Oakland Cemetery Association v. County of Ramsey
| Decision Date | 29 June 1906 |
| Docket Number | 14,580 - (6 [2],1 [3] ) |
| Parties | OAKLAND CEMETERY ASSOCIATION v. COUNTY OF RAMSEY |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
On Reargument October 26, 1906.
Appeal by plaintiff from an order of the district court for Ramsey county, Olin B. Lewis, J., denying a motion for a new trial. Affirmed.
Taxes Paid under Protest.
When recovery is allowed for taxes paid under protest, the element of coercion must be found. In the absence of present and potential compulsion, mere protest is not sufficient. In this case the payment was held not to have been voluntary, but under duress.
Record of Deed.
One who by force of the statute is unable to place on record a deed of conveyance by which he has acquired title to real estate because of taxes legal in their inception, but illegally demanded, may pay such taxes under protest to enable him to record his deed, and recover them in a subsequent action from the state. In this case, the remedy pursued by a party paying taxes under duress and with protest is held to have been proper.
Priority of Tax Titles.
A tax title based on a later tax sale on an earlier tax lien may prevail over a tax title based on an earlier sale under a later lien. The purchaser of a tax certificate under chapter 11, G.S. 1878, and chapter 11, G.S. 1894, may be required to protect his interest, not only as against subsequent taxes but also as against prior taxes. The relevant parts of sections 1610, 1631, and 1697, G.S. 1894, authorized the state to proceed and enforce the lien of a tax delinquent and unpaid subsequently to a prior sale on a later lien. State v. Kipp, 80 Minn. 119, followed and extended.
Priority of Tax Titles.
The holder of a valid state assignment certificate, based on a sale for the taxes of 1896 made in 1898, which was properly perfected by service of notice to eliminate the right of redemption, acquires a title upon the expiration of the time of redemption, subject to being divested by a tax title based on prior taxes for 1892, resulting in a void judgment in 1894, on which a forfeited sale was made in 1900 under chapter 322, p. 410, of the Laws of 1899.
William G. White, for appellant.
Thos. R. Kane and O. H. O'Neill, for respondent.
This was an action brought by the plaintiff and appellant against the defendant and respondent to recover certain taxes alleged to have been paid under duress. The court found for the defendant. Plaintiff appealed from an order denying a new trial.
The trial court in a carefully prepared memorandum states the facts and the principal issues argued before it and presented by this appeal, as follows:
Taxes for the year 1896 were duly levied against this property, and in default of payment judgment was duly rendered and the premises sold thereunder and bid in by the state in May, 1898. There being no bidders at the sale, and there being no redemption therefrom, the rights of the state therein were in November, 1899, duly assigned to the National Bond & Security Company, plaintiff's grantors, which prior thereto had no interest in said premises. The National Bond & Security Company duly perfected title to these premises under such sale and assignment certificate by causing proper notices of the expiration of the time of redemption to be given, and, no redemption having been made, thus acquired the fee title. Prior to the sale of said premises for the taxes of 1896, taxes for the year 1892 had been duly levied and assessed, and judgment therefor was entered in this court in May, 1894, which judgment is void because the county commissioners never properly designated a newspaper in which to publish the delinquent list for that year. At the time of making the list for delinquent taxes for the year 1898 -- that is, in January, 1900 -- the auditor, pursuant to chapter 322, p. 410, Laws 1899, duly appended thereto and included therein the taxes upon said premises for the year 1892, as provided by law, and at the sale under judgment therefor, there being no other bidders, the land was bid in by the state in its name in May, 1900, and, no redemption having been made, the state is still the owner of the interest thus acquired.
1. The preliminary question upon this appeal is the correctness of defendant's argument for not sustaining this appeal, namely: The following necessary facts did not appear, to wit: That the payment of taxes in question was involuntary and made under such circumstances as to constitute duress, and that the taxes were unjust and illegal. It insisted that the property rights of plaintiff were never in jeopardy, because, as the court finds, the plaintiff reserved from the consideration price to be paid his grantor enough to pay the taxes under protest and agreed to account for such sum to his grantor in case of recovery in this action. We think the agreement between the plaintiff and his grantor was immaterial to the present issue. If the plaintiff was entitled to recover, what it might do with the money recovered is no concern of public authorities. The agreement between the plaintiff and his grantor was a private one. Neither that agreement nor what might be done under it affected the right of the plaintiff to record his deed.
It is undoubted, as the defendant contends, that to warrant a recovery for taxes paid under protest the element of coercion must be found, and that, in the absence of actual, present and potential compulsion payment under protest is not sufficient. But Dickinson, J., in State v. Nelson, 41 Minn. 25, 27, 42 N.W. 548, 4 L.R.A. 300. It was distinctly held in that case that one who by force of the statute is unable to place on record a deed of conveyance by which he has acquired title to real estate, by reason of illegal taxes being charged upon the land, may pay such taxes in order to secure the recording of his deed, without such payment being deemed voluntary. Therefore there was duress in this case. The last case cited disposes also of defendant's further contention that there could be no recovery unless the taxes were illegal. The general rule is that one paying under duress and with protest "money unlawfully demanded" may recover it again.
2. A further contention of the defendant, which was that, to entitle the plaintiff to recover, it must also appear that the plaintiff or its grantor pursued the ordinary remedies provided by the statute to be relieved from the payment of the so-called illegal tax, is without merit. Falvey v. Board of Co. Commrs. of Hennepin County, 76 Minn. 257, 79 N.W. 302, which he cites, does not support his proposition in this case. There the tax alleged to have been paid under duress, and which was paid under protest, was not yet delinquent. No proceedings to enforce its collection had been commenced. Much less had any judgment been rendered against the land. The court refused to permit the party seeking to recover to ignore the remedy given by statute to defend against illegal taxes paid with knowledge of all the facts and then to recover them by suit. There was, therefore, no compulsion or coercion and the character of the payment was not affected by his protest. In the case at bar the taxes had been delinquent, proceedings to enforce their collection had been commenced, judgment had been rendered, and a sale had been made, when they were paid.
The objection of the defendant is not addressed to the failure of the plaintiff to resort to mandamus, nor does this point seem to have been raised in the court below. While that fact would not prevent the present consideration of the question, we are not inclined to decide it, because, inter alia, of the considerations referred to in State v. Weld, 66 Minn. 219, 222, 68 N.W. 1068. That case involved a mandamus to compel the county auditor to indorse "Taxes paid and transfer entered" upon a deed. Judge Buck there said:
3. The essential question on the merits is accordingly presented for consideration. That question is this: Was the purchaser of a tax certificate under the revenue system provided for by chapter 11 of the General Statutes of 1878 and of the General Statutes of 1894 required to protect his interest thereunder as against taxes levied and assessed prior to the year in which the tax under the sale for which he claims title was levied and assessed? In other words, did a tax title based on an earlier sale under a later tax lien prevail over a later tax sale on an earlier lien?
On the one hand, the arguments for holding that tax certificate based on a later lien confers an interest not affected by a later sale on an earlier lien are many and cogent. A tax title is generally regarded as a definite grant from the...
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