Oakley v. State
| Decision Date | 17 January 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 5241,5241 |
| Citation | 54 Haw. 210,505 P.2d 1182 |
| Parties | George OAKLEY, by and through his Guardian, Patricia Oakley, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. STATE of Hawaii et al., Defendants, and County of Hawaii and Edward Harada, Appellees, and Edward Harada, Chief Engineer, County of Hawaii, Cross-Appellant. |
| Court | Hawaii Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The basic purpose of the statutory requirement of filing a written notice of claim in the time specified is to inform the municipal authorities of the circumstances surrounding the injury in order that they may protect their interests by conducting their own investigation.
2. A written notice of claim, timely filed but defective in form, may be sufficient, if under all the circumstances of the case, the defect has not misled municipal officials to their prejudice.
3. Once a claim of prejudice is made due to an alleged defective notice of claim, the burden is on the claimant to show that the municipality was not prejudiced by such notice of claim.
Robert B. Ingram, San Francisco, Cal. (Belli, Ashe, Ellison, Choulos & Lieff, San Francisco, Cal., of counsel; C. Duane Carlsmith, Hilo, and Vasilios B. Choulos, San Francisco, Cal., on the briefs), for plaintiff-appellant, cross-appellee.
George S. Yuda, special counsel, Hilo, (Clifford H. F. Lum, Acting Corp. Counsel, Hilo, of counsel), for defendants-appellees and defendant, cross-appellant.
Before RICHARDSON, C. J., and MARUMOTO, ABE, LEVINSON and KOBAYASHI, JJ.
George Oakley, by and through his Guardian, Patricia Oakley (hereinafter called appellant), filed a complaint against Edward Harada, Chief Engineer, County of Hawaii (hereinafter called cross-appellant), County of Hawaii (hereinafter called appellee), and others, alleging that cross-appellant, appellee, et al., negligently designed, maintained and inspected the couny roadways, resulting in serious injuries to appellant, and sought damages therefor.
The appellee and cross-appellant in their answers to the complaint raised, inter alia, the following defense: that appellant's notice of claim required under HRS § 46-72 and County of Hawaii Charter Sec. 13-18 is insufficient and defective, and moved for a summary judgment.
The appellee and cross-appellant relied strictly on the opinion expressed by this court in Rogers v. City an County, 32 Haw. 722 (1933).
The trial court in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment stated orally prior to the issuance of a written judgment that the court would not abide strictly by the holding in Rogers but would determine whether appellant had sufficiently complied with the requirements of HRS § 46-72. The court concluded that actually there was non-compliance on the part of appellant relative to the requirements of said § 46-72.
The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment requested by cross-appellant.
Appellant requested and was granted the opportunity to file an interlocutory appeal from the order granting dismissal of complaint and summary judgment to appellee.
Cross-appellant was also permitted to appeal from the trial court's denial of cross-appellant's motion for summary judgment.
Prior to the commencement of this action, on or about May 9, 1969, appellant presented to appellee a notice of claim for damages, stating, to-wit:
Pursuant to Section 46-72 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes, notice is hereby given within the six-month period of the personal injury suffered on November 11, 1968 by George Oakley, M. D., on the streets and highways of the County of Hawaii, and by his wife and by his five children. Dr. Oakley was lawfully and carefully operating his motor vehicle upon the County highway; due to the negligent failure of the County to properly construct or have constructed the road and shoulders thereof, and in accepting said highway as complete, and the negligent failure of the County to maintain a safe highway, Dr. Oakley's car went out of control and flipped over a number of times.
The injuries suffered by the doctor as a result of his accident in addition to the pain and suffering, including a severe injury to the brain which will effectively keep him from practicing as a doctor in the future, may well preclude him from practicing any other profession, skill, occupation or calling of a gainful sort. In addition, his coordination has been seriously affected and he has suffered injuries to his skull, spine and shoulders and other areas presently unascertainable. The injuries to Dr. Oakley include the estimated cost of his medical care which is presently believed to be $300,000.00 but which may be more; loss of income which we believe will be in excess of $1,200,000.00; pain, mental suffering and anguish and other damages in the amount of $250,000.00.
