Oakland County v. Oakland County Deputy Sheriff's Ass'n
| Decision Date | 03 February 2009 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 280075. |
| Citation | 765 N.W.2d 373,282 Mich. App. 266 |
| Parties | OAKLAND COUNTY v. OAKLAND COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S ASSOCIATION. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Before: JANSEN, P.J., and O'CONNELL and OWENS, JJ.
Charging party, the Oakland County Deputy Sheriff's Association (the union), appeals by right the decision and order of the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC), which dismissed in part the union's petition for binding arbitration under 1969 P.A. 312, MCL 423.231 et seq. (), and severed the union's existing bargaining unit into two units—one consisting of employees eligible for Act 312 arbitration and the other consisting of employees not eligible for Act 312 arbitration. We affirm.
The union represents a bargaining unit of approximately 750 uniformed employees of respondent Oakland County Sheriff's Department. In August 2006, the union filed an unfair-labor-practice charge against the Sheriff's Department and a petition seeking Act 312 compulsory arbitration for "all sworn sheriff's department employees below the rank of sergeant." Respondents, Oakland County and the Oakland County Sheriff's Department, moved to dismiss the petition for arbitration, alleging that several classes of employees were ineligible for Act 312 arbitration or to clarify the existing bargaining unit and declare certain groups of employees ineligible for arbitration.1 The MERC granted respondents' motion to dismiss in part and severed the union into two separate bargaining units—namely (1) a unit consisting of all employees eligible under Act 312, consisting of "all positions previously within the bargaining unit that are assigned to the Patrol Services Division (including the complex control [sic] assignments), or assigned to the Investigative and Forensic Services Division (excluding forensic laboratory specialists), and require [certification under the Commission on Law Enforcement Standards Act] or are assigned to positions as dispatchers" and (2) a unit consisting of "all positions previously within the bargaining unit that are assigned to the Corrections Division or to circuit court investigator or forensic laboratory specialist positions."
In Branch Co. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Int'l Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, 260 Mich.App. 189, 192-193, 677 N.W.2d 333 (2003), this Court set forth the standard that governs our review of MERC decisions:
We review MERC decisions pursuant to Const. 1963, art. 6, § 28, and MCL 423.216(e). MERC's findings of fact are conclusive if they are supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole. MERC's legal determinations may not be disturbed unless they violate a constitutional or statutory provision or they are based on a substantial and material error of law. In contrast to ... MERC's factual findings, its legal rulings are afforded a lesser degree of deference because review of legal questions remains de novo, even in MERC cases. [Citations and quotation marks omitted.]
The union argues that there was no legal or factual reason for the MERC to sever the bargaining unit for the benefit of the employer and that severance improperly served only to punish the union for filing the unfair labor practice charges. We disagree.
Although less deference is afforded an agency's legal conclusions, appellate courts traditionally have acknowledged "`the MERC's expertise and judgment in the area of labor relations.'" Port Huron Ed. Ass'n v. Port Huron Area School Dist., 452 Mich. 309, 323 n. 18, 550 N.W.2d 228 (1996) (citation omitted). Further, a determination of the appropriate bargaining unit "`is a finding of fact, not to be overturned ... if it is supported by competent, material and substantial evidence.'" Mich. Ed. Ass'n v. Alpena Community College, 457 Mich. 300, 307, 577 N.W.2d 457 (1998) (citation omitted); see also Police Officers Ass'n of Michigan v. Grosse Pointe Farms, 197 Mich.App. 730, 735, 496 N.W.2d 794 (1992).
