Oaks v. People

• Decision Date: 23 April 1962
• Docket Number: No. 19992,19992
• Citation: 371 P.2d 443
• Parties: Carl Robert OAKS, Plaintiff in Error, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Defendant in Error.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 443

371 P.2d 443

150 Colo. 64

Carl Robert OAKS, Plaintiff in Error, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Defendant in Error.

No. 19992.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

April 23, 1962.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing May 28, 1962.

Carl Robert Oaks, pro se.

Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., F. J. Brauer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for defendant in error.

FRANTZ, Justice.

Should this court reverse a judgment and sentence in a criminal case where the guilt of the defendant is indicated but the record reveals the commission of serious, prejudicial errors in the conduct of the trial? Such is the dilemma confronting the court in this review by writ of error.

Immediately the question is put, the answer comes to mind: all that need be done is for the court to weigh the rights and interests of society as against those of the accused as it performs its function of administering justice, and as thus equated, Oaks' guilt being suggested by the record, his rights and interests must give way. But such answer does not bear up under a searching inquiry. The quick and facile answer is not the solution here.

The good of society is not necessarily tied up with the easy solution of a single case. That which might be gained in the disposition of a single case may constitute at once an ill blow to society, where it represents a departure from established concepts of criminal law. Other breaches of tried and tested rules of criminal law might be foreshadowed or compelled by such a departure.

To develop an exception in this case to the rule that the commission of substantial, prejudicial error in the trial of a cause gives ground for reversal would be most dangerous, and productive, in the march of time, of much mischief. After all, society is nothing more than individuals as they collectively comprise the community or the public. It follows that divestiture of the rights of the individual is in some measure a deprivation of the rights of society.

An exception, to extend only to this case or to similar cases, would also be evil innovation. The law's proud boast is that it has discountenanced the double standard and that the double standard is antithetical to the concept of a fair trial. We do not apply a different standard in the review of a trial of a defendant whose guilt is more obvious from that used for another whose guilt is less obvious, even though the same grave errors, prejudicial to both defendants, were committed in the course of their separate trials. If the substantial rights of the accused are not respected and safeguarded in this case, is not society the loser? For it is an essential part of justice that the question of guilt or innocence shall be determined in accordance with a process that respects and secures the substantial rights of an accused.

Errors in the course of a trial may be technical or substantial. This court has held that technical errors generally afford no grounds for reversal of a judgment where the guilt of the defendant has been clearly proven. May v. People, 77 Colo. 432, 236 P. 1022; cf. Phenneger v. People, 85 Colo. 442, 276 P. 983; Balfe v. People, 66 Colo. 94, 179 P. 137. But even technical errors may in some circumstances form the bases for reversal.

If technical errors result in 'prejudice to the substantial rights of the defendant,' this court will reverse. Cliff v. People, 84 Colo. 254, 269 P. 907. And, numerous formal irregularities, each of which in itself might be deemed harmless, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial, in which event a reversal would be required. Penney v. People, 146 Colo. 95, 360 P.2d 671. Moreover, technical errors may have a significance requiring a reversal in a close case. People v. Van Cleave, 208 Cal. 295, 280 P. 983.

Commission of substantial error has universally given cause for reversal. The unanimity of decision, that 'a judgment must be reversed for an error, defect, or omission which is not technical but which denies or affects the substantial rights of accused,' becomes evident from the hundreds of cases cited to support the quotation appearing in 17 C.J. 369, § 3751, 24B C.J.S. § 1948, p. 339. We would depart from traditional criminal trial concepts should we adopt a doctrine that such rule would be disregarded where the evidence contains an intimation of the guilt of the defendant.

The Machiavellian doctrine--that the end justifies the means--is stranger to, and wholly uncongenial with, our constitutional and common-law concepts. A wrong means to achieve a deserved result finds no sanction in our law; only a right means effecting a proper end finds justification in law. These are fundamental precepts which we reaffirm. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081.

