Oakes v. School District No. 3, Township 35, Range 25

• Decision Date: 02 February 1903
• Parties: J. A. OAKES, Respondent, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 3, TOWNSHIP 35, RANGE 25 et al., Appellants
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

71 S.W. 1060

98 Mo.App. 163

J. A. OAKES, Respondent, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 3, TOWNSHIP 35, RANGE 25 et al., Appellants

Court of Appeals of Missouri, Kansas City

February 2, 1903

Appeal from Cedar Circuit Court.--Hon. H. C. Timmonds, Judge.

REVERSED.

Judgment reversed.

W. C Hastin and Cole & Burnett for appellant.

(1) Plaintiff could not recover against the district on account of defendant's officers "discharging" him, as no officer of the defendant had power to discharge him, if he had ever been legally employed by the district. R. S. 1899 sec. 9767. (2) In discharging a teacher the directors are not acting in the scope of their authority, and the district is not liable. McCutchen v. Windsor, 55 Mo. 149; Arnold v. School District, 78 Mo. 226; Frazier v. School District, 24 Mo.App. 250. (3) If defendant's directors sought to prevent plaintiff from teaching without force, then he should have ignored their conduct and proceeded with his school. Frazier v. School District, 24 Mo.App. 250; Emmons v. Gordon, 125 Mo. 636.

T. L Nelson for respondent.

No briefs filed.

OPINION

SMITH, P. J.

The court below gave judgment for plaintiff on a petition which was as follows:

"Plaintiff states that W. A. Simrell, R. F. Winton and James Belk are the board of directors of school district No. 3, township 35, range 25, of Cedar county, Missouri, the defendant herein, and that said defendant is and was at all the times hereinafter mentioned a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Missouri and having capacity through its board of directors to sue and liable to be sued as a corporation.

"Plaintiff for his cause of action states that (he is and was at all times hereinafter mentioned a legally qualified schoolteacher and that) on the 20th day of March, 1902, the defendant, the school district aforesaid by its legally authorized officers, entered into a written contract with plaintiff to teach the public school in said district for a term of three months beginning the twenty-fourth day of March, 1902, at the sum and price of thirty dollars per month to be paid monthly.

"And plaintiff further says that in pursuance of said contract and in compliance with the terms of said contract on his part, he taught said public school two weeks of said term and was afterward discharged and prevented from further continuing to teach the balance of said term, by the defendant's said officers and was ready and willing at all times to so continue to teach said school to the end of the three months' term contracted for an otherwise comply with the terms and conditions of said contract on his part.

"Plaintiff further says that by reason of the wrongful discharge and prevention by the said officers of the defendant from continuing his contract he is damaged in the sum of ninety dollars, for which he prays judgment."

If the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, as the defendants contend, then it was error to give such judgment; and error, too, apparent upon the face of the record which we may review. It will be observed from the allegations of the petition that the plaintiff does not claim that he taught the school for the term required by the contract and that he is therefore entitled to...