As an initial matter, we find no error in the MERC's legal determination that an employer is permitted to seek severance of a mixed bargaining unit, even in the absence of a request by an employee. Although the MERC recognized the general policy against disturbing existing bargaining units and acknowledged that severance at the request of an employer had not previously been considered, it also noted that it had not been rejected either. In any event, the MERC is permitted to reexamine prior decisions, depart from precedents, promulgate law though rulemaking, break from past decisions, or reconsider previously established rules. Melvindale-Northern Allen Park Federation of Teachers, Local 1051 v. Melvindale-Northern Allen Park Pub. Schools (After Remand), 216 Mich.App. 31, 37-38, 549 N.W.2d 6 (1996). "If the departure from precedent is explained, appellate review is limited to whether the rationale is so unreasonable as to be arbitrary and capricious." Id. at 38, 549 N.W.2d 6.
As the MERC observed, an employer has the same statutory right to raise a representation issue as an employee or a labor organization acting on the employee's behalf. See MCL 423.212. The MERC also properly observed that Act 312 is intended to protect both employers and employees. The union did not identify below, and has not identified on appeal, any law prohibiting an employer from seeking severance of a mixed bargaining unit. Against this backdrop, the MERC concluded that there was
no basis under PERA or under Act 312 to hold that a covered employer may never seek severance of a mixed bargaining unit, where the circumstances make severance appropriate. It is the employer that is principally burdened by Act 312, by having its ordinary prerogatives truncated.... There is no logical basis for precluding an employer from seeking clarification of a unit's coverage by Act 312, where the statutory structure expressly allows that same employer to petition for arbitration under the Act in precisely the same fashion as a union may initiate proceedings.
Additionally, although the MERC acknowledged its past practice of avoiding severance of preexisting mixed units, it stated that this practice should not be inflexibly applied:
We must have always foremost in mind our obligation to "decide in each case, to insure public employees the full benefit of their right to self-organization, to collective bargaining and to otherwise effectuate the purposes of this act, the unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining" taking into account the need to define a unit which "will best secure to the employees their right of collective bargaining." MCL 423.213 and 423.9e. Here, we find that the existing mixed unit is not effectuating the purposes of the Act; to the contrary, the continued existence of this mixed unit has interfered in the normal and healthy give and take of bargaining anticipated under PERA and under Act 312.
The union has not shown that MERC's decision to sever its bargaining unit violated any constitutional or statutory provision or that the decision was based on a substantial and material error of law. Further, contrary to the union's argument, the MERC provided factual support for its conclusion that severance was appropriate under the circumstances of this case. As the MERC explained, the
parties' collective bargaining agreement expired in 2003. This has left the parties frozen in place, with no immediate mechanism for adjusting conditions of employment. By a significant margin, the majority of the existing bargaining unit are in job categories not covered by Act 312. The Act 312 arbitration petition seeks to have an arbitrator set conditions of employment for County road patrol officers and for over 400 employees who clearly function as jail guards. The bargaining process itself has been skewed by the inability of the parties to agree, or otherwise resolve, which groups of employees are covered by which dispute resolution mechanism. The intractable nature of the dispute between the parties was evidenced by the filing of an extraordinary number of unfair labor practice charges.
Severing the existing unit results in one Act 312 covered unit of nearly 350 employees and a non-Act 312 unit of over 400 employees. Both resulting units are large by comparison with other public employee bargaining units and would clearly be of sufficient size to effectively engage in collective bargaining with the Employer over issues peculiar to their respective unit members. The two separate units may continue to be represented by the Union, which will act separately on behalf of each unit. The Employer will be able to bargain separate agreements with the two units without having issues that should properly be limited to one group impinging on negotiations involving the other. Therefore, we find it appropriate to direct the severing of the existing unit in order to foster more productive bargaining and to thereby effectuate the purposes of the Act.
We find no support in the record for the union's assertion that the MERC punished it for filing unfair labor practice charges. Rather, the MERC observed that the parties had been operating without a collective bargaining agreement since 2003 and that the bargaining process had been hindered because of disagreement over the appropriate dispute resolution mechanism applicable to a majority of the employees. The MERC's severance decision was intended to foster more productive bargaining for all affected employees, all of whom would still be represented by the union. The MERC's decision was neither arbitrary nor...
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