Ober v. National Cas. Co.
Decision Date | 05 March 1945 |
Citation | 60 N.E.2d 90,318 Mass. 27 |
Parties | MARY F. OBER, administratrix, v. NATIONAL CASUALTY COMPANY. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
February 5, 1945.
Present: FIELD, C.
J., LUMMUS, QUA DOLAN, & SPALDING, JJ.
Theatre. Club.
Insurance Construction of policy, Accident insurance. Contract Construction. Practice, Civil, Question of law or fact. Words, "Theatre.
"
Upon the hearing of a motion by the defendant for a directed verdict, presented at the close of the plaintiff's opening at the trial of an action upon an unambiguous policy of insurance, where by agreement of the parties the policy was "admitted in evidence" and there was no dispute as to the facts which should be applied to the terms of the policy, the interpretation of the policy in the light of those facts was a question of law for the judge.
There was nothing ambiguous or uncertain about the word "theatre" as used in a policy of insurance providing for a payment in case of loss of life
"by the burning of any church, theatre, library, school or municipal administration building"; it was to be construed in its ordinary sense of a building especially adapted to dramatic, operatic or spectacular representations, and did not include a restaurant or night club.
An establishment in Boston, operating under a victualler's license authorizing the sale of food, a license permitting it to serve alcoholic liquor and a license referred to as an entertainment license, exacting no admission charge, and furnishing entertainment by "shows" as an incident to its main business of serving food and other refreshments, was a restaurant or so called night club, and not a theatre.
CONTRACT. Writ in the Superior Court dated December 21, 1942. The case was tried before Morton, J. The record states:
D. A. Lynch, for the plaintiff. H. Loewenberg, for the defendant.
This is an action of contract upon an insurance policy issued by the defendant to recover for the death of the plaintiff's intestate, Douglass J. Ober. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's opening the defendant moved for a directed verdict. Thereupon the policy of insurance was admitted in evidence, and the judge directed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff duly excepted to that action.
The terms of the policy provide, so far as here material, for the payment of $2,000 in case of loss of life by "the burning of any church, theatre, library, school or municipal administration building in which the insured shall be at the beginning of such fire, and is burned by such fire or suffocated by the smoke therefrom." In her opening the plaintiff offered to prove that the intestate died as a result of while a patron of Cocoanut Grove [1] on November 28, 1942. The sole issue for determination is whether Cocoanut Grove was a theatre within the meaning of the policy of insurance, and whether that question should have been submitted to the jury. Statements of expected proof in the plaintiff's opening were in substance as follows: Cocoanut Grove operated under three licenses issued by the Boston licensing board, (1) a victualler's license authorizing the sale of food, (2) a license permitting it to serve liquor, and (3) a license referred to by the board as an entertainment license. The application for the entertainment license described the stage and the character of entertainment as "All types of entertainment, dancing, singing, music." Under the titles "Where to dine" and "Night Spots" Cocoanut Grove advertised "practically daily" in Boston newspapers The basis of the show was "a line of girls" who appeared on the stage four or five times in different costumes and went through various routines. A band leader acted as master of ceremonies. A tenor sang nightly at all the shows. At various times certain actors and actresses and parts of theatrical casts appeared in the shows. On November 26, 1942, two days before the fire, Cocoanut Grove advertised "Cocoanut Grove guest stars and an all star floor show." In her opening the plaintiff described the physical arrangement of Cocoanut Grove, reading the description thereof set forth in Commonwealth v Welansky, 316 Mass. 383 , 387-389, from which it appears that the main dining room with an area of three thousand seven hundred sixty-five square feet contained a...
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Ober v. Nat'l Casulty Co.
...318 Mass. 2760 N.E.2d 90OBERv.NATIONAL CASULTY CO.Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.March 5, 1945 ... Exceptions from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Morton, ... ...