In addition, the Oakley children have been deprived of a father and their damages collectively are believed to be in the amount of $200,000.00. Lastly, Mrs. Oakley has been substantially deprived of a husband and whose injuries are believed to be $250,000.00. We hereby make claim upon the County of these amounts.
The claim of appellant was denied by appellee and thereafter appellant instituted this proceeding.
In Rogers, § 1833, R.L.H. 1925, was in issue. Said § 1833 provided as follows:
Sec. 1833. Notice of injuries. Before the city and county shall be liable for damages to any person for injuries to person or property received upon any of the streets, avenues, alleys, side-walks or other public places of the city and county, or on account of any negligence of any official or employee of such city and county, the person so injured, or the owner or person entitled to the possession, occupation or use of the property so injured, or someone in his behalf, shall, within six months after receiving such injuries, give the mayor notice in writing of such injuries, and the specific damages resulting, stating fully in such notice, when, where and how the injuries occurred, the extent thereof and the amount claimed therefor.
HRS § 46-72 provides as follows:
§ 46-72 Liability for damages; notice of injuries. Before the county shall be liable for damages to any person for injuries to person or property received upon any of the streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, or other public places of the county, or on account of any negligence of any official or employee of the county, the person so injured, or the owner or person entitled to the possession, occupation, or use of the property so injured, or someone in his behalf, shall, within six months after the injuries are received, give the chairman of the board of supervisors or the city clerk of Honolulu notice in writing of the injuries and the specific damages resulting, stating Section 13-18 of the Hawaii County Charter states, to-wit:
fully in the notice when, where, and how the injuries occurred, the extent thereof, and the amount claimed therefor.
Section 13-18. Claims. No action shall be maintained for the recovery of damages for any injury to persons or property by reason of negligence or other act of any official or employee of the county unless a written statement stating fully when, where and how the injuries occurred, the apparent extent thereof and the tentative amount claimed therefor shall have been filed with the county clerk within six months after the date the injury was sustained.
The provisions of § 1833, R.L.H. 1925, and HRS § 46-72 do not differ in any important detail. Both sections are general provisions relating to counties and both have similar provisions stating that before a county (as in HRS § 46-72) or city and county (as in § 1833, R.L.H. 1925) shall be liable for damages a notice in writing must be filed with the chairman of the board of supervisors or the city clerk of Honolulu (as in HRS § 46-72) or filed with the mayor (as in § 1833, R.L.H. 1925).
The provisions of § 13-18 of the Hawaii County Charter do not differ in any important substantive degree from the provisions of HRS § 46-72. Said § 13-18 provides, however, that 'no action shall be maintained for the recovery of' rather than 'before the county shall be liable' as in HRS § 46-72.
By Act 235, S.L.H. 1967, the state legislature empowered the various counties to formulate, publish and submit to the electors for approval a proposal for a county charter. The legislature in said Act 235 specifically provided as follows: 'Upon adoption, the charter shall become the organic law of the county and shall supersede any existing charter and all laws affecting the organization and government of the county which are in conflict therewith.'
The Charter of the County of Hawaii became effective January 2, 1969.
Thus, whatever opinions expressed by this court in this opinion are applicable to the provisions of both HRS § 46-72 and § 13-18 of the Hawaii County Charter.
The basic issue to be resolved herein is whether HRS § 46-72 is to be strictly and technically construed as in Rogers.
In Rogers this court, in construing § 1833, R.L.H. 1925, held at pages 724 to 727:
It will be observed that one of the requirements of this section is that in the written notice to be given to the mayor the claimant shall state 'fully' where the injuries occurred, that is, that the claimant shall describe 'fully' the place of the accident. It is not even a substantial compliance with this requirement to merely say, as is said in the plaintiff's letter of February 6, 1931, that the accident occurred 'on North King Street.' North King Street, it is well known in this community, is over two miles in length. . . . Assuming, that which is not entirely clear, that the letter of the county attorney . . . could be held to constitute a waiver of any other or further description of the place of the accident, we are of the opinion that in such a case as this there can be no waiver. . . . In none of them (statutes in other jurisdictions) have we found a statement in...
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