Obermeyer v. Gilliland
Decision Date | 06 January 1995 |
Docket Number | No. 94-3123.,94-3123. |
Citation | 873 F. Supp. 153 |
Parties | Wanda OBERMEYER and James Obermeyer, Plaintiffs, v. Philip GILLILAND, H.B. Enterprises Inc., d/b/a Lee's Wrecker Service, and Robert Read, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Jay H. Janssen, Joseph L. Frank, Peoria, IL, for plaintiffs.
James J. Manning, Jeanne L. Wysocki, Peoria, IL, for defendants.
Traffic accident in Michigan.
Interstate truck driver from Michigan routinely hauls to and from Illinois.
Does this Court in Illinois have personal jurisdiction over him?
No.
On July 22, 1992, Wanda Obermeyer, an Illinois resident, had car problems on Interstate I-96 near South Haven, Michigan. As a result of the problems, she was forced to call a tow truck. The responding tow truck was driven by Philip Gilliland. The tow truck was owned by Lees's Wrecker Service. Upon arrival at the scene, Mr. Gilliland attached Ms. Obermeyer's vehicle to the tow truck and with Ms. Obermeyer as a passenger began driving south on I-96. At the same time, Robert Read, a Michigan resident, was driving a semi-trailer southbound on I-96.
Mr. and Mrs. Obermeyer allege that the semi-trailer ran into the rear of the tow truck and injured Mrs. Obermeyer. They contend Mr. Read's negligence was the proximate cause of Mrs. Obermeyer's injuries. (Mr. Obermeyer seeks recovery for loss of consortium.).
The semi-trailer was owned by a Michigan resident, Donald P. Loew. Mr. Loew, however, leased the truck to Ro Mar Transportation Systems, Inc. (hereinafter Ro Mar), an Illinois corporation. Robert Read drove the truck on a route between Grand Rapids, Michigan and Chicago, Illinois. He was paid by Mr. Loew but took directions from the Ro Mar Grand Rapids terminal. The only route driven by Mr. Read was between Grand Rapids and Chicago. It is not clear, however, how many times Mr. Read made the trip from 1990, when he started working for Mr. Loew, to the date of the accident, July 22, 1992.
Defendant Read contends that the Complaint should be dismissed because this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over him, because venue is improper, and because the Complaint fails to state a cause of action under Michigan law.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court Gomez v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030, 1039 (7th Cir.1987). Although a complaint is not required to contain a detailed outline of the claim's basis, it nevertheless "must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory." Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1054, 105 S.Ct. 1758, 84 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985).
When the motion to dismiss is based on lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the court has jurisdiction over each defendant. Nelson v. Park Indus., Inc., 717 F.2d 1120 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1024, 104 S.Ct. 1277, 79 L.Ed.2d 682 (1984). Plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing to avoid dismissal. Id. at 1123. A motion to dismiss will not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any facts that will entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).
In deciding a Motion to dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction in a diversity case, a federal district court looks to the law of the state in which it sits. Dehmlow v. Austin Fireworks, Inc., 963 F.2d 941, 945 (7th Cir.1992). If personal jurisdiction is found under Illinois law, the next step is to determine whether asserting jurisdiction is a violation of due process. Burnham v. Super. Ct. of California, County of Marin, 495 U.S. 604, 110 S.Ct. 2105, 109 L.Ed.2d 631 (1990).
The Illinois Long-arm statute, 735 ILCS 5/2-209, however, was amended in 1989 to make Illinois law coextensive with minimum due process requirements. Brandt Consol. Inc. v. Agrimar Corp., 801 F.Supp. 164, 168-169 (C.D.Ill.1992). Thus, analysis can be limited to whether asserting jurisdiction over Mr. Read satisfies due process requirements under the Illinois and United States Constitutions.1 Pilipauskas v. Yakel, 258 Ill.App.3d 47, 629 N.E.2d 733, 739, 196 Ill.Dec. 188, 194 (1st Dist.), appeal denied, 156 Ill.2d 566, 638 N.E.2d 1124, 202 Ill.Dec. 930 (1994).
As noted by Judge Tinder of the Southern District of Indiana, "the search for the outer limits of what due process permits may be singular, but it is not simple." Simpson v. Quality Oil Co., 723 F.Supp. 382, 386 (S.D.Ind.1989). Kulko v. California Super. Ct., 436 U.S. 84, 92, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 1696, 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978). (quoting Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 545, 68 S.Ct. 1213, 1216, 92 L.Ed. 1561 (1948)).
According to the Supreme Court, due process requires that a nonresident defendant have "minimum contacts with the forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 342, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940)).
Minimum contacts have been defined as "some act by which the defendant purposely avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1240, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958). The due process clause enables "potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 567, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980).
Whether it is reasonable to require a defendant to defend a suit is determined by examining the relationship between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977). However, "the sufficiency of minimum contacts cannot be determined by any set formula or rule of thumb, but `must rest on a consideration of what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of each particular case.'" Deluxe Ice Cream Co. v. R.C.H. Tool Corp., 726 F.2d 1209, 1213 (7th Cir.1984) (quoting Telco Leasing, Inc. v. Marshall County Hosp., 586 F.2d 49, 50 (7th Cir.1978)). See Kulko v. California Super. Ct., 436 U.S. 84, 92, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 1696, 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978).
Because there are two kinds of personal jurisdiction — specific and general — whether Robert Read's contacts with Illinois justify hauling him before this Court depends on two separate tests. In order for specific jurisdiction to apply, the controversy must arise from or be related to the defendant's contacts with the forum state.2Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 1872, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984). Conversely, general jurisdiction applies when the underlying cause of action does not arise from the defendant's contacts but the defendant has "continuous and systematic" contacts with the forum. Id. at 416, 104 S.Ct. at 1872.
According to his affidavit, Robert Read began driving the truck leased to Ro Mar in 1990 and his regular duty involved driving between Grand Rapids and Chicago. At the time of the accident, Mr. Read was enroute to Chicago. The record, however, does not state exactly how often Mr. Read made the trip between 1990 and the date of the accident, July 22, 1992, or if he continues to make the trip. Mr. Read was paid by Mr. Loew but apparently always drove on behalf of Ro Mar. Robert Read did not pay Illinois taxes nor have an Illinois drivers license.
Regardless of the terminology of the test — "arose out of," "related to," or "substantive relevance," whether there was a sufficient nexus between Robert Read's contacts with Illinois and the accident is a close question. Most courts, however, in deciding cases involving truck drivers or others travelling on business to or from a forum state who are involved in accidents outside the forum state have held that there is not a sufficient nexus between the drive to or from the forum state and the controversy. Saylor v. Dyniewski, 836 F.2d 341 (7th Cir.1988) ( ); Amos v. Pendry, 810 F.Supp. 146 (M.D.Pa.1992) ( ); Simpson v. Quality Oil Co., 723 F.Supp. 382 (S.D.Ind.1989) ( ); Whitaker v. Krestmark of Alabama, Inc., 157 Ga.App. 536, 278 S.E.2d 116 (1981) ( ); Volkswagen Insurance Co. v. Whittington, 58 Ill.App.3d 621, 374 N.E.2d 954, 16 Ill.Dec. 179 (1st Dist.1978) ( ). See 2 ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL...
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