The precise question stated at the beginning of this opinion has not been answered by this court, but that a negative answer to it would be disserving is definitely indicated in Graves v. People, 18 Colo. 170, 32 P. 63. Here is language from the opinion which is monitor to the court's conscience in the consideration of the present case:

'In all criminal prosecutions the law of the land guarantees to every accused person a fair trial, and a right to meet the witnesses against him face to face. This plaintiff in error has not had such a trial. Suspicions and statements of the deceased not even having the sanction of her oath were put in evidence against him by third parties, in violation of fundamental principles. Take away any one of these guarantees, and a precedent would be established which, if followed to its legitimate end, would lead to arbitrary punishment, which is inconsistent with our institutions, and utterly incompatible with the safety of the citizen.

'It is conceded that not every error occurring upon a trial will warrant a reversal. If it be shown that a substantial compliance with the law has been had, even a capital sentence may be allowed to stand; but in this case the jury were allowed to consider evidence, on the one hand of a character that has been universally condemned as improper,--evidence violative of fundamental and long-established principles; while on the other, evidence was excluded which the defendant had an undoubted right to have considered. The error in this regard being aggravated by error in the charge to the jury, prejudicial to the rights of the accused, the duty of this court to set aside the conviction is plain.'

Equally important is the right to trial by jury guaranteed by Article II, Section 23 of the Constitution of Colorado: 'The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate in criminal cases * * *.' This right contemplates a fair and impartial jury to hear the case; such is the mandate of Article II, Section 16 of the Constitution: 'That 'In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to * * * a * * * trial by an impartial jury * * *.'' Wharton v. People, 104 Colo. 260, 90 P.2d 615. A jury is no longer impartial which has been misled by inadmissible evidence. State v. Robinson, 24 Wash.2d 909, 167 P.2d 986; Jones v. State, 88 Okl.Cr. 243, 202 P.2d 228.

Among the rights guaranteed to the people of this state, none is more sacred than that of trial by jury. Such right comprehends a fair verdict, free from the influence or poison of evidence which should never have been admitted, and the admission of which arouses passions and prejudices which tend to destroy the fairness and impartiality of the jury. This right to a fair and impartial jury 'is all-inclusive; it embraces every class and type of person. Those for whom we have contempt or even hatred are equally entitled to its benefit. It will be a sad day for our system of government if the time should come when any person, whoever he may be, is deprived of this fundamental safeguard.' United States v. Haupt, 7 Cir., 136 F.2d 661.

Viewing in retrospect, as we do (an advantage which the trial court does not have), we have before us a case in which there is competent evidence to sustain the guilt of the accused, but in which inadmissible evidence was received. But as he stands before the trial tribunal, the accused is not rightless, and he is armored with the presumption of innocence. He has rights derived from the Constitution, from statutes and from the common law. These rights must be respected and protected in the trial process, since they are the very essence of a fair criminal trial. Whether these rights were respected and safeguarded by the trial court is for us to determine. If they were not, regardless of our conviction of his guilt, we must reverse.

What we may think concerning the defendant's guilt is not the criterion by which we are guided in the disposition of a criminal case on review. Our function is not to hold which of contradictory facts are determinative, nor to draw inferences from facts permitting more than one inference; these are prerogatives of a jury. As related to this case, we must determine whether the jury considered inadmissible evidence, the reception of which may have influenced the jury as the fact-finder and may have been decisive in the rendition of the verdict.

The right to a fair trial does not depend upon the degree of culpability disclosed by the evidence. An accused whose guilt is evident should be tried by the same norms as one whose guilt is not so evident. Indeed, the idea of an unfair trial for the first and a fair trial for the latter is unthinkable and completely out of harmony with judicial process as it is known and practiced in this country.

Firmly embedded in both federal and state due process is the fair trial concept in criminal cases. Antithetical to constitutional due process is the subjection of an accused to an unfair trial. The guilt of the accused in no way lessens our duty to see that due process is afforded him in the course of his prosecution. Lisenba v. People, 314 U.S. 219, 62 S.Ct. 280, 86 L.Ed. 166; Wharton v. People, s...