Oberlander v. Fulop

Docket NumberIndex No. 521908/20,Mot. Seq. Nos. 02,03,04
Decision Date08 July 2022
PartiesIn the Matter of the Application of YECHIEL OBERLANDER a/k/a YECHIEL MICHEL OBERLANDER and KEREM MANAGEMENT CORP. a/k/a KEREM MANAGEMENT a/k/a MANAGEMENT, Petitioners. v. YIDEL FULOP a/k/a YIDA FULOP and MIRIAM FULOP, Respondents, For an Order Pursuant to Article 75 of the CPLR Confirming an Arbitration Award,
CourtNew York Supreme Court

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2022 NY Slip Op 32664(U)

In the Matter of the Application of YECHIEL OBERLANDER a/k/a YECHIEL MICHEL OBERLANDER and KEREM MANAGEMENT CORP. a/k/a KEREM MANAGEMENT a/k/a MANAGEMENT, Petitioners.

For an Order Pursuant to Article 75 of the CPLR Confirming an Arbitration Award,
v.

YIDEL FULOP a/k/a YIDA FULOP and MIRIAM FULOP, Respondents,

Index No. 521908/20, Mot. Seq. Nos. 02, 03, 04

Supreme Court, Kings County

July 8, 2022


Unpublished Opinion

Motion Date: 4-11-22

DECISION/ORDER

PETER P. SWEENEY, J.S.C.

Upon the following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF as item numbers 24-53, 58-75, 77-83, these motion are decided as follows:

In Motion Seq. #2, the respondents move for an Order (i) vacating the Court's Decision/Order, dated April 19, 2021, pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a)(1) and, upon such vacatur, (ii) vacating the Beis Din award at issue in this case, under CPLR 7511 (b)(iii), and for such other and further relief that this Court may grant.

In Motion Seq. #3, the petitioners cross-move for an Order: (1) denying Respondents' motion in its entirety; and (2) vacating Respondents' hardship declarations and/or setting the matter down for a hearing to determine whether to invalidate the declarations, pursuant to Chapter 417, Laws of 2021, Part C, Subpart A, §§ 9-10; and (3) upon the hearing being held, invalidating the declarations and permitting Petitioners to obtain Respondent's previously submitted proposed judgment and writ of assistance.

In Mot. Seq. No. 4, the petitioners moved by Order to Show for an Order (1) invalidating the hardship declaration(s) filed by Respondent pursuant to Chapter 417, laws of 2021, Part C,

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Subpart A, §9 (the "Eviction Restriction Law"), or, in the alterative (2) pursuant to Eviction Restriction Law §10, setting the matter down for a hearing on whether to Invalidate Respondents' claims of hardship; an (3). Pursuant to CPLR § 408, granting Petitioners leave of court to conduct and receive discovery on Respondents' claims of hardship, so such discovery is complete prior to date of such hearing.

The three motions are consolidated for disposition.

Background:

The parties agreed to arbitrate a landlord-tenant dispute involving residential tenancy before a Beis Din. The dispute proceeded to arbitration and the Beis Din issued an award in petitioners' favor. Petitioners thereafter moved to confirm the award and to enter judgment based on the award and by order dated April 19, 2021, the motion was granted on default. A monetary judgment was entered against the respondents in the amount of $25,575.00 for past due rent and use and occupancy through November 30, 2020. Petitioners' claim for rent and/or use and occupancy that has accrued after November 30, 2020, was dismissed, without prejudice, with leave granted to the petitioner to commence an action to recover these amounts in a court of competent jurisdiction. The Court also entered a judgment of ejectment against the respondents and directed the petitioners to submit for signature a writ of assistance within 30 days.

Respondents now move to vacate their default in failing to oppose petitioners' motion to confirm the arbitration award. To prevail on a motion to vacate their default, the respondents were required to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for their default and a potentially meritorious defense (see Chowdhury v Weldon, 185 A.D.3d 649, 649 [2d Dept 2020]; Jian Hua Tan v AB Capstone Dev., LLC, 163 A.D.3d 937, 937-938 [2d Dept 2018]; Ashley v Ashley, 139 A.D.3d 650, 651 [2d Dept 2016]; Lambert v Schreiber, 69 A.D.3d 904, 905 [2d Dept 2010]). 'The determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse generally lies within the sound discretion of the trial court" (Man Hua Tan, 163 A.D.3d at 938; Herrera v MTA Bus Co., 100 A.D.3d 962, 963 [2d Dept 2012]). "At the same time, mere neglect is not a reasonable excuse" (Chowdhury, 185 A.D.3d at 649 [internal quotation marks omitted]; OneWest Bank, FSB v Singer, 153 A.D.3d 714, 716 [2d Dept. 2017]). Conclusory and non-specific allegations do not suffice (see OneWest Bank, 153 A.D.3dat716).

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Here, the respondents' conclusory and unsupported allegation set forth in their affidavits did not constitute a reasonable excuse for their default in failing to...

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