it obtained prior to July 1, 1940. Ill.Rev.Stat.1939, chap. 48, par. 218. There is no controversy with respect to the employees of the greenhouse who are stenographers, bookkeepers, funeral-spray designers, and sales-clerks. Twelve or thirteen employees divide their time between the greenhouses and the nursery. Their duties include planting seeds in flats, watering the sprouts, regulating the temperature, potting plants, propagating slippings or cuttings in sand, fertilizing the soil, wiring up carnations and chrysanthemums, making frames, turning soil in the garden, trimming and spraying in the nursery, and shredding dirt. Plaintiff's greenhouse and nursery business is nonseasonal with respect to employment. In other words, the men whose status is in question work eight hours a day, punching a time clock at 8:30 A. M. the entire year.

The greenhouse business is a part of plaintiff's cemetery business. The accounts of the patrons of the greenhouses are kept in plaintiff's office and, according to plaintiff's president, when charge accounts become in arrears, We slap a charge against the lot and they can't use the lot until they pay the charge.’ The cemetery has two listings in the Chicago classified telephone directory, one under ‘cemeteries' and the other under ‘florists.’ Each listing shows the same telephone number. When contracts for ornamentation are executed with a lot owner, the name of plaintiff is used. It is plaintiff, not the greenhouses, which is a member of the Allied Florists Association, furnishing telegraph service. Plaintiff advertises in two neighborhood papers without, however, mention of its greenhouse services. About 2500 order forms for grave ornamentation are mailed each year by the greenhouses to regular customers, most of which result in sales. The close relationship of the greenhouses to plaintiff is apparent from the testimony of its president who said, ‘All of our merchandise that is grown there is sold to people who come into the cemetery; they put them or have us put them on their lots or graves.’ To a query as to whether the greenhouses were incidental to the major purpose of the cemetery, the witness answered, ‘Well, that's true, yes, because if we depended on any profit from the greenhouse, we wouldn't stay there long,’ and, further, ‘The greenhouses wouldn't exist without the cemetery. Its prime purpose is to serve the cemetery and also to make money if we can.’

Plaintiff made contributions under the Unemployment Compensation Act during 1937, 1938 and 1939, and the first three quarters of 1940, for the employees whose services have been described. January 8, 1941, plaintiff filed claims for credit or refund of these contributions pursuant to section 25(d) of the statute. Ill.Rev.Stat.1941, chap. 48, par. 242. The Director found that the horticultural workers were covered prior to July 1, 1940, and denied the claims for refunds as to this period. Their wages. after July 1, 1940, it was further found, were not subject to contributions. Conformably to the statute, plaintiff then filed with the Director its written protest and petition for a hearing. A representative of the Director of the Department of Labor conducted a hearing and filed her report recommending that the determination of the Director, to the extent relevant here, be affirmed. Plaintiff interposed objections to the report of the Director's representative. Thereafter, the Director made his decision sustaining the report. In due course, plaintiff sued out a writ of certiorari pursuant to section 25(a) 2, the circuit court of Cook county sustained the writ, set aside the decision of the Director and awarded the refunds sought by plaintiff in the sum of $1254.85. This appeal by the Director followed.

Plaintiff's motiion to dismiss the appeal requires initial consideration. The contention, among others, is made that defendant has neither legal nor statutory right to appeal from the judgment of the circuit court which he assails. In particular, plaintiff urges that the applicable statute does not authorize defendant or the Attorney General, on his behalf, to defend his decisions or determinations, under section 25(d). Recourse to relevant provisions of the Unemployment Compensation Act becomes necessary. The Social Security Act of the United States was passed in 1935, 42 U.S.C.A. § 301 et seq. Unemployment Compensation laws of the States followed, induced by the enactment of the Federal statute. The purpose of our act, approved June 30, 1937, Ill.Rev.Stat. 1941, chap. 48, par. 217, is set forth in section 1, which concludes: ‘It is the considered judgment of the General Assembly that in order to lessen the menace to the health, safety and morals of the people of Illinois, and to encourage stabilization of employment, compulsory unemployment compensation upon a state-wide scale, providing for the setting aside of reserves during periods of employment to be used to pay benefits during periods of unemployment, is necessary.’ The statute is an exertion of the police power of the State. Relief of unemployment is a public purpose. Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 57 S.Ct. 868, 81 L.Ed. 1245, 109 A.L.R. 1327. Again, in Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. State Unemployment Compensation Comm., 167 Or. 142, 103 P.2d 708,116 P.2d 744, 746, 138 A.L.R. 1398, the Supreme Court of Oregon said: ‘The paramount purpose is one of relief under the police power.’ Without question, the State and the people of the State are directly interested in the administration of this ameliorative statute. To achieve its salutary objective, the General Assembly has seen fit to confer considerable power upon the Director of Labor. In collecting contributions from those denominated employers and, again, by distributing benefits to eligible claimants, section 9(b) provides for the determination of eligibility to unemployment compensation benefits. Section 14 ordains that any decision of the board of review or of the Director in cases of decisions made pursuant to section 9(b), in the absence of an appeal, shall become final 20 days after the date of mailing, and that judicial review shall be permitted only after any party claiming to be aggrieved thereby has exhausted his administrative remedies as provided by the act. It is expressly provided: ‘The Director shall be deemed to be a party to any judicial action involving any such decision and shall be represented by the Attorney General.’ In a limited sense it is, of course, true that the only parties having a direct pecuniary interest in the disposition of claims for benefits are the unemployed claimant and his former employer. In re Mitchell, 220 N.C. 65, 16 S.E.2d 476. The people of the State have, however, an interest paramount to the personal interest of the employer and employee where refunds are sought by an employer. Section 23 provides: (a) All contributions collected under this Act together with any interest thereon; all fines and penalties collected pursuant...

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18 cases
  • Zelney v. Murphy
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • 19 Septiembre 1944
    ...and that the act shall be administered by the Director of Labor exclusively for the purpose of the act. In Oak Woods Cemetery Ass'n v. Murphy, 383 Ill. 301, 50 N.E.2d 582, this court declared this statute to be an exertion of the police power of the State, holding that relief of unemploymen......
  • Zehender & Factor, Inc. v. Murphy
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • 21 Marzo 1944
    ...and that the act shall be administered by the Director of Labor exclusively for the purpose of the act. In Oak Woods Cemetery Ass'n v. Murphy, 383 Ill. 301, 50 N.E.2d 582, this court declared this statute to be an exertion of the police power of the State, holding that relief of unemploymen......
  • Scripture Press Foundation v. Annunzio
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • 23 Marzo 1953
    ...Board of Review, 392 Ill. 614, 65 N.E.2d 350; Zehender & Factor, Inc., v. Murphy, 386 Ill. 258, 53 N.E.2d 944; Oak Woods Cemetery Ass'n v. Murphy, 383 Ill. 301, 50 N.E.2d 582. In the American Medical Association and Oak Woods Cemetery cases, cited above, we have also held that the decisions......
  • Herbst v. Ryan
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • 26 Julio 1996
    ...F.Supp. 1385 (N.D.Ill.1971), vacated on other grounds, 410 U.S. 950, 93 S.Ct. 1410, 35 L.Ed.2d 682 (1973); Oak Woods Cemetery Ass'n v. Murphy, 383 Ill. 301, 50 N.E.2d 582 (1943).13 There is no evidence of record to support the plaintiffs' suggestion that their ability to collect the judgmen......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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