Oakes Municipal Airport Authority v. Wiese

• Decision Date: 20 April 1978
• Docket Number: No. 9429,9429
• Citation: 265 N.W.2d 697
• Parties: OAKES MUNICIPAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, a public body corporate, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Raymond WIESE, Defendant-Appellee. Civ.
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Page 697

265 N.W.2d 697

OAKES MUNICIPAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, a public body corporate Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Raymond WIESE, Defendant-Appellee.

Civ. No. 9429.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

April 20, 1978.

Rehearing Denied May 12, 1978.

Bosard, McCutcheon, Kerian, Schmidt & Holum, Ltd., Minot, for plaintiff and appellant; argued by Jon R. Kerian, Minot.

Vogel, Brantner, Kelly, Knutson, Weir & Bye, Fargo, for defendant and appellee; argued by Kermit Edward Bye, Fargo.

PAULSON, Justice.

This is an appeal by the Oakes Municipal Airport Authority (hereinafter Oakes) from the judgment of the Dickey County District Court entered on December 13, 1977, dismissing with prejudice Oakes' condemnation action against Raymond Wiese. The judgment of dismissal was based upon the district court's determination that the issues involved in the action had been determined in a prior condemnation action commenced by Oakes against Wiese and that the doctrine of res judicata precluded the re-litigation of those issues. Oakes asserts, on this appeal, that the doctrine of res judicata was not applicable and was not a proper ground for dismissing the current condemnation action against Wiese. Oakes requests this court to reverse the judgment of dismissal and to remand for a trial on the merits.

On December 10, 1975, Oakes commenced a condemnation action against Wiese in the Dickey County District Court to acquire a fee interest in 74.1 acres of Wiese's land, pursuant to Chapter 2-06 of the North Dakota Century Code, as part of a project to establish and construct a new airport to replace the existing airport facility at Oakes. A trial was held before the court, without a jury, and the court concluded that Oakes had "failed to establish public use, public necessity and the proper selection of property sought to be condemned so as to entitle it to the exercise of eminent domain and condemnation" of Wiese's land. In accordance with this conclusion, the district court, on October 20, 1976, entered a judgment dismissing Oakes' condemnation action with prejudice. No appeal was taken from that judgment of dismissal.

On June 27, 1977, approximately eight months after the judgment of dismissal had been entered, Oakes commenced another condemnation action against Wiese in the Dickey County District Court. In this second action, Oakes seeks to acquire from Wiese a fee interest in 37.93 acres for the new airport, plus a clear zone easement in 9.18 acres for air navigation purposes. Wiese moved for dismissal of this action on the ground that the October 20, 1976, judgment of the district court was res judicata with respect to the issues raised and barred their re-litigation in the second condemnation action. The district court concluded that the issues in this second action had been raised and determined in the first action and that Oakes was therefore barred from re-litigating the case. Accordingly, the district court, on December 13, 1977, entered a judgment dismissing the second condemnation action with prejudice. Oakes now appeals from that judgment.

Oakes alleges that the district court erred when it determined that the second action against Oakes was barred by the res judicata effect of the October 20, 1976, judgment of dismissal and Oakes raises the following two issues in this regard:

1. Whether the October 20, 1976, judgment of dismissal by the district court was void and without res judicata effect because the district court lacked jurisdiction to determine the public necessity of the proposed taking by the condemning authority; and

2. Whether the doctrine of res judicata bars a subsequent action by a condemning authority to acquire land which was sought by and denied to the condemning authority in a prior condemnation action against the same party.

Oakes asserts that the October 20, 1976, judgment of dismissal was void because the district court lacked jurisdiction to determine the public necessity of the proposed taking. We disagree with the assertion that the district court lacked jurisdiction to determine the question of public necessity.

Pursuant to subsection 2 of § 32-15-05, N.D.C.C., the legislature has entrusted the right to review a determination of the question of necessity in an eminent domain action to the judicial branch of government. KEM Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Materi, 247 N.W.2d 668 (N.D.1976); Otter Tail Power Company v. Malme, 92 N.W.2d 514 (N.D.1958); County of Pembina v. Nord, 78 N.D. 473, 49 N.W.2d 665 (1951). Pursuant to § 2-06-08, N.D.C.C., the acquisition of property through eminent domain by an airport authority must be accomplished in the manner provided by Chapter 32-15, N.D.C.C. Consequently, the issue of the necessity for a taking of property by an airport authority under Chapter 2-06, N.D.C.C., is ultimately for the courts to determine.

Oakes asserts, however, that § 2-06-17, N.D.C.C., declares that an acquisition of land by an airport authority under Chapter 2-06, N.D.C.C., is for a public purpose and is a public necessity, ¹ and that the courts are thereby without power to determine the question of public necessity in condemnation actions initiated by airport authorities under Chapter 2-06, N.D.C.C. Oakes' assertion is unpersuasive. Although § 2-06-17, N.D.C.C., expresses a clear intent that property which is properly acquired by an airport authority for the purposes enumerated in Chapter 2-06, N.D.C.C., shall be considered an acquisition for a public purpose and a matter of public necessity, the decision as to the necessity of a particular taking for a use authorized by Chapter 2-06, N.D.C.C., remains a question for the courts to review under § 32-15-05, N.D.C.C.

To clarify the court's role in the determination of the question of public necessity, we emphasize that the determination of a condemning authority to exercise the power of eminent domain for an authorized public use is solely a legislative or political question which is not subject to judicial review. City of Grafton v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co., 16 N.D. 313, 113 N.W. 598 (1907). For example, the courts cannot review or disturb an airport authority's determination that a new airport facility is necessary. The court's review of public necessity is limited to the question of whether the taking of the particular property sought to be condemned is reasonably suitable and usable for the authorized public use. KEM Elec. Coop., Inc., supra; Otter Tail Power Company, supra. Much latitude is given to the condemning authority to determine the location and the extent of the property to be acquired, and a taking is not objectionable merely because some other location might have been made or some other property obtained that would have been as suitable for the purpose. Otter Tail Power Company, supra. In the absence of bad faith, gross abuse of discretion, or fraud by the condemning authority in its determination that the property sought is necessary for the authorized use and is pursuant to specific statutory authority, such determination should not be disturbed by the courts. See, Board of Education of City of Minot v. Park District, 70 N.W.2d 899 (N.D.1955); Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Kreszeszewski, 17 N.D. 203, 115 N.W. 679 (1908).

We conclude that the district court had jurisdiction to determine the question of public necessity. Any errors by the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction were subject to correction by appeal from the October 20, 1976, judgment of dismissal. The judgment was a valid one, and failure to appeal from that judgment resulted in its becoming conclusive and binding upon the parties with res judicata effect as to the issues determined therein.

Oakes also asserts on this appeal that the doctrine of res judicata does not bar a condemning authority from initiating a second condemnation action to acquire land it sought and was denied in a former condemnation action against the same party.

The doctrine of res judicata is that a valid, existing final judgment is conclusive, with regard to the issues raised and determined therein, as to the parties and their privies in all other actions. See, Dolajak v. State Auto. & Cas. Underwriters, 252 N.W.2d 180 (N.D.1977). The purpose of the doctrine is to require a definite termination of litigation and to prevent the multiplicity, waste, and harassment which would result if a party could compel an...