Obion County v. McKinnis

Decision Date07 December 1962
PartiesCOUNTY OF OBION and Earl Thorpe, Trustee of Obion County, Tennessee v. D. W. McKINNIS, Jr. 15 McCanless 183, 211 Tenn. 183, 364 S.W.2d 356
CourtTennessee Supreme Court

Paul Hudgins, C. W. Miles, III, Union City, for plaintiffs in error.

Heathcock, Elam & Cloys, Union City, for defendant in error.

PER CURIAM.

This is a suit by D. W. McKinnis, Jr., against Obion County, seeking to recover certain money as salary and ex officio services for his service as County Judge of said County.

The office of County Judge of this County was created by Chapter 136, Private Acts of 1891. This Act provided a salary of $1,000.00 per annum. By Chapter 234 of the Private Acts of 1945, and Chapter 312 of the Private Acts of 1947, a purchasing agent was created with a salary of $2,000.00 per annum. By Chapter 235 Private Acts of 1945, and Chapter 313 Private Acts of 1947, the position of Director of Budgets of the County was created with a salary of $2,000.00 per annum. Both of said positions were to be filled by the County Judge of said County, making in all the sum of $5,000.00 per annum as compensation to the County Judge.

Then by the County Judge Minimum Salary Bill, Chapter 172 of the Public Acts of 1957, codified Sections 8-2414-8-2416 of T.C.A., he was to receive, according to the classification therein, based on a population basis, the sum of $6,500.00 per annum for his services.

The Circuit Judge was of the opinion that the Minimum Salary Act did not repeal the two Acts above referred to providing for $2,000.00 per annum to the County Judge for his services as purchasing agent, and $2,000.00 for his services as Budget Director, and entered a judgment to this effect in favor of the County Judge.

The County has appealed in error here. So the only question we have presented is whether the petitioner below is entitled to the $4,000.00 per annum in addition to the $6,500.00 per annum provided by the Minimum Salary Law.

It is to be observed that the petitioner was the budget officer of said County, and it is inconceivable that he failed to put in the $2,000.00 provided for by the Private Act, and the $2,000.00 provided for him as purchasing agent if he did not feel the $6,500.00 a year minimum salary under the Acts of 1957 repealed these two Private Acts. In other words, the petitioner was drawing $1,000.00 a year as provided by the Acts of 1891, $2,000.00 as provided by the Private Acts...

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16 cases
  • Faust v. Metropolitan Government
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • 3 d3 Maio d3 2006
    ...he had, or was chargeable with, full knowledge of the facts, and another will be prejudiced by this action." Obion County v. McKinnis, 211 Tenn. 183, 364 S.W.2d 356, 357 (1962); see also Layhew v. Dixon, 527 S.W.2d 739, 741 (Tenn.1975); Werne v. Sanderson, 954 S.W.2d 742, 745 Marcus v. Marc......
  • State v. Banks
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • 7 d5 Novembro d5 2008
    ...because of the doctrine of judicial estoppel. See Marcus v. Marcus, 993 S.W.2d 596, 602 (Tenn.1999) (quoting Obion County v. McKinnis, 211 Tenn. 183, 186, 364 S.W.2d 356, 357 (1962)) (holding that "a party will not be permitted to occupy inconsistent positions or to take a position in regar......
  • Jackson v. Travelers Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee
    • 13 d4 Novembro d4 1975
    ...are contrary to those the party first propounded. Duke v. Hopper, Tenn. App., 486 S.W.2d 744, 748 (1972); Obion County v. McKinnis, 211 Tenn. 183, 364 S.W.2d 356, 357 (1963). However, before a party can claim an estoppel, there must be on the part of the claiming party: (a) lack of knowledg......
  • Boyce v. LPP Mortg. Ltd., W2012-02725-COA-R3-CV
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • 20 d3 Novembro d3 2013
    ...by this action.Regions Financial Corp. v. Marsh USA, Inc., 310 S.W.3d 382, 402 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Obion County v. McKinnis, 211 Tenn. 183, 364 S.W.2d 356, 357 (1962)). The Tennessee Supreme Court has explained the doctrine of judicial estoppel this way:The distinctive feature of ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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